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Abstract
Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian
of some note; but though recent scholarship has revived an interest in much of his
work, little attention has been paid to an early treatise he wrote on the topic of
future contingents, entitled De futuris contingentibus. In this thesis I aim to address
this deficit, arguing in particular that the treatise makes original use of the divine
power distinction to resolve the apparent conflict between God’s foreknowledge on
the one hand, and human free will on the other. Bradwardine argues that God’s
foreknowledge operates in accord with God’s ordained power, and so relative to
God’s ordained power, our actions are indeed compelled; however, because of
Bradwardine’s appeal to the distinction in power, he is able to maintain that our
actions remain free relative to God’s absolute power, and are thus free, absolutely
speaking. This solution is, I argue, unique to Bradwardine, although it seems to be
abandoned in his later writing.
Bradwardine’s approach to the problem is heavily influenced by three figures
in particular — Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and John Duns Scotus — each of
whose solutions I discuss in some detail. Furthermore, Bradwardine explicitly
places his own solution in opposition to that of William Ockham, and so I give
substantial attention to examining Ockham’s position. But while I agree with
Bradwardine’s assessment that Ockham’s position undermines God’s
foreknowledge in ways that should be untenable to someone of 14th-century
Christian commitments, I argue that Bradwardine’s solution amounts to an equally
untenable determinism.
An appendix contains excerpts from my own English translation of the De
futuris contingentibus (the first into any modern language), in parallel with the
original Latin.

Keywords: Thomas Bradwardine, William Ockham, free will, divine foreknowledge,
medieval philosophy, future contingents, divine power distinction, ordained power,
absolute power, Boethius, Anselm, John Duns Scotus, history of philosophy.
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But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren,
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn,
Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn,
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng, "Nedely" clepe I symple necessitee;
Or elles, if free choys be graunted me
To do that same thyng, or do it noght,
Though God forwoot it, er that I was wroght;
Or if his wityng streyneth never a deel
But by necessitee condicioneel.
I wol nat han to do of swich mateere;
My tale is of a Cok, as ye may heere. . .
Geoffrey Chaucer
“The Nun’s Priest’s Tale,” lines 474 - 86
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Introduction

Bradwardine's context
Thomas Bradwardine was probably born in the last decade or so of the 13th
century, somewhere in Sussex — most likely in the diocese of Chichester.1 Though
little is known about his exact provenance or year of birth, he rose to such
prominence in adulthood that we know with a great deal of certainty the exact date
of his untimely death: 26 August 1349. He was thus a direct contemporary of
William Ockham (who probably died at some point between 1347 and 13492). In
fact, Bradwardine and Ockham were likely both in Oxford for much of the 1320s and
30s, while Bradwardine was a fellow at Merton College, and undoubtedly the two
crossed paths during that time.
In the 1340s, Bradwardine's life took an increasingly ecclesiastical and
political turn, and he became chaplain and confessor to the King, Edward III, whom
he accompanied on campaigns in France. In 1348, Bradwardine was appointed
Archbishop of Canterbury; however, King Edward seems not to have wanted to lose
Bradwardine’s services as advisor and confessor, and prevented his ascension to the
See of Canterbury, having John de Ufford made Archbishop instead. But even before
his consecration as Archbishop, Ufford succumbed to the plague, which was at this

Jean-François Genest (1979), “Le De futuris contingentibus de Thomas Bradwardine,” Recherches
Augustiniennes vol. 14 (1979), p. 251. In my overview of Bradwardine’s life, I am relying largely on
Genest’s report, as well as Heiko Oberman’s book Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: A
Fourteenth-Century Augustinian (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1957).
2
Older scholarship often gives the later date, but more recent scholarship has uncovered evidence to
suggest something closer to the earlier date.
1
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time at a particularly high point in its ravagings. Edward did not seek to prevent
Bradwardine’s appointment a second time, and in June of 1349, Bradwardine was
consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury, the most powerful ecclesial position in
England. But Bradwardine fared little better than his unlucky predecessor: on the
26th of August, 1349, while travelling back to Canterbury from his consecration at
Avignon, he, too, died of plague. He was buried at Canterbury.
During his early career at Oxford, Bradwardine established his reputation as
a talented geometer, mathematician, and physicist among the “Oxford Calculators”,
writing treatises in these areas that have received considerable attention. He was
also a notable logician, devising a unique and influential solution to the Liar Paradox
(Stephen Read has been a strong advocate for the strength of this solution).3 It was
during his tenure at Oxford that Bradwardine became a strong intellectual opponent
of William Ockham. In particular, Bradwardine objected strongly to those elements
of Ockham's teaching that he perceived as undermining the authority and power of
God. In this line of writing, Bradwardine is best known for the theological tome De
causa Dei contra Pelagium – the “Pelagians” being identified as Ockham and his
followers.4 In this work, Bradwardine emphasizes the primary importance of God's
will and action in the work of salvation, and the necessity of God's extension of grace
for our salvation. Thus, contra the “Pelagians,” human creatures are dependent upon
God's action for their salvation and, apart from God's will and grace, they can do
nothing to independently merit salvation. There is much in this work of
Bradwardine that anticipates the emphases of various Reformation theologians,

There is currently a vast literature on this topic, with contributions by Stephen Read, Graham Priest,
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, and others (see the bibliography for more sources); a good place to start,
though, is Stephen Read, “The Liar Paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine,” Vivarium
vol. 40 (2002), no. 2, pp. 189 – 218; and Read, “Bradwardine's Revenge,” in J.C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the
Liar: New Essays on the Paradox (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007). A critical response to Read can be found in
Yann Benétreau-Dupin, “Buridan’s Solution to the Liar Paradox,” History and Philosophy of Logic vol. 36,
no. 1 (2015), pp. 18-28.
4
Thomas Bradwardine, De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum, ed. Henry Seville (London:
1618). (Reprint, Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964. There is currently an inexpensive reprint-of-the-reprint
available on demand from Nabu Public Domain Reprints, with an erroneous attribution of authorship to
Henry Seville.)
3
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particularly John Calvin and John Knox, and various historians of theology have
pointed to the probable influence Bradwardine had on these later thinkers.5
But prior to writing this theological manifesto, Bradwardine treated the
related topic of future contingents in a shorter treatise entitled, unsurprisingly, De
futuris contingentibus (“On future contingents”).6 The topic of future contingents
relates strongly to the questions of De causa Dei, because it is generally assumed
that, in order for human beings to genuinely act freely, there must be a genuine
contingency with regard to their future actions. That is, they must really be free to
act in either of two ways, with no strong compelling force to one way or the other.

Medieval Degrees of Contingency
To put this in medieval terms, human free will requires the existence of ad
utrumlibet future contingents — “ad utrumlibet” being a virtually untranslatable
phrase which in this context designates contingent events which have no strong
compulsion to happen in one way over another. About this concept perhaps a bit
more should be said, because it stands in marked contrast to our contemporary
understandings of contingency. We are typically inclined to divide events into three
categories: what is necessary; what is impossible; and whatever is neither necessary
nor impossible is simply termed “contingent.” We make no further distinctions
between different kinds of contingency, and unless we are determinists (which, of
course, many of us are), probably consider the vast majority of events — everything
from the Big Bang to the daily ebb and flow of tides to our own actions and decisions
— to fall within this rather broad category of contingency. (We may in fact not
conceive of any events as necessary, only the relationships between events. The
tides, for instance, are not strictly or logically necessary, but are only necessary

Most notable in this vein of scholarship is Oberman 1958.
Thomas Bradwardine (1979), De futuris contingentibus, ed. J.-F. Genest, Recherches Augustiniennes vol.
14 (1979), pp. 280 – 336.
5
6
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insofar as certain physical relationships (contingently) hold between the sun, moon,
earth, and the waters on the earth — if the moon were smashed to smithereens by
an enormous asteroid, the tides would cease to function in the ways we expect them
to. This demonstrates their contingency. But assuming that the heavenly bodies
whose gravitational pull influences the course of the tides remain as they are, then
relative to these facts, it is necessary that the tides continue as we expect them to
do.) To illustrate visually, this is perhaps something like the way we tend to modally
catagorize events in our own parlence:

IMPOSSIBLE

CONTINGENT

NECESSARY

Late medieval logicians, by contrast, conceived of the category of contingency as
being subdivided itself into three categories: contingens ut raro, contingens ad
utrumlibet, and contingens ut in pluribus.7 We might think about these categories as
being something like “technically contingent, but practically impossible,” “really and
truly contingent,” and “technically contingent, but practically necessary,”
respectively. A revision of the above table in these terms would therefore look
something like this:

CONTINGENT
⏞
IMPOSSIBLE

UT RARO

AD UTRUMLIBET

UT IN PLURIBUS

NECESSARY

There are other variations on these distinctions and terminology. Contingens ut in pluribus seems to be
more or less equivalent to what is sometimes called contingens natum (its opposite being contingents
non natum). For our purposes, however, since contingencia ad utrumlibet is what concerns us, we will
content ourselves with this perhaps somewhat simplified formulation. More about this can be found in
Henrik Lagerlund (2000), Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 2000).
7
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Let us explore this subdivision for a moment. On the one hand, there are events
which, though technically having it within their power to turn out otherwise (and
therefore being contingent), hardly ever (or perhaps in finite time, never) do so,
because they are generally prevented from doing so by other factors. For example,
that a raven is black is a contingent fact, since on rare occasions an albino raven may
turn out white. But since it is almost always the case that a raven turns out black,
and, furthermore, since there are certain factors (in this case, mainly genetic) which
generally prevent it from being any colour other than black, the medieval logician
would consider the raven’s blackness to be contingent only in the contingens ut in
pluribus sense -- technically contingent, but necessary for all practical purposes. On
the other hand, there are events which, though technically possible, almost never
happen. These can be seen logically as the negations of the events which are
contingens ut in pluribus, such as a raven not being black, but white (or yellow, or
fuchsia). Such events which, though technically contingent, are extremely unlikely
to happen are called contingens ut raro.
Finally, there is the third, middle class of contingent events, designating those
events which can really, plausibly, and reasonably be considered to turn out in either
of two ways, or ad utrumlibet. It is this category into which Bradwardine
understands morally significant actions to fall. Such events are really free, in a sense,
to turn out in either of two (or more) ways, like the flipping of a coin. However, in
citing this example (the coin toss), it is important to bear in mind that what
Bradwardine and other medieval thinkers have in mind when they consider ad
utrumlibet contingents is not so much a question of equal probability, but rather, an
event’s not being constrained or compelled by other factors. So suppose, for
instance, that I stoop to pick up a pebble from the beach on a summer holiday:
considering that there are thousands of pebbles on the beach, and that there are any
number of other actions I may have chosen to perform at that very moment (I might
instead have kicked the pebble, or performed a somersault, or taken off at a run to
get back home and continue writing my thesis), then probabilistically speaking, the
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event in which I stoop at that exact spot to pick up that very pebble is extremely
unlikely indeed (it may conceivably even be statistically impossible). But it is not an
action which is in any way constrained or compelled by natural or metaphysical
factors -- it is one which I am at perfect liberty to either perform or refrain from
performing. And for these reasons, it is considered to be an ad utrumlibet
contingent action.
Bradwardine assumes that all actions of moral significance fall into this
middle, ad utrumlibet category of contingents. If human beings are to have free will,
it must be because they can, in the future, will actions which are themselves
contingent ad utrumlibet; thus human free will requires the existence of ad
utrumlibet future contingents. But of course, a dilemma arises when such future
contingent actions and events are considered in relation to God's omniscience,
which includes knowledge of all future things: how can an act be truly free, or an
event truly contingent, if its outcome is already known by God before it happens?
This is the question which Bradwardine sets out to address in this treatise, and it is
the solution he proposes that is the central subject of my investigations in this thesis.

What has been written to date
Bradwardine's De futuris contingentibus has received very minimal scholarly
attention, so let me provide a brief summary of what has been written about this
work in contemporary scholarship. In the 1930s, a fragmentary edition of the
treatise was prepared by E.B.M. Xiberta.8 This edition includes fragments making up
less than fifteen percent of the work, making it very incomplete, but is the earliest
modern reference to the work I have so far discovered. Heiko Oberman
subsequently discussed the work briefly in his 1957 study of Bradwardine's

E.B.M. Xiberta, O. Carm, “Fragments d’una questio inedita de Thomas Bradwardina,” in Festschrift für M.
Grabmann (Münster, 1935), pp. 1169 - 1180 in BB, Supplementvolume III, 2 (Publication from Cod. Vat.
Lat. 813).
8
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theology,9 but as I will explain in chapter 3, his treatment is hindered by
misunderstanding the structure of the treatise. No doubt his misunderstanding
arose, at least in part, from the lack of any modern critical edition, apart from
Xiberta’s fragments.
A complete modern critical edition was finally supplied by Genest in 1979,
accompanied by a helpful introduction.10 Three years later, Calvin Normore
addressed Bradwardine's approach to future contingents in his article on the topic in
the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy.11 However, it appears that at the
time of writing, Normore was not yet familiar with the (then brand-new) edition by
Genest, because he focuses his discussion of Bradwardine exclusively on De causa
Dei, without mentioning even the existence of De futuris contingentibus. Given the
extent to which Normore discusses Bradwardine's treatment of future contingents, it
may appear to us that his neglect to consider the treatise explicitly on the topic is a
grave omission; however, as Jennifer Ashworth has pointed out to me, it is quite
possible that Normore's article was prepared before the edition became available, as
the Cambridge History volume had a very long gestation.12
Genest again returned to the topic in 1992, this time in a volume discussing
Thomas Buckingham's treatment of future contingents in contrast with that of
Bradwardine;13 but as with Normore's earlier article, the focus of Genest's 1992
treatment is De causa Dei. The De futuris contingentibus, the very work he edited
thirteen years earlier, meanwhile, receives scarcely a mention. Finally, the last
evidence of modern engagement with the treatise that I have been able to discover is
an unpublished partial translation by Norman Kretzmann: at some point before his
Oberman 1957.
Genest (1979), pp. 249 – 336.
11
Calvin Normore (1982), “Future Contingents,” in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds.), The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), pp. 358 – 81.
12
I have yet to learn from Normore directly whether he knew of the treatise at the time that he wrote
the Cambridge History article, and would be interested to learn about this — and also about how he
came to be interested in Bradwardine’s views on the topic in the first place!
13
Jean-François Genest (1992), Prédétermination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham
contre Bradwardine (Paris: J. Vrin, 1992).
9
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death, Kretzmann began drafting a translation of the treatise into English; however,
he only completed a fraction of the text (perhaps about fifteen percent14), and never
wrote anything else on the topic.15
This small handful of sources represents the sum total of modern scholarship
which has, to date, engaged in any way at all with this text — and with the exception
of Genest’s fine edition from 1979, none has done so in any very substantive way
(indeed, in most cases, I mentioned them to point out their lack of engagement with
this treatise). Perhaps the neglect of De futuris contingentibus would be justified if it
was viewed simply as an earlier, less developed version of his arguments on future
contingents, expressed more fully in De causa Dei; if De causa Dei simply restated
and improved upon whatever was put forward in De futuris contingentibus, then it
would make sense to focus on the former. But this is not the case, as we will discover
in what follows, and touch on again in the conclusion.

Content of the treatise
The De futuris contingentibus of Thomas Bradwardine provides an apparently
original account of future contingents, framed largely as a response to William
Ockham's influential treatment of the same topic. But though Bradwardine's account
shows, I think, potential for great interest as a unique contribution (whether or not
it is ultimately successful) to the age-old problem of reconciling God's prescience
with human free will, it has received almost no attention from contemporary

Notice that this is about the same percentage as the Xiberta fragments; this leads me to wonder
whether it might have been the Xiberta edition which Kretzmann was working from. However, as I have
been unable to locate a copy of the Xiberta fragments myself, I have been unable to compare the
portions included to either confirm or disconfirm this theory.
15
Copies of this partial translation have circulated in unpublished form; my thanks are due Stephen
Read for passing one along to me, which sparked my initial interest in this text. As I have said,
Kretzmann’s translation is only fragmentary. To address this deficit, I have drafted a complete
translation of the text (re-translating even the parts already translated by Kretzmann, for the sake of
consistency of style), which I hope might be useful to others in due course; portions of my translation
are found throughout the body of this thesis, and in the appendix.
14
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scholars, nor, it seems, from Bradwardine's own contemporaries and immediate
successors.16
The form the treatise takes is probably that of a reportatio (i.e., a student’s
report of Bradwardine’s lectures), and the evidence for this is largely stylistic: in
many ways it seems to be a hastily-prepared work, with infelicities of style and
grammar throughout, and an often haphazard organizational structure. Its mode of
expression is also repetitive and formulaic, suggesting a lack of fluent ease with the
Latin language. Genest agrees with the likelihood of this assessment, saying,
La forme du texte est d’ailleurs celle d’une reportatio, comme le montrent les
multiples répétitions, la syntaxe très lourde et souvent incorrecte, ainsi que
les flottement qui sòbservent parfois dans le plan, notamment dans le
découpage des objections et des réponses. (Genest 1979, p. 253)
On the other hand, there are also some indications that the work may have been
directly prepared by Bradwardine himself: e.g., the text contains references to his
own (lost) work De peccato, and self-deprecating phrases like, “sed hoc non dico
asserendo, quia illam materiam non bene studui adhuc”17 (DFC 53a), which would
not seem to be in keeping with a report by a student of a Master’s lecture. It is
worth noting, though, that the assessment that the text is a reportatio need not be
incompatible with Bradwardine having at some point looked the notes over himself,
possibly adding a few editorial additions or corrections. It would not have been
unusual for a master to check over a student’s reportatio of his lectures.

Preparatory remarks about the problem
As we will explore in much greater detail in what follows, the problem of
future contingents in the late medieval period is one which touches on many issues

16
17

About this latter issue, a bit more will be said in the Conclusion.
“But I do not say this as an assertion, because this matter has not been well-studied before now.”
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relating to epistemology (particularly the knowledge — and foreknowledge — of
God), metaphysics (the nature of God’s relationship with time, questions of what
grounds contingency, causation and causal powers, etc.), human nature and the
nature of free will, ethics (particularly the question of responsibility), logic and
modality, and more. It is a multi-faceted problem, with many different possible
approaches, from many different angles. In the course of this study, we will examine
in some detail the approaches to this problem of four philosophers who set the stage
for Bradwardine: Boethius, Anselm, John Duns Scotus, and William Ockham. Each of
these four has a unique approach to the problem, relating to Bradwardine’s own
approach in different ways. Broadly speaking, we will find that the approaches of
Boethius, Anselm, and Scotus are viewed sympathetically by Bradwardine, and even
influence his own view in significant ways; the approach of Ockham, however, is
taken by Bradwardine to be on entirely the wrong track, and demonstrating its
shortcomings is among the primary purposes of his treatise.
We will find in Bradwardine’s approach to the problem an attempted solution
that draws on many elements of those he admires, while creatively employing an
original application of a distinction in God’s powers to try to explain the
compatibility between God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. The distinction
Bradwardine makes use of is not per se original to Bradwardine, but the way in
which he applies the distinction to solve this particular problem is, I argue,
something that had not been attempted in a sustained way before.
By the end of this thesis, however, I will have argued that Bradwardine’s
solution, though interesting because of its uniqueness, is ultimately unsuccessful in
solving the problem in a way that a philosopher like Bradwardine should find
satisfactory. In his fervour to avoid the mistakes he sees present in Ockham’s
solution, he himself winds up falling into the trap of mistakes that are in fact the
mirror image of Ockham’s.

11

A note about the texts
In my presentation of Latin primary-source texts, I will not presume of the
reader a facility with Latin, but neither will I presume a lack of interest in the
original text. In the case of each quotation that follows, it is my aim to provide the
reader, firstly, with clear, readable translations (of either my own or another’s
devising, as indicated by my notes), but also with easy access to the original Latin.
In the case of short quotations in passing, the Latin text of the original will usually be
included in a footnote (unless I am highlighting the use of a particular phrase or
word in the original), so as not to disrupt the flow of the prose; but in the case of
extended quotations inviting closer study, I will provide the Latin text directly below
the translation, within the main body of text, to facilitate ease of comparison.
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Chapter 1
Future Contingents Up to the 14th Century: Three Views

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of each of three major
solutions to the problem of future contingents preceding Bradwardine which form
the groundwork for Bradwardine’s own view. It is my view that two of these three
influential positions — those of Boethius and Anselm — can be seen as springing
from the same family tree of solutions to the problem. The third, that of John Duns
Scotus, departs in marked ways from the dominant lineage, but is important to
consider for its influence on Bradwardine. Bradwardine, I will argue, sees his own
view as descending from the same line as that of Boethius and Anselm; however, he
is also influenced in significant ways by the rather different approach of Duns
Scotus. I do not intend for this collection I have chosen to be viewed as an
exhaustive overview of the family tree of solutions to the problem of future
contingents; indeed, there are many more minor branches to be explored. And in
fact, I leave untouched in my treatment the view which is arguably the root of all that
follow, namely, that of St Augustine.
The virtue of brevity necessarily requires the neglect of many figures of great
interest and influence in their own right, but Augustine — because of his stature in
the canon, and his well-known attention to this very matter — is likely the figure
whose exclusion from this treatment requires the most argument. This choice on my
part is down to at least three factors: firstly, as a study of the medieval development
of the problem, Augustine belongs a little too much to the Classical world to neatly
fit within that framework (indeed, if Augustine needs attention, then surely Plotinus,
and Aristotle, do, too); secondly, it is in part because Augustine’s solution is so
well-known and well-studied that it hardly needs recounting in these pages; and
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thirdly, Augustine’s view is so quickly and thoroughly taken up, and so dramatically
extended by Boethius, that to rehearse his view separately would seem almost an
unnecessary redundancy.
I have already said that I see the views of Boethius and Anselm as forming a
part of the same family tree. Indeed, the continuity of these solutions with one
another, and Bradwardine’s with them, is one of the key elements I intend this thesis
to highlight. Thus, in moving from the study of one figure to the next, the reader
should not be surprised to find substantial overlap from one view to the next.
However, it is my aim to emphasize the new ways in which each thinker develops the
ideas, and the new components added by each. Thus, as the lineage advances and
new bloodlines are added along the way, we should not be surprised if we note
subtly changing features gaining prominence as we progress chronologically. And in
Duns Scotus, we will encounter an approach that is very different from the others.

1.1 - Boethius on Future Contingents
1.1.1 - Commentary on De Interpretatione
The first main discussion by Boethius on the issue of future contingents
occurs in his commentaries on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.18 Boethius wrote two
such commentaries, but because the second commentary is the lengthier and more
detailed of the two, I will confine my discussion to that one. In this work, Boethius
seeks to address the perennial problem of Aristotle’s treatment of tomorrow’s sea
battle. Aristotle says that statements about future contingents have a truth value,
but have it indeterminately. What Aristotle means by this, however, apart from his
denial that everything happens by necessity, is far from clear. One interpretation,
In Ammonius Hermiae, On Aristotle's On interpretation 9, Ammonius (trans. by David Blank). With On
Aristotle's On interpretation 9, Boethius: first and second commentaries (trans. by Norman Kretzmann);
with essays by Richard Sorabji, Norman Kretzmann & Mario Mignucci, (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University
Press, 1998); edition of Latin text Karl Meiser (ed.), Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in librum
Aristotelis Peri hermeneias (Leipzig: 1877 - 80), 2 vols.
18
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adopted by the Stoics in their (unfavourable) interpretation of Aristotle, is that
Aristotle intends by this to abandon the principle of bivalence, thereby committing
himself to the notion that statements about future contingent events are neither true
nor false. Boethius rejects this interpretation, and proposes in his commentary that
instead Aristotle means to say that statements concerning future contingent events
do have a truth value, but one which is “indefinite and changeable”:
For Aristotle does not say this – that both are neither true nor false – but
indeed that each is either true or false, but not definitely in the way that
happens with past-tense sentences. But [Aristotle says] that in a certain way
the nature of statement-making utterances is twofold. Some of them are such
that not just are true and false found in them, but in them one is definitely
true, the other definitely false. But in others, one is indeed true and the other
false, but indefinitely and changeably – and this is a result of their nature, not
our ignorance or knowledge.
non enim hoc Aristoteles dicit, quod utraeque nec verae nec falsae sunt, sed
quod una quidem ipsarum quaelibet aut vera aut falsa est, non tamen
quemadmodum in praeteritis definite nec quemadmodum in praesentibus,
sed enuntiativarum vocum duplicem quodammodo esse naturam, quarum
quaedam essent non modo in quibus verum et falsum inveniretur, sed in
quibus una etiam esset definite vera, falsa altera definite, in aliis vero una
quidem vera, altera falsa, sed indefinite et commutabiliter et hoc per suam
naturam, non ad nostram ignorantiam atque notitiam. (2 In de interpretatione
208:7 – 18, trans. Marenbon)

There is disagreement in the literature over how this is to be understood. Norman
Kretzmann has proposed that statements about future contingent events have a
peculiar “either-true-or-false” status up to the point at which they either do or do
not occur.19 So, for instance, the sentence, “The White House will be burned down
on 24 August 1814,” was, prior to 24 August 1814, either-true-or-false, but after the
events of that day, it acquired the truth-value “True”, and this truth-value henceforth

Norman Kretzmann, “Boethius and the Truth about Tomorrow’s Sea Battle,” in Ammonius (1998), 29 37.
19
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applies retroactively to all prior instances of the statement. As I understand
Kretzmann’s interpretation of Boethius, he would seem to have it that before 24
August 1814, the statement “The White House will be burned down on 24 August
1814” was either-true-or-false; but when the White House was, in fact, burned down
on 24 August 1814, it became the case that the statement was always definitively
True.
Apart from the peculiarity of a sentence having been either-true-or-false for
all of history, and then suddenly becoming definitively true for all of history,
Kretzmann’s account seems to me to have the additional difficulty of not
contradicting the Stoic account of Aristotle that Boethius seems to have been keen to
refute. Indeed, asserting a sentence to have this “either-true-or-false” indefinite
truth-value amounts to the same things as a denial of bivalence for future-tensed
propositions concerning contingent events.
It is for these reasons that I prefer the account offered by John Marenbon,
though as I mention below, even it does not seem to be an entirely satisfactory
account.20 Marenbon directs our attention to a later passage in which Boethius
argues that for someone to say, “There will be a sea battle tomorrow,” they speak
falsely, even if there is indeed a sea battle the following day. This is because Boethius
understands the statement, “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” to be equivalent to
the statement, “There will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow.” What a person
ought rather to say is, “There will be a sea battle tomorrow contingently.” This is
because the speaker should make clear that “it happens, if it happens, in such a way
as it will have been able not to have happened.”21
So a future-tensed statement about a contingent event that asserts a thing
will happen (i.e., will happen necessarily) is always false; but a future-tensed
statement about a contingent event asserting that the thing will happen contingently
John Marenbon, Boethius, in B. Davies (ed.) “Great Medieval Thinkers” series (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 37 41.
21
ita evenit, si evenerit, ut potuerit non evenire. (2 InDI 212:14 - 15, trans. Marenbon)
20
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may be true or false, albeit indefinitely. It remains unclear what, exactly, is meant by
statement being true or false “indefinitely,” but it seems to imply an ability for that
statement’s truth value to change up to the point at which it is either confirmed or
denied by actual events. And I am not positive that Marenbon’s interpretation,
though indeed rather subtler and more nuanced than Kretzmann’s, entirely avoids
the need to reject bivalence, at least in any traditional form it may take. But it is
perhaps for the reason of these difficulties that Boethius himself seems to have
ultimately turned aside from the line of explanation pursued in the De
Interpretatione commentary when he addresses related topics in later works. The
primary instance of his later approach is to be found in The Consolation of
Philosophy.

1.1.2 - The Consolation of Philosophy
In the fifth and final book of The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius presents
an account of God's knowledge of future things and human freedom that was to have
immense influence on discussions of the topic for centuries to come.22 This book of
the Consolation concludes the lengthy discussion that has already taken place
between Boethius (the character) and Lady Philosophy regarding fate and the
highest goods of life, as he is “consoled” in his imprisoned condition. But in Book V,
their conversation turns to questions of God's foreknowledge, and how human
beings might still act freely, in spite of God's knowledge of their actions beforehand.

Discussion of “chance” (CP V.I)
The first part of their conversation is devoted to establishing that the only
All page references to English translations of The Consolation of Philosophy (CP) in this section will be
to the translation by Victor Watts (revised edition, London: Penguin, 1999). All translations are Watts’s.
All Latin page and section references are to the edition of H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (SR&T),
Theological Tractates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).
22
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kind of chance there can be is the sort that happens when one's action brings about
an effect that one did not intend (CP 117). The classic Aristotelian example used to
illustrate this is that of a farmer who happens upon a treasure chest in the act of
cultivating a field (Physics II, 4 – 5). The farmer did not begin digging with the
intention of unearthing the chest; nor did the person who hid the chest intend for it
to be found by the farmer. But this literal coincidence (“coincide-ance”) of actions
results in the “chance” discovery of the chest by the farmer.
This is the sort of “fortuitous” chance that was at work when I ran into a
friend in line at a coffee shop, just after I had discovered that I was 25 cents short of
the change I needed for my beverage. I did not intend to see my friend at the coffee
shop; nor did my friend come to the coffee shop in order to bail me out of my
short-changed predicament. But her happening to come for coffee at just the same
time that I discovered my lack of change had the fortuitous result (for me, in any
case) of saving me from an embarrassing situation. Neither of us intended the result
that happened; but neither did the event happen randomly, without a cause.
This latter sort of “chance,” of an event happening without any cause, is the
sort that Lady Philosophy denies the existence of. This un-caused sort of chance
would have been in evidence if my friend had materialized beside me out of thin air,
or if one of the quarters in my pocket had magically duplicated itself, thereby
making up for the missing 25 cents. Cause-less chance is rejected as nonsensical by
Lady Philosophy; but she does concede that actions, performed with other intended
purposes, may coincide in such a way that they produce unexpected, unintended,
and perhaps even surprising or perplexing results.

Chance and free will (CP V.II - V.III)
Boethius' character interjects by voicing the concern that without “uncaused”
chance, all things would be causally determined: “[I]s there room in this chain of
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close-knit causes for any freedom of the will? Or does the chain of Fate bind even the
impulses of the human mind?” (CP 118)23 While Philosophy does not clearly
indicate how the human mind is free from the “chain of Fate”, she clearly asserts that
all rational beings also have free will. But freedom is not equally distributed. In fact,
the quality of freedom possessed by human beings is markedly inferior to absolute
freedom, particularly if they fall into habitually sinful behaviour: celestial and divine
beings possess clear sighted judgement, uncorrupted will, and the power to effect
their desires. Human souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the
contemplation of the mind of God, and less free when they descend to bodies, and
less free still when they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood. They reach an
extremity of enslavement when they give themselves up to wickedness and lose
possession of their proper reason. (CP 118) In this, Boethius to a large extent
follows Augustine, who contends that our wills are most truly free when they are
ordered toward what is good and righteous, and that we undermine and in a sense
surrender our own freedom when we choose to act evilly.24 I hasten to add, though,
that in Boethius’ treatment, the view carries much stronger gnostic overtones,
insofar as the spiritual is elevated as morally superior to the corporeal, and the
corporeal is taken to be a deterrent to holiness.
According to Boethius, then, the human person's limited power to execute
her will, hindered still further by the limitations a bodily existence brings, renders
the quality of human freedom greatly inferior to that of purely spiritual beings (such
as angels), and more inferior still to the purely spiritual and omnipotent being that is
God. But Boethius goes a step further when he suggests that, in surrendering to sin,
a person becomes even less free than they otherwise would have been. This theme
of decreasing powers of freedom in sinful creatures is one that Anselm will later take

Sed in hac haerentium sibi serie causarum estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos quoque
humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit? (SR&T 390)
24
Augustine of Hippo, De libero arbitrio, esp. books II and III. An English translation of this text can be
found in Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, ed. and
trans. P. King (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2010).
23
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up and refine, as we shall see in a succeeding section.
But to Boethius, the character, the fact of free will seems to run contrary to
the fact of God's foreknowledge, for “the two seem clean contrary and opposite”
(119). He expresses the problem in the following way:
If God foresees all things and cannot be mistaken in any way, what
Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen. So if from eternity
Providence foreknows not only men's actions but also their thoughts and
desires, there will be no freedom of will. No action or desire will be able to
exist other than that which God's infallible Providence has foreseen. For if
they can be changed and made different from how they were foreseen, there
will be no sure foreknowledge of the future, only an uncertain opinion; and
this I do not think can be believed of God. (PC 119 – 20)

Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest, evenire necesse est
quod providentia futurum esse praeviderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta
hominum modo sed etiam consilia voluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit
arbitrii libertas; neque enim vel factum aliud ullum vel quaelibet exsistere
poterit voluntas nisi quam nescia falli providentia divina praesenserit. Nam si
aliorsum quam provisae sunt detorqueri valent, non iam erit futuri firma
praescientia, sed opinio potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico.
(SR&T 394)

Boethius is unsatisfied with accounts of this problem that seek to explain away the
necessity inhering in the foreseen act by pointing out that God's knowledge does not
cause an action to turn out in a particular way; rather, God knows a thing will turn
out in a certain way, because that is the way it will turn out. Boethius' initial
objection to this explanation is twofold: first, he does not think this explanation does
away with the necessity of the event; and second, he thinks it implies that a
creaturely action is the cause of a divine attribute.
In the first case, Boethius' character argues the following line: Suppose an
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event happens, and God foreknows that it will happen as it does. Then even if God
foreknows the event because the event will happen, it is still the case that, insofar as
God foreknows the event will happen, the event must happen. Were it not to happen,
then God's foreknowledge would have erred, which is impossible. Thus, Boethius
argues, because the event cannot happen otherwise without leading us into an
impossible situation, it therefore happens necessarily.
In Boethius' second objection to this response, he argues that to say God
foresees an event because an event will in fact happen, is to say that the event is a
cause of some knowledge in God. This implies that finite, creaturely acts cause
knowledge in God – and hence, act on God in such a way as to cause some divine
attributes. Since God is unchanging and unchangeable, and, furthermore, the cause
of all created things, this reversal of causal powers, Boethius thinks, is absurd. We
can no more be the cause of divine attributes than a pot can be a cause of its potter's
attributes.

Modes of Cognition (CP V.IV - V.V)
Acknowledging the problems that Boethius' character identifies with this
approach to the problem, Lady Philosophy states that, in fact, all previous attempts
to tackle the problem have failed in one way or another. She attributes this to the
failure of human beings ever to understand the way in which divine knowledge
operates, and says that if that could be understood, then “all uncertainty would be
removed” (CP 124). She then goes on to lay out a schematic hierarchy of types of
knowledge, corresponding to a hierarchy of sentient beings.
At the bottom of the knowledge hierarchy is sense perception, which is a
power possessed by animals which have no locomotive faculty: such creatures are
able to see, feel, and hear what is present before them, but cannot abstract from that
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perception, or call to mind perceptions not currently perceived.
Next up in the chain is the power of imagination, possessed by animals who
can move themselves about. It is by this power that creatures remember past
perceptions, and combine (re-member) and abstract from past perceptions to
imagine or anticipate perceptions they have not yet had. For instance, a dog
remembers that, in the past, the sound of his food hitting his dish in the next room
preceded his finding food in his dish when he went to investigate; hence, when he
next hears the same sound, he expects to find food in his dish, as he did before. Past
experience trains the animal, in a non-cognitive way, to form strong associations
between particular sets of circumstances, so that the animal reacts accordingly
when he next encounters a similar set of circumstances. Note that, in this schematic,
the imaginative power employs the lower power of sense perception in its
operation, transforming sense perception to function in ways it could not have
without the introduction of imagination.
Similarly, the human power of reason, which is the next step in the hierarchy
of knowledge, employs the lower faculties of sense perception and imagination, but
adds to these the power to abstract from these things to grasp universals. Through
knowledge of universals, the human person is able to reason syllogistically. If I am
correct in my assessment that Boethius' schema allows for a sort of inductive
reasoning capacity in locomotive animals, then what distinguishes human reason
from the animal sort is its deductive character. Human beings have the ability to
abstract universal generalizations from observed phenomena, and from these
deduce (syllogistically) to arrive at new general truths. From knowledge we have
already acquired, we can arrive at other truths concerning things we have not
directly learned or experienced; that is, we can arrive at knowledge by deduction.
According to this view of knowledge, the human power of knowing is on an entirely
different level from that of other animals, functioning in an entirely different way.
Similarly, God's power of knowledge is on another level again: Philosophy
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instructs her pupil that God knows by way of “intelligence”, or intellection, a mode of
knowing with a completeness and immediacy incomprehensible to us mere mortals.
God's knowledge, Philosophy contends, is of a sort that enables “immediate”
knowledge of things which, to us, are future (and therefore unknowable by us). But
this knowledge operates in a way that does not make the things known by it
necessary, at least not in an absolute sense. The fact that we cannot imagine how
such a knowledge could operate only stands to reason:
[H]uman reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future
in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge. This is
how the argument runs: if anything does not seem to have any certain and
predestined occurrence, it cannot be foreknown as a future event. Of such,
therefore, there is no foreknowledge: and if we believe that even in this case
there is foreknowledge, there will be nothing which does not happen of
necessity. If, therefore, as beings who have a share of reason, we can judge of
the mind of God, we should consider it most fitting for human reason to bow
before divine wisdom, just as we judged it right for the senses and the
imagination to yield to reason. (CP 131)

Simile est quod humana ratio divinam intellegentiam futura, nisi ut ipsa
cognoscit, non putat intueri. Nam ita disseris: Si qua certos ac necessarios
habere non videantur eventus, ea certo eventura praesciri nequeunt. Harum
igitur rerum nulla est praescientia, quam si etiam in his esse credamus, nihil
erit quod non ex necessitate proveniat. Si igitur uti rationis participes sumus,
ita divinae iudicium mentis habere possemus, sicut imaginationem
sensumque rationi cedere oportere iudicavimus, sic divinae sese menti
humanam submittere rationem iustissimum censeremus. (SR&T 418)

Philosophy in this way dismisses our inability to understand how knowledge of
future events could not entail the necessity of these events: God's way of knowing
these things is so entirely unlike our own – it transcends our own modes of thought
so completely – that it is only to be expected that we cannot make sense of what this
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sort of knowledge is like.
In fact, if we infer, from the way we know our own knowledge to operate, that
God's foreknowledge of an event requires that event to happen necessarily, we have
inferred improperly from our own mode of knowing to God's. We are only able to
know that which is necessary (in the case of events, we are only able to know those
things which have already happened – and are thus necessary); but we should not
assume that the same is the case for God. This error would be analogous, on
Boethius' hierarchical schema of knowledge, to a clam being unable to comprehend
how a dog, say, might remember his master without his master's being present. A
clam, having only the power to perceive things present to it, would be unable to
grasp the power of memory possessed by the dog in virtue of the power of
imagination. Similarly, a human being is unable to comprehend the sort of
knowledge which enables God, by the power of God's intellect, to know future events
with the same immediacy and completeness with which we know things present and
past – nay, with an even greater immediacy and completeness than we could ever
know any present or past event.

Eternity and the Nature of Necessity (CP V.V, 132 - 37)
Thus, Boethius the writer, through the voice of Lady Philosophy, lays the
foundation for his dictum that the power of being known is not in the thing known,
but in the knower: it is not because future events cannot be known that we do not
know them, but because we are not the right sort of knowers. This conclusion leads
Lady Philosophy to her final prose, a rapturous meditation on the way in which
God's mode of knowledge reflects his mode of existence in eternity, on the nature of
eternity, and how a proper understanding of eternity leads us to grasp, at least
partially, the nature of God's foreknowledge. “Eternity … is the complete,
simultaneous, and perfect possession of everlasting life,” Philosophy tells us (CP

24
132).25 Thus, the philosophers who hold that the world is co-eternal with God are
mistaken – even if, for the sake of argument, they are correct to hold that the world
has no beginning (CP 133). For the world exists in and progresses through ordered
time, possessing time only moment by moment, and passing out of each moment
into the next. This is nothing like God's eternal existence, which completely,
simultaneously, and perfectly possesses all of time.
As many have observed, the notion of eternity may be delineated in at least
two ways. John Marenbon describes this delineation using the following effective
terminology26: the first way, which he calls Timeless eternity (T-eternity), is a notion
of that which exists without any extension or position in time; the second way,
Perpetual eternity (P-eternity), applies to that which exists in every moment of time.
P-eternity is further delineated into strong and weak forms: in the weak form, time
has both a beginning and an end, whereas in the strong form, time lacks a beginning,
or an end, or both. Whether Boethius has in mind T- or P-eternity in the above
passage is not entirely clear, although there seems to me to be reason to prefer the
possibility that T-eternity is intended. This is because Boethius does not point to
God’s extension or position in time, but rather to his perception and experience of it.
In fact, it would seem that locating God in any particular place in time would render
the “complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession” of all time impossible: God
would only be able to possess time in this way if he transcends particular instants in
time.
It is from this simultaneous and complete possession of all time that God's
immediate knowledge of future events (or more precisely, events which are future to
us) springs. And from here, a distinction of necessities is introduced, derived from

Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione
temporalium clarius liquet. (SR&T 422)
26
John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge,
2007), p. 53; Marenbon also discusses this topic, though without using the same terminology developed
in Medieval Philosophy, in a number of other places, including his “Great Medieval Thinkers” study
Boethius (see note above), pp. 135ff.
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Arisotle27: on the one hand, “necessity” can be simple necessity (such as “all men are
mortal”), and on the other, it can be conditional necessity (such as, “if you know that
someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking”). (CP 135, SR&T 428)
Boethius, in the voice of Philosophy, concludes that God's foreknowledge of events
only results in the conditional necessity of their occurrence. This conditional
necessity of events (on the condition of God’s knowledge of them), however, does
not make events simply necessary, any more than a person's walking becomes
necessary by our observance of that person walking. It is conditionally necessary
that, if we see her walking, then, necessarily, she is walking — because we could not
have seen her walking if she was not walking! — but it is not on this account simply
necessary that she is walking.28
It is tempting to interpret this distinction between conditional and absolute
necessity as one of scope, and indeed, there are many historians of philosophy who
have interpreted Boethius in this way.29 Although this way of understanding
Boethius’ distinction is passing out of favour, let us examine for a moment what it
would mean for Boethius’ distinction to be one of scope. From around the 11th
century on, we see with logicians like Peter Abelard a distinction between applying a
predicate (like “necessary”) to the object of a sentence, and applying it to the
sentence as a whole. Typically, this is described as the distinction between applying
the predicate de re (concerning the thing, or the object, of the statement) and
applying it de sensu or de dicto (concerning the (entire) statement). The reason it is
tempting to read this distinction into Boethius’ argument is that the way he parses
out the necessity inhering in a conditional statement of necessity, such as, “If I see a
man walking, then he is necessarily walking,” sounds much like the distinction

See Watts' footnote, p. 135.
It is useful to note that Boethius uses the words “see” and “know” almost interchangeably, particularly
when speaking of God's foreknowledge/foresight.
29
See D.P. Henry, The Logic of St Anselm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 178; Richard Sorabji,
Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle’s Theory (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 122; C.
Kirwan, Augustine (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 96 - 98; Paul Spade in Kenny, Oxford Illustrated
History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1994), p. 72.
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between de sensu and de re necessity: Boethius says that this statement is true, so
long as we understand the necessity of the man’s walking to be dependent upon our
seeing him walk. This is, in a sense, much like a de dicto reading of the necessity of
the conditional. It is not the walking which is, in and of itself, necessary, but the
relationship between our seeing the man walk and his walking. The parallel is not
precise, since we are not talking about necessity being applied to the copula versus
the object of the sentence; but it nevertheless seems to be a case of defining the
scope on which the predicate “necessary” operates.
Marenbon, however, has argued that such an interpretation is anachronistic.
Marenbon does not believe that Boethius has in view anything like the later notions
of scope or of de re and de dicto necessity.30 Marenbon does not think that Boethius
was conceptually equipped at this point to make these distinctions of scope.
Furthermore, the imperfect parallel between the conditional statement of necessity
and one involving the sort of distinction in scope picked out by Abelard, et al., under
the monikers “de re” and “de dicto” is a difference of considerable substance. In
order to translate the conditional statement of necessity into one to which the de
re/de dicto distinction might apply involves a number of conceptual steps. The
conditional statement is formed something like this:
[I see (a man is walking)]

[a man is NEC. walking]

What Boethius asserts is that the consequent of this statement is true if the
antecedent is; but the necessity inhering in the consequent depends on the truth of
the antecedent, and is therefore not necessary in an absolute sense.
We cannot directly apply the de re/de dicto distinction to such a sentence,

Marenbon puts forward this view in numerous places, including Marenbon 2003 p. 139 - 42. For
other rejections of the scope reading of Boethius’ distinction, see Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 60 - 61; H. Weidemann “Die Unterscheidung zwischen
einfacher und bedingter Notwendigkeit in der Philosophiae Consolatio des Boethius,” in
Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse: Philosophiegeschichte im Überblick, ed. A. Newen and U.
Meixner (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998), pp. 195 - 207.
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because this distinction only clearly applies to simple, atomic statements consisting
of subject and object joined by a copula. The conditional sentence above is a
compound of two such sentences. What we may analyze under this distinction,
however, is what sense it is in which the consequent is true, given the truth of the
antecedent. That is, assuming the antecedent (“I see a man is walking”) is true, in
what sense is the consequent (“A man is necessarily walking”) true? Focusing our
attention, therefore, on only the consequent —
A man is NEC. walking
— we may ask whether, given the truth of the antecedent, this statement is true in
the de re sense, or the de dicto sense. In the former sense, we would be saying that
his walking is in fact necessary; in the latter, that the whole statement (“A man is
walking”) is necessary. Those who have sought to locate in Boethius a scope
distinction have tried to say that, according to Boethius, under the condition “I see a
man is walking”, the sentence “A man is necessarily walking” is true de dicto, but not
de re.
However, I think it can be argued that, given Boethius’ conditional necessity
schema, this sentence is also true de re, as I now show. Boethius says that given the
truth of the antecedent, the necessity of the consequent can be granted relative to
the truth of the antecedent. But it is not just the case that the the antecedent, taken
de dicto, is necessary: rather, the very object of that antecedent is necessary relative
to the truth of the consequent. In other words, if it is true that I see a man walking,
then relative to this truth, it is necessary that a man is walking; but even stronger
than this, if I see a man walking, then relative to my seeing the man walk, that man’s
walking is necessary.
Perhaps another example would serve to clarify this point. Consider the
conditional statement, “If the jellybean in my hand is red, then the jellybean in my
hand is necessarily not blue.” Now suppose that I really do take up a single, red
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jellybean in my hand, rendering the antecedent true. Relative to the truth of the
antecedent, we may consider the necessity of the consequent in two ways: in the
first way (the de dicto or compound reading), we say that the whole statement, “The
jellybean in my hand is not blue,” is necessary; in the second way (the de re or
divided reading), we say that the jellybean is necessarily not blue — in other words,
that the “not-blue-ness” of the jellybean is necessary. Those who interpret Boethius
as advancing a sort of scope distinction would say that he embraces the former, but
not the latter, reading of the necessity of the consequent. However, I think that this
is to miss the point altogether of Boethius’ notion of conditional necessity, for given
the truth of the antecedent, the consequent is necessary in all ways: in the case of
this example, if the jellybean I hold in my hand is red, then its “not-blue-ness” is a
necessary property of that jellybean, relative to the fact that it is red.
These examples serve to illustrate that Boethius’ discussion of conditional
necessity is not a distinction of scope. The necessity inhering in a consequent,
relative to the truth of its antecedent, is a necessity which encompasses both the
compound and divided senses of necessity. But conditional necessity, despite
lacking perhaps the formal sophistication of a scope distinction, nevertheless
provides a useful analysis whereby to understand the sort of necessity inhering in
statements about the foreknowledge of God: a necessity not of the foreknown event
itself, but only relative to the knowledge God has of it. As we will see in the
following section, this idea will be picked up and refined by Anselm in his own
analysis of the topic.

1.2 – Anselm on Future Contingents
We turn now to a discussion of Anselm of Canterbury’s treatment of the topic
of future contingents. It would seem that Anselm is among the most important and
influential direct sources for Bradwardine’s treatise, as is evident by the abundance
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of references Bradwardine makes to Anselm’s work, and by the uncharacteristically
and overwhelmingly positive treatment Bradwardine gives his report of Anselm’s
view (all this will be discussed at much greater length in ch. 3, especially section
3.4). For this reason, in the context of understanding Bradwardine on future
contingents, we ought to pay especially careful attention to Anselm’s solution, and
observe how one Archbishop of Canterbury played an important role of intellectual
influence on his eventual successor.
1.2.1 - De concordia
One of Anselm’s last works was a highly influential treatise dealing directly
with the puzzles of future contingents, called De Concordia Praescientiae et
Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, or, “On the concord of God’s
foreknowledge, predestination, and grace with free choice.”31 The work is divided
into three sections, and the title of the work suggests quite handily how this division
breaks down: the first section defends the compatibility of human free will with
God’s foreknowledge; the second with predestination; and the third with God’s
grace. It is the first of these sections that is primarily relevant to this present study,
since God’s foreknowledge is the chief concern of Bradwardine’s treatise.
Accordingly, I begin my overview of Anselm’s treatment of the topic of future
contingents with a summary of his mature view as found in the De Concordia
treatise.
Following in the pattern of Boethius’ solution, Anselm’s view exhibits two key
elements: first, a recognition that God’s mode of knowledge — and in particular,
God’s foreknowledge — must operate in a way quite different from our own, so that
we cannot draw the inferences we are accustomed to draw between certain
Throughout this section, references to the Latin text of De Concordia will be to the edition of F.S.
Schmitt, in S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1940-1961), pp. 244 - 88
in the second volume; the complete edition of the Opera Omnia, excepting the 6th (and last) volume, is
available online through the Intelex Past Masters Full Text Humanities library, crkn.nlx.com. All English
translations of De Concordia cited in this section are those of Thomas Bermingham, in Anselm of
Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. B. Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford: OUP, 1998), pp. 435 - 74.
31
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knowledge and necessity; and second, an understanding of God’s timeless eternality
(or “T-eternity”), such that all events that happen successively in time are
simultaneously present to God. But Anselm adds to this a much more substantial
and robust logical analysis of the interplay between God’s foreknowledge and the
contingency of acts and events than that supplied by Boethius. The puzzle, as
Anselm lays it out, is that it would seem that “what God foreknows shall necessarily
come to be in the future, while the things brought about by free choice do not issue
from any necessity.”32 (1.1, 435) Yet, Anselm insists that in this work he will seek to
“affirm the coexistence both of divine foreknowledge (which seems to require the
necessary existence of future things) and of free choice (by which many things are
believed to occur apart from any necessity),”33 and upholding these two things, to
discover whether their coexistence is truly an impossibility. (1.1, 435)
Anselm begins his treatment with a rehearsal of the position, perhaps most
influentially expounded by Augustine, but articulated in Boethius’ commentary on
De Interpretatione,34 that though God foreknows future free acts, God foreknows that
they will happen freely:
But if something is going to occur freely, God, who foreknows all that shall be,
foreknows this very fact. And whatever God foreknows shall necessarily
happen in the way in which it is foreknown. So it is necessary that it shall
happen freely, and there is therefore no conflict whatsoever between a
foreknowledge which entails a necessary occurrence and a free exercise of an
uncoerced will. (1.1, 435 - 36)

Sed si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui
praescit omnia futura. Quod autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est,
[Q]uae deus praescit, necesse est esse futura, et quae per liberum arbitrium fiunt, nulla necessitate
proveniunt. (245)
33
Ponamus igitur simul esse et praescientiam dei, quam sequi necessitas futurarum rerum videtur, et
libertatem arbitrii, per quam multa sine ulla necessitate fieri creduntur. (Ibid.)
34
By this I mean Boethius’ assertion, discussed above, that properly speaking, it is never true to say of a
future contingent event A, “A will happen,” as though it will happen determinitely; rather, one ought to
say, “A will happen contingently.”
32
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sicut praescitur. Necesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum sine necessitate.
Nequaquam ergo recte intelligenti hic repugnare videntur praescientia quam
sequitur necessitas, et libertas arbitrii a qua removetur necessitas… (246 ll.
7 - 11)

It is thus concluded, on the basis of this, that it is not entirely accurate to assert
simply that God foreknows that something will be, such as that I will sin (or not sin),
but that we ought instead to assert, if we’re to be precise, that “‘God foreknows that I
am going freely to sin or not.’”35 (1.1, 436, emphasis mine.) If there is any necessity
involved in our action at all on account of God’s foreknowledge of our action, it is
that it is necessary that we act freely.
But though this is the first argument brought forward by Anselm, he seems
not to be wholly convinced that it provides a compelling case for the compatibility of
God’s foreknowledge and human free will, or at least not on its own merits. In the
voice of a potential objector, Anselm says,
‘You do not yet remove from my will the weight of necessity when you say
that it is necessary that I shall sin or not sin freely because God foreknows
this. For necessity seems to imply coercion or prevention. So if it is
necessary that I sin voluntarily, I conclude that I am compelled by some
hidden power to will the sin; and if I do not sin, that I am prevented from
willing to sin. Therefore it seems to me that it is by necessity that I sin, if I
sin, or do not sin, if I do not.’ (1.1, 436)

Nondum aufers a corde meo vim necessitatis, cum dicis quia necesse est me
peccaturum esse vel non peccaturum sine necessitate, quia hoc deus praescit.
Necessitas enim videtur sonare coactionem vel prohibitionem. Quare si
necesse est me peccare ex voluntate, intelligo me cogi aliqua occulta vi ad
voluntatem peccandi; et si non pecco, a peccandi voluntate prohiberi.
Quapropter necessitate videor mihi peccare si pecco, vel non peccare si non

Non debes dicere: praescit deus me peccaturum tantum vel non peccaturum; sed: praescit deus me
peccaturum sine necessitate vel non peccaturum. (246)
35
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pecco. (246 line 25 - 247 line 4)

For the benefit, perhaps, of such an objector, Anselm goes on to defend the
compatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human free will in another, more original
way. The new contribution that Anselm makes to this discussion is his development
of the idea that when we say that God foreknows something, and then infer from
that statement that that something will happen, we are not actually adding to our
knowledge of the world by that inference. In fact, a statement such as, “God
foreknows I will sin, therefore I will sin” amounts to a kind of tautology.
This explanation begins with a distinction of necessity, not unlike that
employed by Boethius. The sort of necessity that inheres in the happening of an
event, given God’s foreknowledge of that event, is not the sort that either “compels
[or] prevents the future existence or non-existence of anything.”36 (1.2, 437) By
analogy, Anselm discusses the sort of necessity inherent in a statement such as, “A
white things is white”: the whiteness of many things which happen to be white (like
a picket fence in my neighbourhood) is not necessary per se; but insofar as we
identify a thing by its whiteness (calling it “A white thing”), in that respect, its
whiteness is necessary. In other words, if a thing is white, then it cannot not be
white, so long as it is a white thing (even if it could cease to be white — at which
point we could no longer properly call it a white thing). The property of being white
is necessarily part of what makes it a white thing, so long as it remains a white thing.
To say that a white thing is white adds nothing to our knowledge of the white
thing, for if we understand rightly what a white thing is in the first place, we know
already that it must be white. In this sense, and in this sense only, its whiteness is
necessary.37 In the same way, Anselm argues, in a statement that something

Sed haec necessitas nec cogit nec prohibet aliquid esse aut non esse. (249)
cf. the discussion of conditional necessity in Boethius, in 1.1.2 above, wherein the truth of the
conclusion — or in that case, the consequent — is necessary conditional upon the truth of the
antecedent.
36
37
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foreknown by God will happen — as when I say, “God foreknows that I will sin, so I
will sin” — the conclusion adds nothing to the meaning of the antecedent, if the
antecedent is rightly understood. God only foreknows those things which will in fact
happen, so a statement that God foreknows something — like my sinning — can only
be true if I will, in fact, sin. Anselm explains this as follows:
[I]f one rightly grasps the meaning of the word foreknown, by the very fact
that something is said to be foreknown, its future existence is declared. For it
is not foreknown unless it shall actually be, since the object of knowledge is
what is actually the case.
So ‘If God foreknows something, then it happens necessarily’ is
equivalent to ‘If it shall be, it shall be of necessity.’ Yet this sort of necessity
neither compels nor prevents the future existence or non-existence of
anything. . . . When I say ‘If a thing shall be, it shall be of necessity,’ the
necessity does not precede but follows upon the assertion of the thing as a
fact. . . . For this sort of necessity means nothing than that what shall be shall
not be able at the same time not to be. (1.2, 437)

Denique si quis intellectum verbi proprie considerat: hoc ipso quod praesciri
aliquid dicitur, futurum esse pronuntiatur. Non enim nisi quod futurum est
praescitur, quia scientia non est nisi veritatis. Quare cum dico quia si praescit
deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum: idem est ac si dicam: Si erit, ex
necessitate erit. Sed haec necessitas nec cogit nec prohibet aliquid esse aut
non esse. . . . Nam cum dico: si erit, ex necessitate erit: hic sequitur necessitas
rei positionem, non praecedit. . . . Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas,
nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse. (248 line 5 - 249 line 9)

What Anselm would seem to be saying is that a statement such as “God foreknows
that I will sin, so I will sin” is no less a tautology than is the statement “I will sin, so I
will sin,” since God can only foreknow what will actually be (and likewise, anything
that will be is foreknown by God). And just as it is true in such a case to say, “I will
sin, so necessarily I will sin,” so it is true to say, “God foreknows that I will sin, so
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necessarily I will sin.”
But this kind of necessary truth of a tautological statement does not imply
that the action of which it speaks is itself necessary, any more than the truth of the
statement “I am a chorister, so necessarily I sing in choirs” implies that my singing in
choirs is a necessary fact about me, but merely that my singing in choirs is necessary
so long as I may rightly continue to call myself a chorister. The point, then, that
Anselm primarily makes in De Concordia concerning the relationship between God’s
foreknowledge and future contingent actions38 is that there is no reason to infer,
from that fact that a future thing will necessarily happen relative to God’s
foreknowledge of it, to the conclusion that the future thing is thus necessary in itself.
On the contrary, Anselm claims, God’s foreknowledge causes no necessity in the
thing considered in itself.
But how, we might wonder, can God foreknow that which is contingent in the
first place? Surely knowledge requires certainty, and certainty is not possible where
uncertain things are concerned; and what could be more uncertain than a contingent
thing? Once again following Boethius’ lead, Anselm appeals to the timeless eternity,
or T-eternity, of God: God knows everything that will happen in time — past,
present, and future — because all of created time is eternally present to God:
“[E]ternity has its own unique simultaneity which contains both all things that
happen at the same time and place and that happen at different times and places.”39
(1.5, 443) A particularly interesting bit of this discussion, that will have relevence in
the next chapter as we consider Ockham’s position, occurs in De Conc. 1.5: the
question at hand is how passages of scripture should be understood which speak of
God’s foreknowledge and predestination of the blessed, such as this from the Letter

It is worth noting that Anselm seems to imply in many places throughout the text that actions of the
rational will are in fact the only events that are truly contingent (see, for instance, De Conc. 1.6), and
indeed that only some of those — namely, those which are morally relevant, or those “without which
people cannot attain salvation” — are worth considering in any detail in this treatise.
39
Habet enim aeternitas suum simul, in quo sunt omnia quae simul sunt loco vel tempore, et quae sunt
diversis in locis vel temporibus. p. 254
38
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to the Romans, 8.29 - 30: “For those whom [God] foreknew he also predestined. . . .
And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also
justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.”40 (English Standard Version)
On the face of such passages, it would seem that God’s foreknowledge makes it such
that those foreknown by God are predestined, justified, and glorified necessarily,
particularly, as Anselm points out, because St Paul’s verb tenses throughout the
passage are past. The predestined, it would seem, were predestined from the
beginning, and thus are necessarily predestined. Anselm argues, however, that St
Paul’s use of the past tense is merely reflective of his lack of any tense adequate to
God’s T-eternity:
However, in order to show that he was not using those verbs in their
temporal signification, St Paul described future happenings in the past tense.
For, temporally speaking, God had not already called, justified, and glorified
those whom he foreknew were yet to be born. We can therefore understand
that it was for want of a verb signifying the eternal present that St Paul used
verbs of the past tense. The reason is that things which are in the past in time
are wholly immutable — like those in the present of eternity. (1.5, 443)

Ut autem ostenderet idem apostolus non illa verba se pro temporali
significatione posuisse, illa etiam quae futura sunt praeteriti verbo temporis
pronuntiavit. Nondum enim quos praescivit adhuc nascituros iam
temporaliter >>vocavit<<, >>iustificavit<<, >>magnificavit<<. Unde cognosci
potest eum propter indigentiam verbi significantis aeternam praesentiam
usum esse verbis praeteritae significationis; quoniam quae tempore
praeterita sunt, ad similitudinem aeterni praesentis omnino immutabilia
sunt. (254 ll. 16 - 22)

We have no verb tense corresponding to the eternal, so St Paul had to settle for a

Romans 8.29 - 30 in full in the Vulgate, as quoted by Anselm in De Conc. 1.5: 29nam quos praescivit et
praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii eius ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus 30quos
autem praedestinavit hos et vocavit et quos vocavit hos et iustificavit quos autem iustificavit illos et
glorificavit.
40
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verb of another tense: and since, Anselm claims, the past tense best reflects the
immutability of the eternal, the past tense is what St Paul chose.
De Concordia, then, provides us with an account of how the foreknowledge of
God operates without causing necessity. The other side of the coin, though, is how
the human will operates freely. In De Concordia itself, Anselm gives passing
attention to this matter, but in doing so, primarily refers us to his earlier works on
the topic (in particular, De Veritate (On Truth), De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will), and
De Casu Diaboli (On the Fall of the Devil)). In the next section, therefore, we consider
Anselm’s treatment of free will, and because of the attention of current scholarship,
we do so with particular reference to De Casu Diaboli.

1.2.2 - De Casu Diaboli and related works
The historical discussion of future contingents is inextricably bound up with
discussions of free will, and Anselm’s case is no exception. Let me take the following
paragraphs to explain why this connection is so strong. We have already rehearsed
the problems that arises when future contingent events are considered in relation to
God’s foreknowledge of them. God’s knowledge of how an event will turn out seems
to result in a necessity for that event to occur — at the very least, a necessity of
fixity, or of inevitability. We have seen above how Anselm seeks to address this
aspect of the problem. But Anselm remains cogniscent of the fact that, despite his
demonstration of the lack of necessity conferred on an event by God’s
foreknowledge of it, people may yet feel unconvinced of the freedom of their will in
such circumstances. For there is still psychologically a strong tendency to feel that
our actions, or indeed any future event, cannot be free if they are already known by
God.
Perhaps that would not be such a problem, in and of itself: we could simply
deny that any future events (or, in fact, any events at all, at any time) are contingent,
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contenting ourselves with a determined order under the benevolent sovereignty of
God. But if no event is contingent, then it would appear to be the case that any
choice we make to act in a certain way is itself determined; and if it is determined,
then it would appear that we do not will to act in that way freely. And if we do not
freely will an action, then being held responsible for the action seems grossly unfair:
how can we fairly be punished for an action that we could not have avoided, or
rewarded for an action that we performed by no will of our own? When the
punishments and rewards in question are amplified to the status of the infinite
punishments and rewards meted out by God’s Providence, the injustice of their
being unmerited becomes all the more apparent!41
There are a number of possible routes out of this dilemma, and the route that
we saw investigated in the previous section was that of denying that knowledge
entails necessity in a thing per se; but another possible route, and the one that is
Some may be concerned that I am attributing more to human freedom than Christian orthodoxy in the
Augustinian tradition may allow. It has even been suggested to me that to attribute such power to our
own freedom commits the heresy of Pelagius. Indeed, there are certain strands of Christian thought —
strands which gained much greater prominence during the Reformation, particularly in Calvinism, and
which claimed an Augustinian heritage — which would have it that the only sort of freedom which we
exercise is the freedom to sin (it should be noted, however, that it is entirely probable that Calvin’s own
emphases on this and many other points were far less extreme than those of this followers). Left to our
own devices, we are, the Calvinists would have it, “totally depraved,” and merit only damnation. It is
only through the unearned act of God’s grace that we are ever able to avoid sin. One can remember the
nexus of tenets connected with this Calvinist teaching with the mnemonic “TULIP,” learned by any child
who participates in the Calvinist Cadet Corps or the Calvinettes, and a particularly apt mnemonic given
the Dutch connection of many in the Reformed tradition: Total depravity (that apart from God’s grace,
we are utterly devoid of any goodness of our own), Unconditional election (that those whom God elects
to be saved are chosen without any preceding condition), Limited atonement (that only some are elect
to be saved), Irresistible grace (that those elected cannot but yield to the grace of God), and
Perseverance of the saints (that those whom God elects will abide in God’s grace to the end). Present in
this collection of doctrines is indeed an Augustinian theme, namely, that of “prevenient grace” — that is,
that God’s grace precedes, or “goes before,” any meritorious action we may perform, and thus it is
properly God, not ourselves, who deserves primary credit for any ability we have to do good and resist
evil. But not present in the Augustinian view, nor in the dominant orthodoxy of the Middle Ages (East or
West), is the doctrine of total depravity. As image-bearers of God whose creation was affirmed as “good”
by God himself, there remains something in the core of our being, even in our fallen state, corrupted as
we are by sin, that desires God and God’s goodness. The Law of God is “written on our hearts,” and we
remain free to heed it or to ignore it. To say that we are free in this way is not to deny the prevenience of
God’s grace in our choice to do good and resist evil; every good thing in creation is only so by the grace
of God. But contra Calvin et alia, God’s grace is not “irresistible.” We are offered this grace as a free gift:
it remains within our power, by our own freedom of will, to reject it. We are indeed “free creatures of an
eternal God.”
41
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highlighted by Anselm in other places, is to undermine conventional notions of what
free will consists in, and how it operates. A conventional argument about the puzzle
of God’s foreknowledge, free will, and responsibility may be rendered something like
this:
P1. God knows all events, past, present, and future.
P2. Something that is known cannot be otherwise than as it is known.
C1. All events, past, present, and future, must happen just as
they are known to happen by God.
C2. (Since all of my future actions are known by God) All of my
future actions must happen just as they are known to happen
by God.
P3. Freedom of will consists in being able to will to act in a variety of
ways
C3. An action which must happen in a particular way is not
free.
C4. My actions are not enacted freely. (C2 and C3)
P4. A person cannot be held responsible for (i.e., merit or demerit
from) actions they were not free to choose.
C5. I cannot be held responsible for my actions.
P5. It is unjust to reward or punish someone for actions for which
they are not responsible.
P6. God rewards and punishes me for my actions.
C6. God is unjust. XXX
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We have already seen how Boethius finds his way out of this absurdity by
complicating and therefore disputing P2, something which Anselm also did in De
Concordia. But as we shall see, Anselm also complicates P3.
Anselm’s treatment of free will is far from straight-forward. One can
summarize fairly easily his definition of free will, which is that it is “the power to
preserve rightness of will for the sake of that same rightness”42; but how does this
definition help us to understand free will? Some contemporary scholars have been
extremely critical of Anselm’s definition. Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, for
instance, summarize potential problems with the definition as follows:
From the point of view of contemporary metaphysics, this is one of the most
unhelpful definitions imaginable. Does such freedom require alternative
possibilities, for example? Is it compatible with causal determination? Is the
exercise of such freedom a necessary and sufficient condition for moral
responsibility? The definition sheds no light on these questions.43

Though some of the questions posed by Visser and Williams may be somewhat
anachronistic, it may yet be worth considering Anselm’s understanding of free will
along these lines, for a contemporary philosopher, so it is certainly worth keeping
these questions in the back of our minds. But though Visser and Williams are
unconvinced that Anselm can give a consistent account of free will in light of these
questions, I am persuaded by Tomas Ekenberg’s more charitable (and more
contextual) attempt to understand Anselm’s account of free will.44

De Libertate Arbitrii 3, trans. Tomas Ekenberg. “Ergo quoniam omnis libertas est potestas, illa libertas
arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem.” This definition is
repeated by Anselm on other occasions, also, including in De Concordia book I.
43
S. Visser and T. Williams, “Anselm’s account of freedom”, in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, ed. B.
Davies and B. Leftow (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 179.
44
Tomas Ekenberg, “Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury,” British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, 24:2 (March 2016), 215-230.
42
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Ekenberg’s argument focuses on the discussion on De Casu Diaboli (On the
Fall of the Devil) as a unique case study of Lucifer’s sin to infer some particularly
interesting consequences for Anselm’s theory of the will. Ekenberg argues that
Anselm’s view of the rational will forms, historically, a unique midpoint between the
Augustinian view and the later view characterized by figures such as John Olivi and
Duns Scotus. Like Augustine, Anselm follows the notion that a sinful will, being evil,
cannot in fact really have a cause or definite being. In this, Anselm adheres to
Augustine’s so-called “Great Chain of Being,” wherein the being or existence of a
thing increases proportionately to its goodness; thus we have God at the very top of
the chain, possessing both infinite being and infinite goodness, until at the bottom,
the chain vanishes into absolute nothingness, which is pure evil.45 But unlike
Augustine, Anselm argues that, as is particularly evident in the case of Lucifer’s sin,
our will to do evil, though it may not have a cause, exactly, must yet arise from some
sort of rational process: it must be the case that the will resulting in an evil deed
arises from a rational desire for something good (even if our desire for that thing is
fundamentally in conflict with justice). And thus we see in Anselm the beginnings of
a doctrine of duality of will, or double will, that would later be developed by Olivi
and Duns Scotus.
In this way, then, Anselm examines both halves of the problem of future
contingents as evident in the dilemma of God’s foreknowledge and human free will:
Anselm both provides an argument as to why God’s foreknowledge entails no
necessity in the things foreknown, and provides a non-trivial theory of the way in
which free will operates.

1.3 - Duns Scotus

The non-being of evil is largely Augustine’s response to at least one aspect of the Problem of Evil: God
is the creator of all that exists, and all that exists is truly good; but evil, being nothing, has no cause, and
is therefore not something caused by God (and so not “God’s fault,” so to speak).
45
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Scholarly discussion of John Duns Scotus' view of contingency was lively and
controversial in the 1990s and in the early years of this century. Simo Knuuttila, in
his overview of modal logic in the Middle Ages, put forward a highly influential
thesis, attributing to Duns Scotus the seminal prototype of the concept he dubbed
“synchronic contingency” (a term I will explain and discuss shortly).46 Reception of
this thesis has been mixed, with scholars such as Stephen Dumont, Scott Macdonald,
and Calvin Normore variously offering criticisms, corrections, and refinements.47 I
will attempt in this section to outline the background of this discussion, laying out
the basic aspects of Scotus' view on which all are agreed, and the received view prior
to Knuuttila’s controversial thesis; I will then outline Knuuttila’s thesis, and
summarize the responses it has received. Finally, I will summarize how Scotus' view
of contingency allows him to develop a unique account of God’s foreknowledge.

1.3.1 - Basic discussion of texts
In his 2003 article, Normore stated that because of the (then-) current state
of manuscript and textual analysis, the trajectory of Scotus' writing was far from
clear.48 The dating of Scotus' works, and even the identification of a complete
authentic corpus, was at that point quite uncertain, and Normore was therefore able
to say very little about how Scotus' ideas of future contingents may or may not have
developed over the course of his life. In the decade or more since, however, a great
deal of scholarship, including new critical editions of several of Scotus' works, has
advanced our understanding of the extent and chronology of Scotus' writings. This
scholarship has primarily occurred under the auspices of the International Scotistic

S. Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993).
See, e.g., Stephen Dumont, “The origin of Scotus' theory of synchronic contingency,” Modern
Schoolman vol. 72, no. ⅔ (Jan/Mar 1995), 149 - 67; Scott MacDonald, “Synchronic Contingency, Instants
of Nature, and Libertarian Freedom: Comments on ‘The Background to Scotus' Theory of Will’,” Modern
Schoolman vol. 72, no. ⅔ (Jan/Mar 1995), 169 - 74; Calvin Normore, “Duns Scotus's Modal Theory”, in
The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 129 - 60.
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Commission of the Vatican, but also in the form of other independent research. Of
particular interest are the reportatio, lectura, and ordinatio49 on question I.39 of
Peter Lombard's Sentences.50 These works of veritable authenticity are presumed to
have been written in the years just before Scotus died, and have a great deal to say
on the topic of contingency in general, and future contingents in particular. Of
especial interest to our current study, these works represent some of Scotus' most
original — and controversial — statements on the topic. Furthermore, because of
their late date, we can assume that these works represent his most developed and
mature thoughts on the matter, and are thus representative of the view at which he
ultimately arrived.

1.3.2 – Knuuttila on Scotus' Modal Theory
As early as 1982, Knuuttila began identifying Scotus as highly original and
innovative in an aspect of his modal theory.51 In the ancient and early-medieval
period, Knuuttila identifies an approach to modality which does not permit
contingency in anything in the present moment. This can be traced back to the
Aristotelian doctrine of “the necessity of the present”, which is to say that whatever
is, when it is, necessarily is. On this model, the present time is “fixed”, and thus
unable to be otherwise, just as the past is. On some interpretations, at least, it would
seem on this model that, because the present moment is necessary, our choices in

A clarification of terminology for non-medievalists: reportatio, lectura, and ordinatio are terms used to
distinguish between three different genres of texts relating to the lectures of a master during the
Scholastic period. A reportatio is a report of a lecture — essentially class notes — written by a student,
but often examined and approved by the master; a lectura is the lecture notes of the master himself, not
necessarily intended for public consumption; while an ordinatio is the polished, prepared work of the
master, intended for distribution beyond the master’s own university.
50
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Wolter, O.F.M., and O.V. Bychkov (St Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2008); John
Duns Scotus Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, intro., trans., and commentary by A. Vos Jaczn et al.
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994); Ordinatio in Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balić (Civitas Vaticana:
Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950 - ).
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that moment are also necessary.
In accordance with this Aristotelian notion, the rules for obligationes (i.e.,
obligational disputations — a late medieval logic game)52 attributed to William of
Sherwood stipulate that if a counterfactual proposition about the present time is put
forward as possible, it must be denied.53 To what extent these obligationes rules can
be seen as reflective of philosophers’ actual intuitions or commitments concerning
the necessity of the present is debateable, but it nevertheless shows a certain degree
of reticence to concede the possibility of alternatives to what is in fact occurring at
the present moment.
Knuuttila contends that Duns Scotus radically breaks with the traditional
view of modality in the present when he denies this rule of obligationes. In
considering the obligationes rule which states, “Everything that exists, when it exists,
exists with necessity,”54 Scotus says,
I say that the proposition “everything that exists, when it exists,” etc., can be
either categorical (or temporal) or hypothetical. If it is categorical, then this
repetitive phrase ‘when it exists’ does not qualify all that is implied in this
expression, but only ‘existence,’ and the sense of ‘everything that exists, when
it exists,’ etc., is: ‘every being, when it exists, exists as necessary or
necessarily.’ But if it is hypothetical, then that repetition ‘when it exists’ is a
condition that qualifies the [whole] expression or the predicate, and the
sense is: ‘every being exists in a necessary manner — when it exists.’ Hence,
if you draw an inference to the case at hand, there is a fallacy of [confusing]
the qualified and unqualified senses.

[D]ico . . . quod haec propositio “omne quod est, quando est,” etc. potest esse
categorica sive temporalis vel hypothetica. Si sit categorica, tunc haec
For an outline of what obligationes are, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Medieval Theories of Obligationes,”
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online), revised 2014.
53
For a discussion of obligationes and counterfactuals, see, for instance, Paul Vincent Spade, “Three
Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning,” History and
Philosophy of Logic, vol. 3 (1982), 1 – 32.
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reduplicatio ‘quando est’ non determinat omne, quod est in compositione
implicita, sed determinat tantum ‘esse,’ et est sensus: ‘omne quod est, quando
est” etc., id est ‘omne ens, quando est, est necessarium vel necessario.’ Si
autem sit hypothetica, tunc reduplicatio ‘quando est’ est modus determinans
compositionem sive praedicatum, et est sensus: ‘omne ens est necessario
quando est.’ Si ergo inferas ad propositum, est fallicia secundum quid et
simpliciter. (Reportatio I dist. 39, par. 49, pp. 478 - 79 in Wolter & Bychkov)

In this way, Scotus explicitly denies — or at the very least, heavily qualifies — the
obligationes rule, based on the dictum of Aristotle. What Scotus instead proposes is
that things which happen contingently remain contingent, even in the very moment
at which they are actualized. On Knuuttila’s reading, the idea that two opposite
outcomes both remain possible in the moment that one of the two is actualized is a
radically new idea, which he terms “synchronic contingency”.
Another way to conceive of the difference is this: on the one hand, we can
consider two opposites to be possible, insofar as it is possible for the first to obtain
at time t1 and the other to obtain at t2. What Scotus asserts, according to Knuuttila,
is that at the very same time at which one of a pair of opposites is happening, the
other remains possible in that moment. In other words, at the same time t1, both P
and ~P are possible. It is not just that P is happening now, and both P and ~P are
now possible insofar as ~P might be the case at some future time; rather, though P
is, in fact, happening now, it also remains possible that ~P could be happening now
instead. It is this latter property, this
possibility-to-be-at-the-very-same-time-that-the-opposite-is, that marks out Scotus'
view as distinctly original. It is because of this possibility at the same time, with
respect to the same time, that Knuuttila calls this sort of contingency “synchronic.”
It is worth noting that this conception of counterfactual possibility leads
directly to a notion of possibility that is no longer tied, as the principle of plenitude
might stipulate, to what in fact happens or is actualized in the world of our
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experience. This leads to a distinction between what is actually, or naturally,
possible, and what is (merely?) logically possible. For something to be logically
possible, it need not be the case that it could actually be realized in the world. For
possibility in terms of powers, by contrast, in the case of the present contingent
event, because a particular event is occurring, its opposite could not actually happen
in the present moment, by the fixity of events past and present — and thus its
opposite could therefore not be “possible” in this sense. Logical possibility, however,
seems only to require the absence of any contradiction if the opposite of what is
actually the case is counterfactually asserted to be the case instead.

1.3.3 - Objections to Knuuttila’s thesis
In the years since Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, three main objections
have been leveled against Knuuttila’s synchronic contingency thesis. The first comes
from Calvin Normore, who criticises Knuuttila for being somewhat careless in his
designation of Scotus' innovation being that of “synchronic contingency,” and offers a
refinement of the view which takes broader metaphysical considerations into
account. The second is from Stephen Dumont, who identifies in the earlier writings
of Peter John Olivi strong elements of Scotus' position, suggesting, therefore, that
Scotus may not have been as original as Knuuttila supposes. And the third is that of
Scott MacDonald, who doesn’t see anything original in any of these 14th-century
writings, and thinks, rather, that these ideas can be traced back at least as far as
Augustine.55 In this sub-section, I will outline each of these objections in turn,

It has been suggested to me by Lorne Falkenstein that the idea of synchronic contingency might be
traced yet further back, at least as far as the ancient skeptic philosopher Carneades, whose views on the
matter may be found reported by Cicero in the De fato. There may indeed be an interesting line of
inquiry to be found here. For the time being, however, I will not concern myself with pursuing the
matter, both because I think too little can be gleaned from the extant texts to determine with much
certainty what Carneades may or may not have thought on the matter; and because, even if Carneades
did have a position very like that of Scotus, it most certainly would not have been known to either
Scotus or his immediate predecessors.
55
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together with my own responses.
Normore believes that Knuuttila has missed the mark in suggesting that
Scotus' original contribution was a view of synchronic — or simultaneous —
contingency simpliciter.56 As Normore understands Knuuttila, he has claimed that
Scotus thinks that the possibility of contradictories in the same moment applies not
only to the present, but also to the past and future — mutatis mutandi for the
appropriate verb tenses. Normore sees, rather, the relevant difference between
Scotus and his predecessors to be a notion of the present being contingent. He
thinks that medievals long before Scotus conceived of future events being contingent
in a synchronic sort of way; furthermore, he points out that Scotus does not extend
this notion of synchronic contingency to points in the past (an issue that I will return
to at the end of 1.3), saying, “Moreover, although he rejects the necessity of the
present, Scotus thinks that the past is necessary.”57 Normore therefore thinks that it
is wrong to label Scotus' new conception as being that of synchronic contingency,
since synchronic contingency is not a new notion with respect to future points in
time, and is not accepted at all with respect to past points in time. Normore prefers
rather to speak of Scotus' notion of the contingency of the present.
For my own part, I do not think that Knuuttila himself was guilty of more
than sloppy diction in his discussion of Scotus' view. Nowhere does Knuuttila
explicitly imply, by anything more than the unqualified phrase “synchronic
contingency,” that Scotus extended this notion to the past, or that he was original in
its application to the future. However, in modern “possible world” notions of
contingency, it is quite natural to speak of synchronic contingency applying to all
points in time — past, present, and future. The semantics of possible worlds are
closely connected to the notion of “logical possibility”, which Scotus is widely held to
have to have distinguished from natural possibility in an original way. Given the
novelty of Scotus' distinction between what is logically possible, versus what is only
56
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naturally possible, the connexion between this distinction and possible world
semantics, and the fact that synchronic contingency is universally applicable in the
realm of possible worlds speech, it may seem natural to infer from what Knuuttila
does say that for Scotus, synchronic contingency applies to all points in time.
Though it is possible to think that this may follow from Knuuttila’s view, Knuuttila
does not — and, I think, would not — make this explicit.
In large part, this is so because of the overwhelming textual evidence that
Scotus considered the past to be necessary. In support of the view that Scotus,
despite his belief in the contingency of the present, still believed the past to be
necessary, Normore points to a number of passages, including the following from
Lectura I.40, in which Scotus considers the following: “[W]hat passes into the past is
necessary — as the Philosopher wishes in Book 6 of the Ethics, approving the saying
of someone who says that, ‘this alone is God not able to make: that which is past not
be be past.’” Scotus replies, “To the first argument, when it is argued that that which
passes into the past is necessary, it is conceded.”58 In this concession, Scotus makes
plain his acceptance of the necessity of the past.
Despite the fact that Normore is wrong to attribute to Knuuttila the (clearly
false) view that Scotus applied synchronic contingency to the past as well as the
present and future, Normore is right to make this clarificatory correction to
Knuuttila’s use of the phrase “synchronic contingency”. What is really at stake in
Scotus' writing is a very specific case of synchronic contingency, namely, that in the
moment of the present. Synchronic contingency in future moments was generally
accepted by (non-determinist) philosophers prior to Scotus; and synchronic
contingency of past moments was not accepted by Scotus (and was not even
entertained as possible for some time after). It is misleading, therefore, to speak
generally of Scotus having pioneered the notion of “synchronic contingency” in an
unqualified way. It is far superior, being much more accurate, to speak of Scotus
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putting forward the idea of a “contingent present.”
Despite this, Knuuttila’s language of “synchronic contingency” has
predominated in the subsequent scholarly discussion. Dumont, MacDonald,
Marenbon, and others have all taken on this language when speaking of Scotus'
contribution (or lack thereof — as we will see discussed below) to the idea that
alternative possibilities in the present moment are real possibilities. It is for this
reason that, though I generally favour Normore’s description of “contingency of the
present,” I will at times concede to using the term “synchronic contingency” —
though it must in such cases be strictly understood to mean synchronic contingency
of the present.
In addition to making this clarificatory point on terminology, Normore
develops Knuuttila’s analysis in a way that probes the metaphysical and causal, not
just the logical, implications of (synchronic) contingency of the present. In
particular, Normore examines in much greater depth the role played by “instants of
nature” in Scotus' theory. In the traditional (Aristotelian) account of possibility, an
event being possible requires the possibility of the current circumstances to change
in such a way that the possible event occurs. This change requires the passage in
time of a particular causal chain. What Scotus does to disrupt this picture is
introduce the notion of something being causally prior to another thing, without
necessarily being prior in time. He explains this by way of an appeal to instants of
nature, as opposed to instants of time. As an example of something which is causally
prior without being prior in time, consider a cannonball resting on a pillow59:
though the cannonball’s resting is simultaneous in time with the coinciding
indentation in the pillow, the cannonball is causally prior to the pillow’s indentation.
Scotus would have it that we can understand the cannonball as occupying a prior
instant of nature, if not of time. Thus, a causal relationship between two things need
not be understood in terms of succession in time, but may be understood more
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abstractly as a succession in nature.
Dumont, on the other hand, has argued that Knuuttila is wrong to locate the
beginnings of synchronic contingency in Scotus; he believes, rather, that these ideas
can be seen in Scotus' predecessor, Peter John Olivi.60 MacDonald, in response to
Dumont, contends that this notion of synchronic contingency of present (and even
past!) events has really been around for far longer than any of Knuuttila, Normore,
or Dumont claim: he sees this going back at least as far as Augustine, who posits
counterfactuals about man’s fall, stating that it is possible that man could have not
fallen — seeming to suggest that a counterfactual about a past event is possible even
after it has already occurred.61
I would accept (as has Knuuttila, in later writing) that precursors to Scotus'
theory can be detected in earlier sources, including Olivi. However, I think that
MacDonald misses the significance of Scotus' development when he claims that the
idea of synchronic contingency (at all times, even!) has been present in the primary
literature as early as Augustine. What MacDonald fails to recognize is that, while
people have always spoken in hypothetical counterfactuals about the past and
present, the predominating model for understanding true contingency in the
medieval tradition was the frequency model, without any strongly articulated sense
that these counter-factuals spoken of had any actual power or potency to be. Of
course we can talk of Adam not sinning; but there is no power by which that
alternate reality can be realized. For Scotus, it is most relevant to consider this idea
in a present instant: if at time t1, I decide to reach for a cookie, then of course one
could always talk hypothetically about my having decided not to reach for that
cookie at t1; but the revolutionary thing about Scotus' idea is that at t1, the very
moment of my willing, I yet had the actual power to will not to take the cookie. This,
pace MacDonald, is far from having been a widely accepted notion prior to Scotus
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(even if there may have been earlier hints here and there).

1.3.4 - Contingency of the Present and God’s Foreknowledge
Scotus' synchronic view of contingency, or belief in the contingency of the
present, allows him to lay out a new theory of God’s foreknowledge that reconciles,
he thinks, God’s foreknowledge with human freedom. Firstly, contingency of the
present allows for the possibility of contingency in the world, and in particular,
contingency of human will and action. This is because Scotus believes that the only
way for contingency to exist in the world is that the first act of creation must have
been contingent. Otherwise, if the first act of creation were necessary, and all
subsequent history an extension of that act by necessary causes, then all of created
history would itself also be necessary. If, however, that first act of creation is
contingent, then everything which follows from it — even if it follows by causal
necessity — is also contingent. For this reason, Scotus stresses the contingency of
the first act of creation. This act, however, is an act of God’s will. In the moment that
God wills creation into existence, it comes to be; but since Scotus requires that that
act be contingent, it must be so even in the very moment of its creation. Thus, the
contingency of the present allows God’s present act of will to be performed
contingently. Even in the very moment of willing creation into being, God could will
otherwise.
But then God’s act of creation involves choosing between a number of
maximally consistent sets (which, in contemporary parlance, may be seen as
equivalent to choosing among all “possible worlds”62). In this contingent act of the
will, God is setting in motion all future acts of creation — both those which are
(necessarily) causally determined, and those which happen by a free act of human or
For discussion of the relationship between Scotus' account and contemporary possible worlds
semantics, see Normore 2002, 154 - 55 (section V, “Possible Worlds”). Though Scotus did not explicitly
speak of “possible worlds,” there is good reason to think that possible worlds semantics would
complement his views quite nicely.
62
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divine will (in the latter case, we think particularly of instances of miracles). By
knowledge of his own will, he knows what human creatures will be born and live in
this created order; and by his intimate knowledge of the will of each person, he
knows what choice they will make in any given circumstance.
And so, on Scotus' picture, God knows the future by a complete knowledge of
the following three things: (1) All causally (naturally) determined events; (2) God’s
own will, which acts contingently; and (3) the will of all human creatures, which act
contingently. But knowing any of these things in no way necessitates the contingent
acts of the actors. So this morning, a Monday morning, I had two soft-boiled eggs for
breakfast. God knew that I would have two eggs not through any special foresight of
the actual event, but because he knows me, and knows me to be the sort of creature
who would choose to have two eggs for breakfast this morning. This prediction on
God’s part, through God’s knowledge of me, would be no great feat if it was the case
that I ate two eggs for breakfast every day, or every Monday; if this was part of my
daily or weekly routine, then my husband, or even a close friend, if she knew me well
enough, would be able to make the same prediction through their knowledge of me
and my breakfast preferences. But let’s complicate this picture a little further:
suppose it to be the case (as in fact it is) that it’s rather unusual for me to have eggs
for breakfast on a Monday; suppose, further, that I in fact usually have a pair of
soft-boiled eggs for my Sunday breakfast. One might expect in such a case that God
would mistakenly conclude, from God’s knowledge of my typical behaviour, that I
would not have eggs this morning. However, it happened that yesterday I slept late
and did not have time for my usual Sunday breakfast ritual, so instead wolfed down
a quick breakfast of toast and peanut butter before rushing off to church. But God
knows my predilection for soft-boiled eggs, and my disappointment at not having
had time for my usual Sunday breakfast; furthermore, God knows that I’m the sort of
person who, relishing the comfort of weekly rituals (particularly where food is
concerned), would go out of my way to make up for a missed treat. And so knowing
all of this, God would know that I would take the next possible opportunity to eat a
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pair of soft-boiled eggs for breakfast, and thus conclude that I would have two eggs
for breakfast this Monday morning.
In summary, we have seen how Scotus introduced the new, important notion
of contingency of the present; how this allows, through the contingency of God’s
creative act, for contingency in the world; and finally, how God’s knowledge of all
future events, including contingent events, relies on God’s complete knowledge of
the sorts of wills possessed by each of God’s creatures.

1.3.5 - Contingency of the past?
One final word before moving on: I mentioned before that Scotus did not
extend his ideas of synchronic contingency to the past, which is a fact that may strike
contemporary philosophers as strange. In contemporary philosophy, we tend to
conceive of the past as contingent quite easily. So let me explain an idea I have about
why this may not have been the case for Scotus. My idea is this:
Taking logical possibility to simply be the absence of a contradiction, consider
a contingent event A that happens at present time t*. Then the moment before A
happened (let’s call it t* - 1 — for the sake of argument, assume discrete units of
time, call them moments, and assume they unfold sequentially like the integers),
both A at t* and ~A at t* were possible. As we move into the moment t* and A
happens, there is no contradiction in thinking about moment t*, and all moments
leading up to it, as being exactly as they are with the exception that A is swapped for
~A at t*. However, A presumably has some necessary causal effects on the moment
after its inception that ~A would not have — let’s call the set of A’s necessary effects
in the next moment Γ, and ~A’s effects Γ’. So let’s say we’re now in the moment after
A’s inception, t* + 1. In the actual course of things, there is now this set Γ of things
happening now, which would not be identical to the set Γ’ that would be happening
now had ~A happened at t* instead. So if we look back to t* and mentally swap A
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for ~A, we wind up with a contradiction when we consider that moment together
with all other moments, including the present — namely, ~A happening at t*
contradicts the present state of affairs including the members of Γ rather than the
members of Γ’. So while ~At* was possible at t*, ~At* is no longer possible at t* + 1 —
at least, not without introducing the further modification which swaps the members
of Γ for those of Γ’ in t* + 1.
In other words, hypothesizing changes to past moments entails a
contradiction with actual events of subsequent moments, whereas hypothetical
changes in the present moment — assuming the changes are alternatives that were
possible in the preceding moment — entail no such contradiction. This is why I
think Scotus doesn’t extend the principle of synchronic contingency to past
moments of time.
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Chapter 2
William Ockham on Future Contingents

Introduction
William Ockham is a major figure in the development of the discussion of
future contingents, and his place in this thesis is particularly important because it is
primarily to Ockham that Bradwardine responds.63 Indeed, as direct
contemporaries for several years at Oxford in the late 1310s and early 1320s, it is
highly probable, perhaps almost certain, that Bradwardine and Ockham would have
engaged one another intellectually in person during that time. Throughout his
writing, Bradwardine is extremely critical of Ockham, and it would not be an
exaggeration to assert that Ockham is Bradwardine’s chief intellectual target. In his
most famous work, De causa Dei contra Pelagium, Bradwardine explicitly links
Ockham’s philosophy to the ancient heresy of Pelagianism, denouncing Ockham and
his followers in no uncertain terms as Pelagians. In the De futuris contingentibus, the
earlier treatise that is the subject of this study, it is in the context of condemning
Ockham’s position that Bradwardine ventures his own solution. Ockham’s position
is also interesting and important from a contemporary standpoint, since there are a
number of influential philosophers of religion — most notably, Marilyn McCord
Adams (who, sadly, passed away just recently) and Alvin Plantinga — who have in
recent decades taken up and defended versions of Ockham’s solution to the problem.
64
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I owe a great debt of thanks to Alexander Stöpfgeshoff for a series of conversations he and I had,
during his time at Western in the winter of 2015, about William Ockham’s view of future contingents,
and Bradwardine’s objections to the same. These conversations helped me immeasurably in forming
my own understanding of Ockham’s view, and contributed substantially to the shape and content of this
and the next chapter.
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and against Ockham’s solution and its merit as a viable solution. It is therefore
important that we take time at this point to carefully consider Ockham’s position,
which is the chief aim of this chapter. I begin by outlining, very briefly and roughly,
an account of Ockham’s nominalism, which is important for understanding the
subsequent discussion (2.1). I then lay out an exposition of Ockham’s treatment of
the problem, focusing primarily on his text, De praedestinatione et de praescientia
Dei et de futuris contingentibus (On predestination, God’s foreknowledge, and future
contingents) (2.2).65 I will then, in the final section, outline a number of potential
objections to Ockham’s theory, pointing out possible weaknesses and problems as I
see them (2.3). This will all serve to set us up to observe Bradwardine’s criticisms of
Ockham’s position in the following chapter.

2.1 - Ockham’s Nominalism
It is going to help our understanding of what follows a great deal if we first
take a brief diversion to discuss Ockham’s understanding of the content of a
proposition. In the late medieval period, there is a great deal of contention about
how exactly propositions and their terms are to be understood, and in particular,
what precisely they represent. I do not have space in my present study to explore
this in any great precision or detail — indeed, many theses could be (and have been)
devoted to this and closely related topics. But at the risk of trying to dissect the
problem with too dull a knife, I will say that the disagreement may be broadly
understood along the lines of nominalism versus realism, of both universals and the
signification of terms. Ockham is widely recognized as a nominalist of a fairly

(South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1987). William Lane Craig has provided a more succinct summary in
The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill,
1988), 146 - 68. For Plantinga’s treatment of the topic, see Alvin Plantinga, “On Ockham’s Way Out,”
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 3 (July 1986), 235 - 69.
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thoroughgoing sort, explicitly rejecting the so-called “moderate realism” of many of
his prominent contemporaries and proximate predecessors. Some scholars have
even gone so far as to label Ockham an “extreme nominalist.”66 The “moderate
realism” against which Ockham protests largely follows the tradition begun by
Aristotle: this form of realism does not follow the Platonist doctrine that universals
“really” exist as separate heavenly entities independent from the particulars that
they inform, but it nonetheless maintains that universal properties really do exist
and inhere in their particulars. It therefore ascribes a certain metaphysical reality
and independence to these species and genera which we term “universals.” Though
there is variation in the exact expression and understanding of this doctrine, this
basic principle — that universals are real — informs the understanding of many of
the most prominent thinkers leading into the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries, including Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.67
Ockham’s well-documented nominalism, therefore, stands at odds with many
of his prominent contemporaries. Adams summarizes a central tenet of Ockham’s
approach, which she sees as continuous with that of Henry of Harclay,68 in the
following way: “Everything that exists in reality is essentially singular — i.e.,
logically incapable of existing in, as a constituent of, numerically many
simultaneously.”69 Unlike Harclay, however, Ockham derives as a consequence that

Joseph A. Magno, “Ockham’s Extreme Nominalism,” Thomist: A speculative quarterly 43 (July 1979),
414 - 49.
67
An eminently useful overview of the discussion of the problem leading up to the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, which particularly sets up Ockham’s response to the same, can be found in Adams’
important overview of the philosophy of Ockham, William Ockham (1987). In particular, chapter 1
(“The Problem of Universals,” pp. 3 - 12), chapter 2 (“Universals Are Not Things Other Than Names,” pp.
13 - 69), and chapter 4 (“Universals, Conventionalism, and Similarity,” pp. 109 - 41) are helpful both in
understanding Ockham’s context, Ockham’s rejection of the dominant view of his contemporaries, and
Ockham’s own nominalist response. Adams has also written a more concise overview of the topic in The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: CUP, 1982),
“Universals in the early fourteenth century,” pp. 411 - 39.
68
Henry of Harclay was a student of Duns Scotus and near-contemporary of Ockham and Bradwardine
at Oxford, where he served as University Chancellor for the last few years of his life until his death in
1317.
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Adams 1982, pp. 429 and 434.
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“universals are nothing other than names.”70 This nominalism will help us later to
understand some of Ockham’s arguments, which are otherwise somewhat puzzling.
In particular, it is a consequence of his anti-realism that, when it comes to
understanding propositions, Ockham does not see the terms as representing
anything more than the bare particulars to which they refer, whenever they are
uttered.71 A proposition does not take on any fixed existence of its own apart from
the words uttered and their immediate referents.
Where this will become particularly relevant in the following discussion is
understanding Ockham’s interpretation of propositions as they relate to the passage
of time. It may be generally assumed that when a proposition is uttered with a time
referent, such as “Donald Trump is now the President-elect of the United States,” or
“Yesterday, Kelowna had its first snowfall of the year” (uttered at 10:08pm on
Monday, 5 December, 2016), that the proposition automatically ever hereafter bears
the meaning imposed by the referents at the time of its utterance. Thus the first
proposition, for instance, is eternally equivalent to the proposition, “Donald Trump
is the President-elect of the United States on Monday, 5 December, 2016, at
10:08pm,” and by this token, is determinately true. But Ockham does not take
propositions to have enduring referential content in this way. On Ockham’s view,
propositions never mean anything more than what the bare referents of the words
themselves would imply at the moment of their utterance. Propositions are never
more nor less than a string of words — words which name things, but which may
name different things at different times, depending on the context. Thus, for
Ockham, a proposition whose truth or falsity depends on a particular moment in
time may change in truth-value as time elapses. “Donald Trump is now the

Adams 1982, p. 434 (this is similarly formulated in Adams 1987, p. 13). The primary sources
supporting this understanding of Ockham on universals is chiefly to be found in his Ordinatio I, dist. 2,
question 4 (Opera Theologica II, pp. 117ff), but is also supported by his commentary on Aristotle’s De
interpretatione (Opera Philosophica II, pp. 345ff).
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A classic text outlining Ockham’s theory of propositions is that of Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., “A
Medieval Theory of Supposition,” Franciscan Studies 18, no. 3 - 4 (September - December 1958), pp. 240
- 89.
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President-elect of the United States” is true as I write this, but within a matter of
weeks, when Trump (presumably) ceases to be President-elect and instead assumes
the role of President, the proposition will correspondingly cease to be true. This is
certainly an idiosyncratic way of understanding the truth of propositions over time,
but it is an understanding which Ockham adheres to in a remarkably consistent way.
And as we shall see in what follows, it is important for understanding much of what
he says concerning God’s foreknowledge of future contingents.

2.2 - Ockham’s account of future contingents
Ockham’s most sustained and focussed discussion of the topic of future
contingents occurs in his treatise On Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future
Contingents (PPD), written sometime between 1319 (the year that Ockham
completed his Sentences commentary) and 1324 (the year that Ockham was
summoned before the Pope in Avignon to answer for charges of heresy; Ockham
never again left the Continent after that point, and spent the remainder of his life
embroiled in and writing about political controversies, both religious and secular,
until his death in 1347).72 Other relevant discussions of future contingents in
Ockham’s writing include portions of his Sentences commentary (his Ordinatio book
I, distinctions 38 and 39), his commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, and his
Summa logicae.73 However, given that none of these forms as substantial a
discussion as that found in PPD, I will primarily confine the discussion that follows
to that treatise. This treatise is composed of five questions, the most substantial and
significant of which is the second. In the three subsections which follow, therefore, I
will first give a brief examination of what precedes Q. II (i.e., Q. I) (2.2.1); I will then
give a much lengthier and more detailed treatment of the second question itself
(2.2.2); and finally, I will briefly discuss those minor questions which follow Q. II,
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Marilyn McCord Adams, introduction, PPD pp. 1 - 2.
The relevant portions of all three of these works are included as appendices to PPD (see f.n. 3, above).
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questions III through V (2.2.3). Before moving on to criticisms of Ockham’s view
(both my own in this chapter, and Bradwardine’s in the next), I will briefly highlight
corroborating evidence, from his Ordinatio, that Ockham’s view of God’s
foreknowledge remained somewhat consistent across more of his philosophical
output than just PPD (2.2.4).

2.2.1 - PPD Q. I
Ockham begins the treatise by addressing a question of predestination: are
passive predestination (i.e., the condition of being predestined) and passive
foreknowledge (i.e., the condition of being foreknown [to be saved]) “real relations”
in the person who is predestinate and foreknown? (PPD Q. I A) Ockham maintains
that answering such questions in the affirmative (as does Alexander of Hales74) leads
to a contradiction, given the contingency of a person’s predestinate state. Let me
explain now where Ockham sees the contradiction.
By a “real relation,” Ockham means something intrinsic to or inherent in the
thing itself. So the question is something like, is the state of being predestined, or
being foreknown to be predestined, something that is really intrinsic to the person
herself?
Regarding the subject of predestination and foreknowledge, it should be
observed that those who suppose that passive predestination and passive
foreknowledge are real relations in the [person who is] predestinate and
foreknown have necessarily to admit contradictories. (PPD Q. I A, pp. 34 - 35.
Text in square brackets supplied by Adams and Kretzmann)

Circa materiam de praedestinatione et praescientia est advertendum quod
ponentes praedestinationem passivam et praescientiam passivam esse
respectus reales in praedestinato et praescito habent necessario concedere
74

PPD p. 34, f.n. 2.
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contradictoria. (Opera Philosophica vol. II, p. 507, lines 4 - 7)

Ockham argues in the negative, since, he contends, if being predestined, and being
foreknown to be predestined, were real relations (or intrinsic) in the person, then it
would seem to be the case that that person would have no power in themselves to
act in a way that would undermine her predestinate state. Thus their predestination
is necessary.
But being predestinate (or foreknown to be predestinate) Ockham takes to be
a contingent fact about a person; and so Ockham takes it as a given that the
predestinate person is yet able to reject salvation by her own freely chosen action.
So it seems to Ockham that insisting on the real inherence of predestination in the
person leads to the following contradictory absurdity: the predestinate person is
only so contingently; so the predestinate person could, at some future time, willingly
reject salvation by her own action; in such a case, the person would then be damned;
but if her predestinate state was something really inherent in her nature, then she
would then be both predestinate and damned, which is impossible.
A number of assumptions on Ockham’s part combine to yield this somewhat
puzzling result. Firstly, he takes it for granted that any particular person’s
predestinate state is contingent; in other words, there is no necessity that any
particular person should be saved. This assumption is something which, though
certainly a desirable position from a number of theological standpoints, is far from
obvious. Secondly, he seems to be assuming a very particular view of contingency
(different from either the Classical/Augustinian “principle of plenitude” or the
logical contingency of Duns Scotus), whereby the contingency of an event is tied to
the power of an agent to make it turn out differently. Both of these issues will be
brought into greater focus as we examine Ockham’s views in greater depth. For now,
though, we will turn to a more detailed examination of the second question of the
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treatise.

2.2.2 - PPD Q. II
The second question of PPD is, “In respect of all future contingents, does God
have determinate, certain, infallible, immutable, necessary cognition of one part of a
contradiction?” (PPD q. II A). It is perhaps surprising, as apparent from the way in
which Ockham structures his response, that Ockham considers this to be, in fact,
four separate questions: first, a question of the determinacy of God’s foreknowledge;
second, the certainty and infallibility of God’s foreknowledge; third, the immutability
of God’s foreknowledge; and fourth and finally, the necessity of God’s foreknowledge.
This may surprise us, because we often assume (as most medieval thinkers certainly
did) that these five properties of knowledge are interdependent, or logically
equivalent, in such a way that an affirmative answer to one would imply all the
others (and similarly, that the denial of one would entail the denial of the others).
If we follow Ockham as far as distinguishing among these four questions,
however, we might be further perplexed by the fact that he does not distinguish
between “certainty” and “infallibility” of knowledge (notice above that these two
properties are lumped together as a single question). Is it not conceivable that
certain knowledge may not imply infallible knowledge, or vice-versa — at least to
someone who is so keen to push a distinction between, say, immutability and
necessity, for instance? “Certainty” seems to imply a kind of secure awareness of
one’s own knowledge that “infallibility” need not imply. A certain person not only
knows something, but knows that she knows it! We could imagine, for instance, that
someone has the power of always knowing things aright, but is not secure in the
knowledge of that knowledge. Such a person might be said to be infallible, but not
certain: she knows all things aright, but does not know that she knows them aright.
It may perhaps be the case, though it is doubtful, that certainty of any particular
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object of knowledge may imply infallibility of that knowledge. But regardless,
Ockham, in any case, does not seem interested in this distinction, and perhaps Latin
does not carry the connotation of second-order knowledge in the word “certain” that
the English does. Granting, then, for the sake of argument, Ockham’s division of the
question, we come to his replies.

Q. II art. i: Is God’s foreknowledge determinate?
Concerning the determinacy of God’s foreknowledge of contingent
propositions, Ockham affirms this position. In other words, Ockham affirms that
there is some sense in which God’s knowledge may be said to be determinately true,
rather than than occupying some indeterminate middle-ground between truth and
falsity. Ockham contradicts Aristotle, however, when he goes a step further to claim
that even the contingent propositions themselves are determinate. At the heart of
the controversy is a recasting of the nature of determinacy. Marilyn McCord Adams
has characterized the distinction between Aristotle’s and Ockham’s conceptions of
determinacy in the following way. Aristotle would describe determinacy of a
proposition like this:
D1 - The proposition “x is (or was, or will be) A at tm” is determinately true [or
false] at tn, if and only if there is no potency in things at tn for x’s not being (or
having been, or being going to be) [or for x’s being (or having been, or being
going to be)] A at tm.75

This definition and those that follow are based on Adams’ characterization in her introduction to PPD,
pp. 6ff. For the sake of streamlining my own presentation, I am condensing her characterization of
determinate truth and determinate falsehood into one, which, while adding to the number and
complexity of nested brackets, I hope results in no substantial loss of clarity. I am also glossing over the
distinction Adams makes between an event being determinate, and a proposition about that event being
determinately true or false. It seems to me that this distinction is hardly necessary, since it is clear that
a proposition concerning an event is determinately true if and only if the event it concerns is
determinate (and similarly, a proposition is determinately false iff the “non-event” it concerns is
determinate).
75
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In other words, a proposition about a state of affairs — past, present, or future — is
determinately true (or determinately false) at a particular time (now, for instance), if
and only if there is no power at that particular time for the state of affairs to turn out
otherwise.
On Aristotle’s understanding of determinacy, a past event (like, say, the
German invasion of Poland in 1939) is determinate now, because there is no power
in things now for things to have turned out otherwise then. There is no way now for
that past state of affairs to be reversed — Germany cannot now undo its 1939
invasion of Poland. What’s done is done. It is because of the lack of any power in the
present moment to undo things that happened in the past that Aristotle considered
all past events to be determinate.
But if we consider future events from this Aristotelian framework, and in
particular, future contingent events, we reach quite a different conclusion. For we
consider events in the future to be contingent precisely because of the potential (or
potency, or power) for them to happen or not to happen. Whether the flag will be
raised on Parliament Hill tomorrow morning is a future contingent event, and at this
point in time, there is the potential for it to either happen or not happen. For this
reason, on Aristotle’s account, tomorrow’s flag-raising is not determinate right now:
there is currently the “potency in things” for the flag to be raised or not. Tomorrow
at noon, however (presuming the flag is, in fact, raised in the morning), tomorrow
morning’s flag-raising will no longer be indeterminate, because there will no longer
be any “potency in things” for tomorrow morning’s flag-raising not to have
happened. This event will have become determinate. This illustrates the way in
which the determinacy of an event may be time-sensitive: at certain points in time,
an event may be indeterminate, and at others, determinate. In particular, a
contingent event at a time tn will be indeterminate at any point in time prior to tn,
but then determinate at any point after tn.76

76

Whether or not, on the Aristotelian understanding, an event occurring at tn is determinate at tn is a
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Ockham, in marked contrast with Aristotle, would seem to want to
characterize contingency in this way:
D2 - The proposition “x is (or was, or will be) A at tm” is determinately true [or
false] at tn, if and only if there is no potency in things at some time for x’s not
being (or having been, or being going to be) [or for x’s being (or having been,
or being going to be)] A at tm.77

Notice now that the determinacy of an event at a particular point in time no longer
depends on the point in time at which the question is being considered. For an event
to be determinate at a particular point in time, it is enough for there to be some
point in time — any point in time, past, present, or future! — in which there is no
potency in things for the event to turn out otherwise.
So Ockham, like Aristotle, would consider all past events to be determinate,
since there is some point in time (namely, now!) at which there is no potency for
those events to turn out otherwise (Germany cannot un-invade Poland in 1939, and
thus this event is determinate). But Ockham’s conception of determinacy leads to a
radically different understanding from Aristotle’s as to the determinacy status of
future events.78 By tomorrow at noon on Parliament Hill, there will be no longer be
any “potency in things” for the morning’s flag-raising not to have happened
(assuming, of course, that it goes ahead as usual). In virtue of this lack of potency
tomorrow at noon for it to happen otherwise, we now say that tomorrow morning’s
slightly more complicated question, but is usually answered in the affirmative (since, for instance,
Aristotle assumes the principle of the “necessity of the present”). Simo Knuuttila has argued that a
revolutionary aspect of Duns Scotus’ philosophy is the denial of this statement (see 1.3 for a more
detailed discussion).
77
Modified from Adams, p. 10. Once again, I have collapsed the definitions of determinate truth and
determinate falsity, and ignored the distinction between determinate events and determinate truth or
falsity of propositions concerning those events.
78
Ockham and Aristotle agree that present events are determinate, but as we see from their differing
understandings of determinacy, their reasons for holding this to be the case differs. If Adams is correct
in her characterization, for Aristotle, the determinacy of present events is because of the lack of potency
now for things to turn out otherwise than they are now turning out; for Ockham, it is because of the lack
of potency at some time (perhaps a future time) for things to turn out otherwise than they are now
turning out.
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flag-raising will happen determinately. It is enough for an event to be determinate at
some time (even if that time is future) for it to be determinate at all times. And
here’s the rub: anything that has happened, or is happening, or will happen, has
happened, or is happening, or will happen determinately. In other words, everything
happens determinately.
There are two aspects of this conclusion to examine and clarify, both of which
are highly relevant to Ockham’s discussion and Bradwardine’s subsequent
criticisms: first, what does this entail about the epistemological status of
propositions concerning events? and second, what does this entail about the
necessity or contingency of events? To the first, it is obvious that, though all events
(and hence propositions concerning them) may be determinate, it does not follow
that we can know anything about them. Indeed, if Ockham is right, then there are
vast swathes of determinate facts (namely, all those contingent things79 that have yet
to happen) about which we can have absolutely no knowledge whatsoever. But God,
of course, is in an entirely different epistemological position than we are. God’s
knowledge is not limited by whether something happens to have already occurred
or not. It is in this sense that Christians have spoken not only of God’s omniscience
— God’s knowledge of all things — but have included in that omniscience God’s
prescience, God’s knowledge of future things. It should be clear, now, that if Ockham
has no trouble calling future contingent events “determinate,” then he will have no
trouble calling God’s knowledge of those events “determinate,” either. Indeed, the
only reason why anyone might hesitate to call God’s knowledge determinate is the
misgiving that that may make the objects of God’s knowledge determinate, also (this
is precisely the thrust of the objections with which Ockham begins the section). But
if one is perfectly willing to grant the determinacy of events, then there is no longer
any cause for hesitation about the determinacy of God’s knowledge of them. In fact,

You may be wondering at this point whether I am still justified in referring to “contingent things” at
all: Can something which is determinate be, properly speaking, also contingent? As I will show in a
moment, Ockham is adamant that it can.
79
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Ockham would object to the very characterization of the issue as one of God’s
determinate knowledge “making” events determinate; rather, events just are
determinate, in themselves, independently of God’s knowledge of them. This, then,
is his response to the first part of Q. II.
But as for the second issue — What does this entail about the contingency or
necessity of events? — Ockham is keen to distinguish between determinacy and
necessity. On Ockham’s account, the determinacy of an event does not imply its
necessity, though the necessity of an event does imply its determinacy. We will
examine this distinction more deeply shortly, when we come to considering what
Ockham means by necessity that makes it distinct from determinacy; but for now, it
suffices to say that the determinacy of a future contingent event does not in any way
affect its contingency. The raising of the flag tomorrow morning on Parliament Hill,
though determinate and known by God determinately, is yet contingent: it could
have been otherwise; God’s knowledge could have been otherwise; the determinate
truths associated with this event could have been otherwise. But the phrasing of this
should raise our eyebrows a bit: when we say that a future event is contingent, do
we mean to say that it could have been otherwise, or that it could be otherwise?
This issue will be key to our discussion and subsequent objections, but for now, let’s
set it aside.

Q. II art. ii: Is God’s foreknowledge certain and infallible?
Ockham maintains that God’s foreknowledge is certain and infallible. Both of
the objections Ockham presents at the beginning of the second article rest on rather
obvious fallacies of modal logic. Since they are so similar in form, I will just briefly
discuss the second objection and Ockham’s reply. The objection runs as follows:
If God cognized that I would sit down tomorrow, and it is possible that I shall
not sit down tomorrow, suppose that in fact I shall not sit down tomorrow.
Then it follows that God is deceived. Since what is impossible does not follow
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from the positing in fact of what is possible, “God is deceived” is not
impossible. (PPD QII, art. ii C, p 56)

[S]i Deus novit me sessurum cras, et possum non sedere cras, — ponatur in
esse ‘non sedebo cras’ —, sequitur tunc quod Deus decipitur, quia ex
positione possibilis in esse non sequitur impossibile; igitur haec ‘Deus
decipitur’ non est impossibilis. (OP II, p. 522 lines 52 - 55)

This argument, like the others, rests upon a fallacy of modal inference. The objector
is correct in general to state that “what is impossible does not follow from the
positing in fact of what is possible”; however, if two or more of the premises of the
argument are contradictory, or “incompossible,” then of course any conclusion may
follow. As Ockham explains (PPD Q. II art. ii D), the difficulty is that the first premise
(“God cognizes that I will sit down tomorrow”) and the third premise (“I will not sit
down tomorrow”) are “incompossible,” or contradictory.
The objector may protest that the third premise must be permitted, since the
second premise (“It is possible that I will not sit down tomorrow”) would seem to
require the ability to posit it. Indeed, there does intuitively seem to be some sense in
which granting the possibility of an event seems to require the ability to grant the
related assertoric proposition. If it is possible that it might rain this afternoon, then
it seems we ought to be able to suppose that it will rain. Such a supposition is all well
and good, except when other assertoric premises are involved that claim some sort
of insight into future states. These include straightforward statements about future
states (“It will not rain this afternoon”), statements that imply future states (“Peter is
predestinate” — i.e., Peter will receive eternal blessedness),80 and statements about
God’s foreknowledge. The reason these sorts of statements pose a problem for the
arguments we are discussing is that they have the potential to contradict assertoric

80

Concerning this category of statements, more will be said in short order (2.2.3).
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suppositions based on statements of the possibility of something or other.
Let’s consider this situation in a slightly different way (as with most things
logical, there are many ways to skin this cat, and some ways may make more sense
to one person than another). The premises of the objector’s argument are as
follows:
P1 - God foreknows that I will sit tomorrow.
P2 - It is possible that I will not sit tomorrow.
So suppose
P3 - I will not sit tomorrow.
The justification for allowing this third premise is that it is compatible with the
second. And indeed, there is a certain sort of necessary relationship between the
two, which is perhaps why our intuition might tend to deceive us as to the
permissibility of the supposition. But as Ockham implicitly points out, it is not the
case that P3 necessarily follows from P2, but rather, P2 from P3 (i.e., P3

P2). And

though P1 and P2 may be compatible, and though P2 and P3 are also compatible, P1
and P3 are not. And just because P3

P2, this does not mean that something

compatible with P2 can be posited alongside P3 (“For an antecedent can be
inconsistent with something with which its consequent is not inconsistent”81). To
posit P3 together with P1 and P2 is just as ridiculous as positing “Socrates is
standing” alongside “Socrates is sitting” and “Socrates could stand,” as though
“Socrates is standing” and “Socrates is sitting” could happen simultaneously.82
Returning to an earlier issue, recall that (see the beginning of 2.1.2) Ockham
has in this section conflated two properties that should perhaps be considered
separately, namely, the certainty and infallibility of God’s knowledge. It is perhaps
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PPD Q. II art. ii D, p. 58.
Ibid.
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the case that certainty of (all) knowledge would imply infallibility, but the converse
does not necessarily hold. All of the objections which Ockham considers in this
section seem primarily to address the infallibility of God’s knowledge (establishing
that God cannot be deceived), and not God’s certainty (whether God knows that God
knows). Perhaps, however, if we maintain that God has infallible knowledge of all
things that can be known, this includes knowledge of the state of God’s own
knowledge — and hence, God must know that God knows (infallibly), and thus know
all things with certainty.

Q. II art. iii: Is God’s foreknowledge immutable?
Ockham spends considerable time addressing the question of the
immutability of God’s knowledge, and this is of particular relevance for our
discussion because, as we shall see in the following chapter, it is one of
Bradwardine’s chief criticisms of Ockham that his account fails to account for the
immutability of God’s knowledge in particular, and hence undermines God’s
immutability in general. In this article, the objection/reply structure breaks down
somewhat: rather than cataloguing the objections at the opening of the section, and
then replying to each of them (as he has done up to this point), the article begins
with three objections followed by three replies, and then four more objections are
raised one at a time, with Ockham’s reply directly following each one.83
Broadly speaking, the objections in this section are of two sorts. The first
sort concerns the content of God’s knowledge (what it is that God knows), and the
second sort concerns the amount of God’s knowledge (how much God knows, or
whether the sum total of God’s knowledge could ever increase or decrease). Even
though Ockham addresses these questions the other way round, I will begin by

I will follow Adams’ and Kretzmann’s convention of dividing this section into five “parts” — one part
for the first three objections, and then four more separate parts for each of objections four, five, six, and
seven.
83
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discussing Ockham’s responses to objections of the second sort, because the
responses to these objections lead naturally into objections of the first sort.
Several of the objections posed (most obviously that of part 3) relate not so
much to the content of God’s knowledge, but the sheer amount. Recall the discussion
of 2.1 about Ockham’s nominalism as it relates to the truth-value of propositions
over time. On Ockham’s view, if states in the world change, then the truth-value of
propositions concerning those states also changes. When a proposition becomes
true (in the way, for instance, that the proposition “Sarah Rossiter is, at this moment,
standing” becomes true in the moment when I rise to my feet), it would seem that
God acquires knowledge in that moment, which has the net effect of increasing the
amount of knowledge that God has. Conversely, when a proposition becomes false
(as “Sarah Rossiter is, at this moment, standing” does in the moment that I sit back
down), God seems to lose knowledge, decreasing the sum total of God’s knowledge.
In either of these cases, this seems to constitute a measurable change in God’s
knowledge, undermining God’s immutability.
Ockham replies to these objections in a way that I will illustrate by imagining
every proposition about every possible state of the universe being like a switch on a
switchboard (the switchboard is, of course, my own image, but I think it faithfully
conveys Ockham’s idea). At any given moment, each switch is either on (true) or off
(false). But each individual switch is related to a unique second switch representing
its contradictory statement (i.e., its negation), such that whenever one switch is
turned off, its contradictory switch is simultaneously turned on. So, for example,
when I am standing, the “Sarah Rossiter is now standing” switch is turned on, but
the “Sarah Rossiter is not now standing” switch is off. When I take a seat, the
position of those two switches reverses. Because every proposition is paired with its
contradictory in this way, it is always the case that precisely the same number of
switches is turned on, because the moment any single switch is turned on, another is
turned off, and vice-versa. God’s knowledge, because it ranges over everything that
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can be known,84 can be viewed as containing every proposition on this universal
switchboard that is marked “on.” In other words, God’s knowledge contains every
possible true proposition about the state of the universe, past, present, and future.
Ockham’s point is that, the moment a proposition ceases to be true (and so is
deleted from God’s knowledge), it is replaced by its contradictory; likewise,
whenever a proposition becomes true (and is added to God’s knowledge), its
contradictory becomes false and is removed. In this way, the amount of knowledge
contained in God’s intellect, assuming equal weight of individual propositions,
remains stable.
All of this addresses one aspect of mutability, namely, that sort of change that
manifests itself in an increase or decrease of size. Ockham maintains that God’s
knowledge is immutable in that respect. But this does not address what is perhaps
the more pressing question of mutability, which pertains, not to the amount, but to
the content of God’s knowledge. Things change not only by becoming larger or
smaller, but by becoming altogether different. Ockham’s answer to this aspect of the
question is not straightforward, and, in my estimation, not altogether clear (PPD Q. II

This assumption, that God knows everything that can be known, is something that, for the moment, I
will take for granted. In our present discussion, it is assumed that what can be known (by God, at least)
includes all actual states of the World, past, present, and future. Some contemporary theologians and
philosophers (Richard Swinburne is a prominent philosopher who springs immediately to mind; in the
realm of popular theology, I think also of Rabbi Harold Kushner, author of When Bad Things Happen to
Good People) have questioned this assumption, and in particular, the assumption that future states can
be known at all, even by God. In this way, it is claimed that the problem of future contingents in relation
to God’s knowledge is resolved: the problem only arises when future contingents are considered relative
to God’s foreknowledge, and the claim is that such knowledge simply doesn’t exist. It is, furthermore,
claimed that the omniscience of God may be preserved, since God may still be held to know everything
that can be known. What can be known, however, does not include future states. If one were to insist
that God’s omniscience ought to imply knowledge of everything, whether it has already happened or not,
the foreknowledge-denier would reply that that is setting the bar unreasonably high: if future
contingent states are just such that they cannot be known, then why would we seek to attribute
knowledge of them to God? God, like God’s creatures, can only sit back and wait to see how the story of
the World will unfold. In my estimation, this makes nonsense of any claim to faith in God’s promises,
including the uniquely Christian claim that through Christ’s resurrection, all of creation is being
redeemed to its ultimate state of perfect peace. If we refuse to grant, at least for the sake of argument,
that God possesses foreknowledge, then we find ourselves in the purposeless, clockwork universe of the
Deist. This would undermine central assumptions of medieval Christian philosophers like Ockham and
Bradwardine, and put our conversation with such philosophers to an end.
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art. iii, pt 1). But let us see if we can make some sense of it nonetheless.
It may help to begin by distinguishing further between two ways in which the
content of knowledge may be said to change. On the one hand, knowledge may be
said to change if the knower comes to have knowledge that she did not previously
have, as when I learned the other day that the word sepia comes from the Greek
word for cuttlefish, σηπία (cuttlefish were the Greco-Roman source of the
reddish-brown ink). This sort of change in the content of knowledge is independent
of facts in the world. The fact of the etymological history of “sepia” has been around
since the beginning of its use in the English language, even though I only began to
have knowledge of it recently. This sort of change in knowledge represents a change
in me, since prior to my coming to have this knowledge, I was in ignorance of this
etymological fact, while afterward, I was no longer in ignorance. This sort of change
in knowledge is impossible for God, however, since God possesses knowledge of all
knowable things. God cannot learn something that has been a fact for some time,
since in virtue of its being a fact, God already knows it. So God’s knowledge cannot
be said to change in this way.
On the other hand, however, knowledge may be said to change if states in the
world change such that a proposition that was at one time false becomes true, or
vice-versa. For instance, suppose on 24 December the proposition “The queen will
give her annual Christmas address tomorrow” is true (such that the queen does, in
fact, give her Christmas address the next day). Then two days later, the same
proposition is no longer true, for it is no longer the case that the queen will give her
address tomorrow, but rather, that she did give her address yesterday. For a Being
who infallibly knows all true propositions, this seems to imply knowledge of the
proposition “The queen will give her annual Christmas address tomorrow” on 24
December, and an absence of that knowledge (or knowledge of its contradictory) on
26 December. Does this change in the content of knowledge constitute a change in
the knower? About such propositions and their associated change, Ockham says,
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I maintain that just as such propositions can change from truth to falsity and
vice versa, so God can at one time know such a proposition and at another
time not, and know one after He did not know it, and not know after He did
know, and know a proposition that He did not know earlier, without any
change in Him as a result of a mere change in the creature or in known
propositions of this sort . . . because our intellect can [do this] without any
change in it. (PPD Q. II, art. iii, part 1 F)

[D]ico quod sicut tales possunt mutari de veritate in falsitatem et e converso,
ita potest Deus tales aliquando scire et aliquando non, et scire aliquam
propositionem quam prius non scivit, sine omni mutatione sui, propter solam
mutationem in creatura vel in propositionibus talibus scitis . . . quia hoc
potest intellectus noster sine omni mutatione sui. (OP II p. 524 l. 121 - p. 523
l. 1)

Ockham appeals by analogy to the function of our own cognitive capacities. When
facts in the world change such that propositions which were formerly true are no
longer true, our knowledge about such facts change — or at least ought to change. If
we were to persist in believing, on 26 December, that the queen would give her
Christmas address tomorrow, this would represent a deficiency in our cognitive
capacities. A change in the content of our knowledge, under such circumstances,
indicates that our cognitive faculties are in fact functioning well. Likewise, if the
content of God’s knowledge was immutable in the sense that it failed to change to
correspond with the changing states of the universe, this sort of immutability would
not be a perfection in God’s nature, but a defect.
But what does Ockham mean by this change in the content of our knowledge
occurring “without any change in [our intellect]”? Perhaps he means that what is
characteristic of our intellect is not so much what we know, but whether or not our
knowledge is accurate. If we go from being right to being wrong, then our intellect
has undergone substantive change. But if the content of our knowledge changes to
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correspond with changing states in the world, then our knowledge remains correct
(i.e., our knowledge remains knowledge, as opposed to becoming false opinion), and
in this sense our intellect remains substantively the same. Whether this is what
Ockham has in mind, however, is not entirely clear, and as Adams and Kretzmann
point out, his own discussion and examples are frustratingly inadequate.85
Ockham does seem to give a second sort of reply to this question, which is
also somewhat sketchy in its presentation, but which nonetheless also deserves
mention, for it will particularly affect our subsequent examination of propositions
relating to predestination and damnation. The suggestion seems to be that some
propositions, at least, are implicitly keyed to correspond to a particular point in
time, and that regardless of the verb tense in which the proposition is phrased (past,
present, or future), it should be implicitly understood that it is speaking of such a
point in time. So one way of resolving the issue of the apparent change that occurs
between 24 December and 26 December with regard to the queen’s 25 December
address, is to think about the three statements, “The queen will give her Christmas
address tomorrow” (uttered on 24 December), “The queen gives her Christmas
address today” (uttered on 25 December), and “The queen gave her Christmas
address yesterday” (uttered on 26 December), as all equivalent to the proposition
“The queen gives her Christmas address on 25 December.” In this way, when we
hear on 24 December that the queen will give her Christmas address tomorrow,
what we cognize is in fact equivalent to what we cognize when we hear on 26
December that the queen gave her Christmas address yesterday, namely, that
time-independent assertion that the queen gives her Christmas address on 25
December. Understood in this way, it seems that our intellect does not change
according to states in the world. Once again, however, this attempted reconstruction
of Ockham’s view cannot definitively said to be authentically “Ockhamist”; but in the
absence of clarity in the source text, it is, perhaps, as good a guess as any other as to
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what exactly Ockham intends to say on the matter.
To summarize, Ockham’s answer to the question regarding the immutability
of God’s knowledge is far from straightforward. He seems first to clear up many
ways in which God’s knowledge does not change: God’s knowledge does not increase
or decrease, and the content of God’s knowledge does not change in the sense of
learning about any persistent state of the World. But Ockham does concede that
when states in the World change, God’s knowledge of them changes accordingly. In
fact, argues Ockham, if God’s knowledge did not change according to changing states
in the world, this would be a grave deficiency in God’s knowledge (as it is in our
own). Finally, Ockham also introduces discussion of the complications that arise
with respect to the truth or falsity of propositions based on the tense in which they
are uttered (past, present, or future); the exact thrust of this portion of his
argument, however, remains obscure, and providing a satisfactory interpretation is
inevitably a difficult business involving a fair bit of guesswork.

Q. II art. iv: Is God’s foreknowledge necessary?
It is in this final article of Question II that Ockham’s responses become
particularly controversial. Indeed, it seems that as the subsections of the question
progress, Ockham’s position becomes increasingly unorthodox. In answer to the
four questions posed — Is God’s foreknowledge (i) determinate, (ii) certain and
infallible, (iii) immutable, and (iv) necessary? — the expected canonical responses
are yes, yes, yes, and yes! Ockham’s responses, by contrast, boil down to something
more like this: (i) yes (though perhaps not for the reasons one might think), (ii) yes,
(iii) mostly (though not to the extent that it in fact becomes a defect in God’s
knowledge), and (iv) no, with qualification.
Ockham’s response to the fourth question begins, in good scholastic fashion,
with a distinction. Whether God’s knowledge is necessary, argues Ockham, depends
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on what exactly we mean by “necessary knowledge.” There are two ways to
understand this:
[Understood] in the first way [it means] that God’s knowledge whereby
future contingents are known is necessary. And this is true, since the divine
essence itself is one single necessary and immutable cognition of all things,
complexes as well as non-complexes, necessary and contingent.
[Understood] in the second way [it means] that by that knowledge future
contingents are known necessarily. And in this way [His knowledge] is not
necessary, nor need it be granted that God has necessary knowledge
regarding future contingents; instead, [His knowledge regarding them] is
contingent. (PPD Q. II, art. 4 L, p. 67)

. . . uno modo, quod scientia Dei qua sciuntur futura contingentia sit
necessaria. Et hoc est verum, quia ipsa essentia divina est unica cognitio
necessaria et immutabilis omnium tam compexorum quam incomplexorum,
necessariorum et contingentium. Secundo modo, quod per illam scientiam
sciantur necessario futura contingentia. Et sic non est necessaria, nec debet
concedi quod Deus habeat scientiam necessariam de futuris contingentibus
sed potius contingentem . . . (OP II, p. 529 l. 262 - p. 530 l. 269)

In other words, if we are speaking about God’s knowledge as such, in the way that it
functions, this is necessary. It is necessary, for instance, that if a proposition is true,
then God knows it. But in another way, we might say that the actual content of God’s
knowledge is necessary. This, thinks Ockham, is an invalid inference from the
immutability of God’s knowledge, for much of the content of God’s knowledge is of
contingent things, about which no necessary knowledge is possible. Instead, Ockham
posits, God’s knowledge of contingent things is itself contingent.
But how, we might wonder, is it possible to speak of contingent knowledge at
all? Furthermore, how can Ockham simultaneously hold that God’s knowledge is
immutable and non-necessary? Further discussion of the first question will follow
in a later section (2.2), so for now, I will primarily focus on trying to understand the
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second issue. How is it that God’s knowledge may simultaneously be said to be
immutable — i.e., never changing — and yet not necessary?
It may be helpful for thinking of God’s immutable-and-yet-non-necessary
knowledge to consider by analogy something with a high degree of stability, which
we would yet not consider to be necessary. Consider, perhaps, the Great Star of
Africa diamond (Cullinan I), which is now set in the Royal Sceptre of the British
Crown Jewels.86 If we consider this stone from a relatively limited frame of time
reference, then we may be inclined, at least in some senses, to consider the stone to
be immutable. Indeed, nothing that I could readily apply — not fire, nor a
sledgehammer, nor corrosives, nor brute strength — could in any way measurably or
discernibly alter the stone. Throughout my lifetime (and that of my mother, and of
my grandmother), the Great Star of Africa has remained perceptibly unaltered, and
is likely to remain so for generations to come. But though the stone might therefore
be said to be, at least in a limited sense, immutable, could it also be said to be
necessary? Not at all, for its existence and its present state depend upon a long
string of contingent events: that geological forces happened to combine in just the
right way to produce such an enormous diamond in the first place; that further
geological and meteorological forces combined to bring the stone to the earth’s
surface; that human society developed in such a way that diamonds are a highly
prized mineral, and that economic incentives therefore compel people to go to great
lengths to discover them; that the stone was in the particular river where a
prospector happened to be panning for diamonds; that one particular
diamond-cutter, rather than others, was commissioned to divide and cut the stone,
and that he happened to have eaten just the right sort of breakfast to provide the
inspiration for the particular division and cut that he chose; etc., etc., etc. All of these

I suspect a much better analogy than the one I provide here could be drawn from the physical or
chemical sciences, in which I am not sufficiently well-versed to competently draw an example for myself.
If the reader so desires, she may think instead of any phenomenon which is the case, which always has
been the case, and which always will be the case, so long as time endures — but which need not be as it
is, and which may just as well have been otherwise.
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contingent factors and more contributed to the present state of the Great Star of
Africa diamond.
That the Great Star of Africa is how it is and not otherwise is therefore a
contingent matter, despite its (relative) immutability. In a similar way, Ockham
would have it that, although God’s knowledge is immutable (in a much more robust
sense than the Cullinan I diamond), God’s knowledge might have been otherwise
than it is. Contingent factors (namely, the contingent events in the world) contribute
to God’s knowledge being as it is. Because many of the things that God knows could
be otherwise than they are, God’s knowledge could be otherwise than it is. What
this means is that, though God’s knowledge is unchangingly as it is — i.e., immutable
— it is nevertheless non-necessary, at least in the sense that it could have been
otherwise.
We could, if we like, push the analogy a little further to illustrate the sense in
which God’s knowledge is necessary, and thus understand the distinction Ockham is
making between the senses in which God’s knowledge is and is not necessary.
Though many properties of the Cullinan I are contingent (its particular size, cut,
setting in the British Royal Sceptre, location in the Tower of London, etc.), insofar as
it is a diamond of remarkable purity, it has also a number of necessary properties:
for instance, that it is composed of crystallized carbon, that it has a hardness of ten
on the Mohs scale, that it refracts light just as it does, etc. Indeed, I may look at any
diamond in the world, including the ones (miniscule by comparison) on my own
finger, and assert the same of them. Diamond, qua diamond, necessarily possesses
these properties; these are what make it diamond. Absent any of these things, and it
would cease to be the mineral that we call diamond.87 Similarly, we might say that
I am, obviously, glossing over the entire discussion in the 20th-century literature about whether the
names we apply to particular elements and compounds in our world could be meaningfully applied to
substances in another world which share all perceptible properties of a substance in our world, but
have a different chemical composition (I am thinking here primarily of Saul Kripke’s important work,
Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1980), and the discussion it
engendered). For instance, if we came across a substance in another world that was wet, transparent,
non-viscous, odourless, tasteless, and perfect for quenching our thirst — that is to say, in all perceptible
87
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God’s knowledge is, by definition, the sort of knowledge that knows everything true.
So if a proposition is true, it is necessarily the case that God knows it. This is a
necessary property of God’s knowledge, and in this sense, God’s knowledge can be
said to be necessary. In other words, there are aspects of God’s knowledge that are
necessary with respect to objects in the world. Insofar as things in the world are as
they are, it is necessary for God to know them. But that does not make God’s
knowledge necessary per se, because those events in the world could have been
otherwise, and hence God’s knowledge of them could have been otherwise.
In this way, Ockham denies the necessity of God’s knowledge, while affirming
both its immutability and its perfect consistency with the truth about the world.
God’s knowledge is non-necessary precisely because events in the world are
non-necessary. Had things been other than they are (and the property of something
to be such that it could-have-been-otherwise is precisely what it means, on
Ockham’s model, for it to be contingent), then God’s knowledge would
correspondingly have been otherwise than it is. So it would be nonsense, thinks
Ockham, to assert that God’s knowledge is necessary. Necessity is not a perfection of
knowledge, because knowledge that was necessary could, on account of its necessity,
fail to correspond in appropriate ways to the contingent reality of the world around
us. Ockham does not see any inconsistency at all between the assertion that God is
unchanging, eternal, and immutable, with the claim that God’s knowledge is not
necessary, for something can be ever-unchanging, and yet, still, could have been
otherwise.
We should find this claim somewhat novel and surprising in a medieval
context, for it directly contradicts the long-standing “Principle of Plenitude.” This is
the notion that everything that can happen, will indeed happen — given sufficient
ways identical with the substance we call “water” in our world — but happened not to be H2O (i.e.,
happened not to be composed of molecules with that particular structure), could (or would) we call this
substance water? Here, for the sake of illustrating my point, I take for granted the (controversial)
hypothesis that there is necessarily a strictly one-to-one correspondence between substances which
appear identical by all physical measures we might apply, and their chemical makeup.
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time. On this view of contingency, a state of affairs is contingent if at some point in
time — assuming time stretches infinitely far forward — that state of affairs is
realized. We have here the nub of the revolution in thinking of contingencies largely
begun by Duns Scotus (see again the discussion in 1.3). Previously in the medieval
period, it had been generally assumed that if a state of affairs could never be
realized, even in infinite time, then it is for this reason an impossible state. And thus,
conversely, its contradiction is necessary. How does this relate to Ockham’s view of
God’s knowledge? Well, suppose that some contingent event, like the Great Fire of
London, actually takes place. Then because it took place, it is true to say that, for
instance, “The Great Fire of London destroyed a great part of London in 1666.”
Because this event actually happened, God necessarily knows it. And indeed,
because God (presumably) by God’s foreknowledge knew that fire would destroy
large parts of London in 1666, God has known this for all eternity. And because it
will henceforth always be the case that a large part of London was destroyed by fire
in 1666, it will always be the case that God knows this. So according to the Principle
of Plenitude, it is necessary that God knows that a great fire destroyed much of
London in 1666, since it never has been and never will be otherwise, even if time
continues on infinitely long. Because it is never the case that God did not (or will
not) know that there was a Great Fire in London in 1666, it is, according to the
Principle of Plenitude, impossible for God not to know that there is a Great Fire in
London in 1666. It therefore follows from this principle, not only that God
necessarily knows this fact (because it is a true fact about the world), but that God’s
very knowledge that there was a Great Fire in 1666 is in itself necessary. This,
however, is the very inference which Ockham denies.
Simply because something is never (or never will be), in fact, the case,
Ockham denies that it follows that it is impossible for that thing to be. Even if
something never in fact transpires, even in the whole history of the world, Ockham
maintains that it could have been otherwise, and in this sense, that the event may yet
be contingent. This is precisely the situation we’re dealing with with respect to
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God’s knowledge of contingent events.
In sum, then: to the four subquestions of Q. II, Ockham (1) affirms that God’s
knowledge is determinate, but does so because of his unconventional view that all
events of the actual world — past, present, and future — are determinate
themselves; (2) affirms that God’s knowledge is certain and infallible, that is, that
God never errs; (3) affirms that God’s knowledge is immutable, or is at least, no
more mutable than knowledge, rightly-operating, must be in order to appropriately
track with the changing circumstances of the world; and (4) denies that God’s
knowledge is necessary, at least in the sense that the particular content of God’s
knowledge is no more necessary than the events which are the subject of that
knowledge.

2.2.3 - PPD Q. III - V
After dealing with the questions of the determinacy, certainty and infallibility,
immutability, and necessity of God’s knowledge in Q. II, Ockham turns in Questions
III, IV, and V to issues surrounding the application of these principles to specific
theological issues, and in particular, the predestination and damnation of individual
human beings.
The nub of Ockham’s account consists in positing that many statements
which appear, by their present or past tense constructions, to be about one
particular point in time, are in fact statements about quite another point in time.88
In the wake of Adams’ rediscovery of this position of Ockham’s, there has been considerable ink spilt
by contemporary philosophers of religion debating the effectiveness of this view in resolving the
problem of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Adams herself has at various points defended
versions of Ockham’s argument, and I have mentioned already Plantinga’s main article on the topic, in
which he (favourably) presents his own interpretation of Ockham’s understanding of tenses; William
Lane Craig is another defender of Ockhamist positions on propositional contingency and tense; see
Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990). Against these favourable
interpretations of Ockham’s position, however, have been the criticisms of John Fischer (“Freedom and
Foreknowledge,” Philosophical Review, 92 (January 1983), pp. 67–79), William Hasker (God, Time, and
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989)), and Linda Zagzebski (The Dilemma of Freedom and
88
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Such statements include those such as “Peter is predestinate” and “Judas was
damned.” In the first instance, we have a present-tensed statement, which we
therefore assume to be about a present state of affairs; but Ockham would have it
that, since being predestinate is a fact that is made true or false by a future state
(namely, receiving, at the last, either eternal blessedness or damnation), this
sentence is in fact a statement about the future. “Peter is predestinate” may
therefore be considered as equivalent to the statement, “Peter will receive eternal
blessedness.” Similarly, the second statement, “Judas was damned,” despite
appearing to be a statement about the past, is also in fact about the future, since
Judas’s damned state then depends on his receiving, at the last, the punishment of
eternal damnation.
This discussion is confused in English by the fact that “damned” may function
as either an adjective, or a passive verb, or a past participle. In the discussion above,
I intend by “Judas was damned” to indicate the Latin phrase “Judas erat damnatus.”
In Latin, the adjective damnatus specifically designates the state of being damned —
so a damnatus is a person with the property of being damned at the last (in the same
way that a predestinate is a person with the property of being saved at the last). The
statement “Judas was damned” is ambiguous in English, however, between at least
three readings: (1) Judas was a person who will be damned at the last (the adjectival
reading); (2) Somebody (else) damned Judas in the past (passive reading); and (3)
Judas was damned, but has ceased to be so in the time since (past participle
reading). In this discussion, (1) is the primary sense in which the statement should
be taken, though (3) enters into the discussions somewhat (though when that
reading occurs, it will be made quite clear by the discussion surrounding it). (2) will
never be the reading intended.
So Ockham would have it that statements depending on a future contingent
outcome for their truth or falsity, even though they may be present or past tensed in

Foreknowledge (New York: OUP, 1991)), among others.
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grammatical construction, should be considered in the same way as future
contingent statements. The apparently present-tensed statement “Peter is
predestinate” is considered as equivalent to the future contingent statement “Peter
will receive eternal blessedness.” Similarly, the apparently past-tensed statement
“Judas was damned” should in fact be read as equivalent to the future contingent
statement “Judas will receive eternal damnation.”
To use a non-theological example, we can consider the way we describe
someone who is expected to graduate as a “graduand.” To say, for instance, that
“Theodora is a graduand” is to say “Theodora will graduate”; just as in the above
eschatologically-minded examples, this apparent present-tense claim in fact boils
down to a statement which is future and contingent. One may be inclined to object
that this example is complicated by the fact that to be a graduand implies that one
has already done all that is required for the conferral of a degree, and only awaits
receiving the degree. I think that this actually strengthens the analogy, and
highlights a key aspect of calling someone “predestinate”: everything required for
her salvation has already been done (disanalogously, though, what is required has
been done primarily by Christ, rather than the person herself); however, the
predestinate is still in a time of waiting for ultimate blessedness, which is the
ultimate fulfilment of that salvific work. The predestinate person is living in the
same sort of in-between, proleptic,89 or what theologians sometimes call the
“already-but-not-yet” time that the graduand occupies. Everything required has
been accomplished, but the ultimate conferral of the prize (be it a degree or the
beatific vision) is yet to come.
But one may be wondering at this point: What is the point of transforming
past- and present-tensed statements into future-tensed claims? The significance of
this move is the way it affects the truth and modal status of such statements.
Because Ockham is working under the Aristotelian assumption that the past and the
89
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present are necessary because of their fixity, or inability to change, were these
statement to in fact be about the present or the past, their truth (or falsity) would
imply their necessary truth (or falsity). By insisting that they are in fact statements
about future contingent events, he is preserving the contingency of the statement,
because of the indeterminate status of things which are future.90
Turning, then, to questions of God’s foreknowledge, Ockham employs a
similar strategy. About any future contingent event E, it may be said that “God
foreknows E” or that “God foreknew E.” The statement “God foreknows E” appears
grammatically to be in the present tense, and likewise “God foreknew E” appears to
be past-tensed. However, because of the dependence of both of these statements on
E (which is, by assumption, future and contingent), Ockham would have it that these
statements are in fact themselves future and contingent in some relevant sense. In
fact, this extension of future contingency goes beyond the mere statement, but to
God’s knowledge itself: God now knows, presumably, what I will contingently choose
to eat for breakfast tomorrow. But since the subject of that knowledge is future and
contingent, God’s knowledge of it is itself, in some sense, future and contingent.
In this way, then, Ockham provides an answer to the question of how God can
foreknow our actions, and yet our actions still remain contingent: God’s
foreknowledge does not determine our future actions, since he argues that our
future actions were already determined in the first place (and thus, for Ockham,
determinacy seems to be beside the point); God’s foreknowledge of our future
actions does not make them any less contingent, since he argues that God’s
foreknowledge is itself contingent; and finally, Ockham gives an indication of how it
is that God’s foreknowledge is contingent, by analogy with the implied future-tense
of grammatically present-tense statements such as “Peter is predestined.” It remains

Compare this assumption with the position of Duns Scotus, discussed in 1.3: while affirming the
necessity of fixity of the past, Scotus denies the necessity of the present. Ockham clearly does not follow
Scotus on this point, which is perhaps surprising given that Ockham follows in the Franciscan
intellectual tradition which was at this point heavily influenced by Scotistic thought.
90
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to be discussed whether Ockham is truly justified in simultaneously maintaining
that future actions may be simultaneously determinate and contingent — or
whether such contingency can be truly called “freedom”: but this discussion will
happen in more depth in section 2.3.

2.2.4 - Ordinatio I.38
Before turning to criticisms of Ockham’s position, I will just briefly note
another work, earlier than PPD, in which Ockham makes statements similar to those
found in PPD. Though the discussion is much more terse, and in ways much more
hesitant, we find already in Ockham’s Ordinatio commentary on the Sentences hints
that he was beginning to develop the notions of Divine foreknowledge and
contingency that are given a much fuller and more confident treatment in PPD. In
his treatment of the 38th distinction of Book I of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Ockham
begins with a statement that may make us think he had not yet developed his view
of future contingents in relation to God’s foreknowledge in any detail:
Therefore I reply to the question that it has to be held without any doubt that
God knows all future contingent facts evidently and with certainty. But to
explain this evidently, and to express the manner in which He knows all
future contingent facts, is impossible for any intellect in this life.

Ideo dico ad quaestionem, quod indubitanter est tenendum, quod Deus
certitudinaliter et evidenter scit omnia futura contingentia. Sed hoc
evidenter declarare et modum quo scit omnia futura contingentia exprimere
est impossibile omni intellectui pro statu isto.91

Despite this rather unsatisfactory statement about the way in which God knows
Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., ed. & trans., Ockham: Philosophical Writings (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957), p.
133. This volume contains a number of excerpts from across Ockham’s philosophical writing, organized
thematically and presented in Latin-English parallel format.
91
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future contingents, and despite Ockham’s repeated subsequent claims not to know
how this is possible — “The manner in which he knows them, I, however, do not
know”92; “this conclusion cannot be proved by any a priori natural reason possible to
us”93 — he nonetheless goes on to offer thoughts about the nature of God’s
knowledge of future contingent facts:
But for certain members of the Faculty of Arts it must be pointed out that no
matter how much God knows about all future contingent facts, and as to
which side of a contradiction will be true and which false, nevertheless the
proposition “God knows that this side will be true” is not a necessary but a
contingent proposition. This means that no matter how true the proposition
“God knows that this side of the contradiction will be true” may be,
nevertheless it is possible that this never was true.

Verumtamen pro aliquibus artistis est sciendum, quod quantumcumque Deus
sciat de omnibus futuris contingentibus, quae pars erit vera et quae falsa,
tamen haec non necessaria: “Deus scit, quod haec pars erit vera,” immo haec
est contingens in tantum, quod quantumcumque sit vera: “Deus scit quod
haec pars contradictionis erit vera,” tamen possibile est, quod haec numquam
fuit vera.94

Though Ockham seems to have added this note near the end to satisfy some
particular concern of his superiors (“for certain members of the Faculty of Arts…”),
it clearly articulates the position that he would come to state much more stridently
and self-assuredly in PPD, namely, that God’s knowledge of contingent things is itself
contingent. And this, as we have seen, in itself marks a decisive break with Anselm,
Aquinas, and other authorities on the subject, for whom the necessity of God’s
knowledge is doctrine.

Sed modum exprimere nescio. Ibid.
Ista conclusio, quamvis per rationem naturalem nobis possibilem et a priori probari non possit… Ibid.,
p. 134.
94
Ibid.
92
93
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2.3 - Problems with Ockham’s model
I will turn to Bradwardine’s objections to Ockham (which are different from
the ones I raise below) in the following chapter. In this section, though, I would like
to consider first some epistemological questions (and potential problems) that are
raised by Ockham’s apparent solution to the problem of future contingents (2.3.1),
and then turn to questions about the logical implications of Ockham’s solution, and
in particular, the implications of his redefinition of determinacy (2.3.2). I will then,
finally, consider whether Ockham’s model is in fact compatible with the view that
God, though timelessly eternal, acts in the world (2.3.3).

2.3.1 - Epistemological objections
Ockham’s solution has hinged on the idea that God’s knowledge of contingent
facts is itself contingent. In this way, he avoids the dilemma that God’s knowledge of
an event necessitates that event to happen, since nothing contingent necessitates
anything at all (or at least, does not necessitate it any more strongly than relative to,
or conditional upon, itself; see Boethius’ discussion of conditional necessity, towards
the end of 1.1.2). The first concern I have with this view is that I am not sure that
contingent knowledge can really be said to be knowledge at all, or at least not
knowledge consistent with the dominant medieval understanding of what
constitutes true knowledge. It lies beyond the scope of my current project to give an
extensive account of late medieval theories of knowledge; however, I shall give a
cursory sketch just sufficient to suggest that its lack of consistency with Ockham’s
position merits our attention, and — if your epistemological disposition is, like mine,
at all similar to Ockham’s contemporaries, which I do not presume that it is — our
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concern.95
Most late-medieval Scholastic thinkers had very robust criteria for what
attributes belief must possess to attain the status of true knowledge. The classic
formulation of knowledge as “justified true belief” characterizes the dominant
theory of knowledge in the late medieval period quite well, and the medieval criteria
for what constitutes “justification” is generally quite strong indeed by dominant
contemporary standards. Correspondingly, many medieval thinkers had an
extremely modest estimation of whether and to what extent human beings can hope
to attain true knowledge of things, and medieval thought is marked throughout by a
strong sense of epistemic humility.96 In a few cases, this led to outright skepticism
(in the cases, for instance, of Henry of Ghent and Nicholas of Autrecourt).97 Given
the high standard of justification demanded for certainty, it is hardly surprising that
at least a few medievals despaired of the possibility of having any knowledge at all.
For most medieval thinkers, however, what saved them from complete skepticism
concerning human knowledge was a confidence in something like Augustine’s idea
of “divine illumination”: despite our limited and impoverished capacities for
understanding, we are able to have some degree of certainty in our ability to grasp at

Adams (1987) gives a much more extensive and penetrating overview of this topic in the final chapter
of the first volume of William Ockham, entitled “Certainty and Scepticism,” pp. 551 - 629. In this chapter,
Adams provides a persuasive argument for the thesis that the dominant theory of knowledge in the
early fourteenth century was in fact a broadly skeptical one, when considered with respect to its high
degree of epistemic uncertainty from a human standpoint. Thus she argues, pace the predominant
assumptions of historians of medieval philosophy earlier in the twentieth century (led, chiefly, by
Etienne Gilson), that when considered in this light, then Ockham — far from being the chief
representative of medieval skepticism — in fact provides a remarkably anti-skeptical theory of
knowledge. Also useful in this discussion is Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Rethinking the History of Skepticism:
The Missing Medieval Background (Leiden: Brill, 2009), a collection of essays which trace many of the
major movements in medieval epistemological developments. Particularly relevant to the issues at hand
is the essay in that volume by Claude Panaccio and David Piché, “Ockham’s Reliabilism and the Intuition
of Non-Existents,” pp. 97 - 118.
96
I often think, for instance, of Anselm of Canterbury’s prologue to the Proslogion, with his famous
phrase — borrowed partly from Augustine — Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut
intelligam, “Neither do I seek to understand in order that I might believe, but rather, I believe in order
that I might understand.”
97
For a broad overview of skepticism in the medieval period, see Henrik Lagerlund, “A History of
Skepticism in the Middle Ages,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism (see note above), pp. 1 - 28, esp.
pp. 14ff.
95
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least fragments of true knowledge because of the illumination given to us by God in
our reasoning faculty; this faculty is further aided, on occasion, by direct divine
revelation of truth, in which we can have complete confidence because of its source
and its coherence with reason.98 By and large, though, because the degree of
certainty we can generally attain is quite small, the amount of knowledge we can
hope to attain is comparatively miniscule.
Contrasted with the generally low estimation medieval thinkers had of the
human capacity for knowledge, however, is an extremely high view of the knowledge
of God, both in terms of what God knows (i.e., everything), and the degree of
certainty with which God knows it (i.e., absolute). God’s knowledge, from the
perspective of these thinkers, must be certain, immutable, infallible, and necessary
in at least some sense, for God’s knowledge encompasses not only all that is, but why
and how it is, and God can never be deceived (and thus can never have knowledge
which turns out to be false). This sort of knowledge at least appears to be so robust
that it cannot be otherwise: to speak of this knowledge as contingent, as does
Ockham, seems anathema to this robust sense of the sheer thorough-going-ness of
the knowledge of God, and indeed, seems to strike at the very character of God as
one whose very essence is necessary. Certainly, many philosophers, particularly
those in the tradition of Classical Theism, have assumed that necessity is also a
property of knowledge itself — or at least, of knowledge belonging to God. And
though we shall not come to a proper examination of Bradwardine’s views until the
next chapter, it is worth noting here that the necessity of God’s knowledge is
certainly the assumption that Bradwardine is working with in his own arguments
against Ockham, and he spells it out explicitly, citing Anselm as his authority:
In the same way, necessary knowledge and necessary will are more perfect
I am here presenting this position in broadly Thomistic terms, which more or less describe, with
minor variance and difference in emphasis, the epistemological position of the vast majority of late
medieval philosophers. At the end of his life, St Thomas famously said that his entire life’s work of
philosophy was “but straw”: this captures well, perhaps, the epistemic humility of the medievals,
recognizing that all that we can know in this life amounts to mere bits and fragments of the truth — like
straw, it has substance, to be sure, but it hardly amounts to anything at all.
98
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than contingent knowledge and contingent will, just as necessity is in itself
more perfect than contingency. Necessary knowledge of a thing and
necessary will are therefore attributed to God. The antecedent holds, since
contingency includes potency [or potential, or capacity], and consequently
imperfection. The consequence holds according to Anselm.

Item necessaria sciencia et necessaria voluntas perfectior est sciencia
contingenti et voluntate contingenti, sicut necessitas simpliciter perfectior
est contingencia. Igitur necessaria sciencia rerum et necessaria voluntas est
attribuenda Deo. Antecedens patet, quia contingencia includit potenciam et
per consequens imperfectionem. Consequencia patet per Anselmum. (DFC
33a)

The “imperfection” of contingency, if ascribed to the knowledge of God, would seem
to undermine the perfection of God’s knowledge, and thus the perfection of God’s
esse. To Bradwardine and many of his contemporaries, this is an entirely
unacceptable consequence. Likewise, we should wonder exactly what sort of
knowledge God’s foreknowledge might amount to if it is contingent as Ockham
claims.

2.3.2 - Logical objections
In the discussion immediately following, I take it to be not entirely settled
that something can be simultaneously determinate and contingent; or at the very
least, that determinacy seems to undermine freedom to a significant extent. This is
clearly an extremely contentious claim, and one that remains hotly contested in the
contemporary literature. Ockham would seem to be defending a position not unlike
the contemporary “compatibilist” claim that an act can be simultaneously
determined and free.99 I do not intend here to make any definitive claims about the
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On this topic, much more will be said in the final chapter.
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truth or falsity of this position, as an exploration of this question would take us far
afield from the primary focus of this thesis. But whether or not this position is
genuinely tenable, it is certainly open to dispute, and it is in this disputed realm that
I raise the following criticisms. They are, I think, issues that require at least a more
thorough defense on Ockham’s part.
In light of the context above, a problem with Ockham’s account is that, though
he may have successfully created a model on which God’s foreknowledge does not
imply the necessity of human action, he has not entirely done away with the problem.
Rather, Ockham has pushed the problems of necessity relating to God’s
foreknowledge onto his uniquely-defined concept of determinacy (recall Ockham’s
departure from the Aristotelian concept, as explained in 2.2.2). Though future
things may not be necessary on Ockham’s interpretation, they are determinate. In
fact, for Ockham, everything that has happened, is happening, or will happen is
determinate, in virtue of the fact that at some moment of time (namely, after it has
already happened), it has no power to be otherwise. This means that every past,
present, or future state is determinate, which is a view of strong determinacy far
more radical than anything Aristotle would have suggested. Under Ockham’s
interpretation, we no longer need to deal with the problem of whether the necessity
of God’s knowledge entails the necessity of human action (since Ockham does not
claim that God’s knowledge of our actions is necessary at all). But it seems that to
claim that our future actions are determinate (as Ockham does) still undermines our
freedom, at least if considered in a certain way.
The pertinent question for Ockham becomes, if God determinately knows that
we will act in a particular way, and that act is itself determinate, can that act truly be
said to be contingent, or more importantly, free? And if so, in what sense is such a
future action free? Is it simply in the sense of logical contingency, in that there is no
inherent contradiction in supposing that I don’t act that way? or do I actually
possess some sort of power to act otherwise? And if only the former, what does this
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actually say about my freedom to act otherwise? The logical possibility of acting
otherwise does not obviously seem to entail a very real sort of freedom to actually
do so. But if we are speaking of the latter sort of contingency, as defined by powers,
can any such power be a real power to act if my action is already determined? Even
if, at t1, there is some sense in which I have the power to act otherwise at t2 than I in
fact will act, if my action at t2 is already determined, then that power I possess can
never actually be realized. If a power is not realizable, then it seems peculiar to
consider it to be a real power in things. And thus the determinacy of an action
would seem to imply, at least in the most practical sense, that that action is in fact
not free, since I have no realizable power to act otherwise.
Arguably, this lack-of-power-to-act-otherwise constitutes a sort of necessity,
which Ockham denies. And so we are led directly to the question of how Ockham
conceives of necessity. If Ockham defines determinacy as that which, at any point in
time (before, during, or after it happens), has no power in itself to be otherwise,
what then does he consider necessity to be? Is it a powers view, such as what
defined determinacy under Aristotle’s model — that which has no power now to be
otherwise than it is — or is it a logical necessity model — that which, the denial of
which leads us into a logical contradiction? Ockham appears not to have provided a
satisfactory account of what necessity is, but I think it is most plausible to suppose
that what he intends by necessity is what Adams has described as Aristotle’s view of
determinacy. This reading would be consistent with Ockham’s adherence to the
doctrine of the necessity of the present and past, for it is precisely in the present
moment, when a contingent event is actualized, that it loses its power to be
otherwise. Indeed, a “logical necessity” view, which would say that something is
necessary if its denial leads to a contradiction, would not seem to imply that the
present is necessary. I have argued already (see 1.3) that it is precisely his adoption
of the logical notion of necessity that allows Duns Scotus to assert that the present
remains contingent (because in the present moment, it involves no contradiction to
suppose that something could turn out otherwise); but as I argued, logical necessity
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understood in this way does not allow Duns Scotus to extend that inference to
events in the past (contrary to most contemporary understandings of the
contingency of past events in terms of possible worlds), because supposing that a
single event turned out otherwise would entail a contradiction with all events that
causally followed it. Because the notion of logical necessity does seem to imply the
contingency of the present (if not of the past, also), and because Ockham denies,
contra Duns Scotus, that the present is necessary, I think it can be safely concluded
that Ockham could not consistently ascribe to a notion of necessity as logical
necessity. I therefore conclude that Ockham must have in mind a time-dependent,
powers view of necessity, on which the necessity of an event is defined something
like this:
N: An event x is necessary at t if and only if there is no (real, realizable) power
at t for x to be otherwise.

It should be apparent, then, that on this reading of Ockham, what Ockham takes as
necessity is what Aristotle (according to Adams) took to be determinacy. (See
definition D1 in 2.2.2, which is based on Adams’ Aristotelian definition of
determinacy.)
But if this is Ockham’s view of necessity, then it seems very hard to account
for the fact that he simultaneously claims that God’s present knowledge of future
contingent events is contingent. If God’s present knowledge is contingent, it would
seem, it must be the case that there is some real (or realizable) power for God’s
knowledge to be otherwise than it is. Ockham would have it that this power for
God’s knowledge to be otherwise than it is rests in the fact that the subject of God’s
knowledge yet has power to be otherwise (insofar as it is contingent), and thus —
since God must necessarily know all things that are true — if it were the case that
the subject of God’s knowledge turned out otherwise than God currently knows it to
be, it would be the case that God’s knowledge would be other than it is. It would
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therefore appear that Ockham claims that there really is power for God’s knowledge
to be otherwise than it in fact is, since there really is power for its subject to turn out
otherwise than it in fact will. The trouble with this is that God knows these things
now. Despite Ockham’s claim that statements about God’s knowledge of future
states are in some sense future, it is obviously the case that they also make
statements of fact about the present, namely, that God now knows something
particular in the future. We know this to be a statement of fact about the present,
because it presupposes that God can act on that knowledge in the present. But this
is something that we will explore in more detail in just a moment.

2.3.3 - God’s action in the world
Ockham denies Duns Scotus’ claim that the present is contingent. Indeed,
Ockham seems to embrace the Aristotelian doctrine of the necessity of the present
(and, by extension, the necessity of the past). How, then, can Ockham posit that
God’s present knowledge of future things is contingent? As we have already
discussed (2.2.3), Ockham tries to mitigate this dilemma by claiming that God’s
knowledge of future contingent events only appears to be present-directed. A claim
such as, “God knows that I will work on writing my thesis tomorrow” appears to be a
statement about God’s present knowledge, and so would seem to be a statement that
is necessarily true or false, because it is about the present; but Ockham would claim
that by virtue of the fact that it concerns something future and contingent (much like
the statement, “Peter is predestinate”), it should actually be considered as a future
contingent statement. I object, however, that this in fact undermines the idea that
God has knowledge now of that future contingent event. If God’s knowledge, now, of
that future contingent event (that I will work on writing my thesis tomorrow) has
any real clout, it must be the case that God really has knowledge now about that
future state. And if that present knowledge is contingent, it, being present,
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contradicts the presupposition that present things are necessary.
One may think that Ockham would wish to respond that this can be
accounted for because of God’s timeless eternity. Ockham certainly believes that
God is eternal; but like Scotus, Ockham does not conceive of God’s eternity as an
existence timelessly apart from the created order, but rather, as the idea that God
endures throughout the succession of time.100 Thus, Ockham does not allow himself
recourse to the idea of God’s eternity to explain the puzzle of God’s contingent
knowledge. Furthermore, regardless of whether one posits God to exist in or apart
from the succession of time, it remains the case that God works and enacts promises
in time. For example, God promised Abraham, at a particular point in time, that he
would be the father of a great nation; that promise was fulfilled, at a particular later
point in time, with the birth of Isaac, and consequently the beginnings of the
Israelite people. Thus, we can speak of the point in time when God made the
promise (a promise that was dependent upon God’s knowledge of the promise’s
eventual fulfilment), a point in time at which God had knowledge of when and how
the promise would be fulfilled.
God’s promise to Abraham was not arbitrary or vague, like the promise of a
Chinese fortune cookie or a horoscope, for which any number of ordinary and very
likely-to-happen things might be interpreted as the “fulfilment” of the promise.
Indeed, when Abraham — because his very old wife was obviously barren —
attempted to take matters into his own hands and conceived a child by his
concubine, God clearly indicated that that child was not the fulfilment of the promise
Abraham had been given. God knew the details of how God’s promise to Abraham
would be fulfilled, and some of those details were humanly impossible — such as the
conception of a child by a woman whose days of fertility were long gone. And of
course, Sarah’s advanced age was not the only limiting factor: St Paul jokes that

Craig 1988, p. 146. Included in the endnotes of Craig’s volume is also to be found a useful snap-shot
summary of Ockham on time and eternity, drawing on the doctoral thesis of Adams (The Problem of
God’s Foreknowledge and Free Will in Boethius and William Ockham, Cornell University, 1967).
100
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Abraham himself was “as good as dead” (Hebrews 11.12). But from an impotent old
man and an old woman many years past child-bearing years, God promised that a
child would be born. The future contingent event of Isaac’s birth at some particular
point in time was known by God at the time of God’s promise-making, otherwise God
would not have been warranted in making the promise that God made.
If we are to accept that, whether or not God’s own existence is timeless, God
acts in time-bound creation, then it must make sense, at least relative to that
creation, to speak of God knowing or acting now, or in the past. It is, after all, relative
to time-bound creation that we speak in the Aristotelian framework of the present
and past being necessary. It would thus seem that if God now has knowledge of
some future contingent event, that knowledge — if not the event itself — is
necessary by virtue of being now. (Thus the whole problem!) The problem of God’s
action in time is made even more robust when we consider the earthly life of Jesus
Christ, God incarnate. Even if the Godhead inhabits timeless eternity, at least in
general, not only does God act in time-bound creation, but the Second Person of the
Godhead dwells bodily in time-bound creation. A Nazarene man is born at a
particular, identifiable time in Classical history (ca. 4 B.C.), when the power of the
Roman Empire is approaching its height, and this man lived out his earthly life over
a period of 33 Earth-years before being subjected to Roman execution on a cross ca.
30 A.D. The claim of Christians, including Ockham and Bradwardine, is that this man
is the eternal God: whether or not God himself exists timelessly, dwelling beyond our
order of created time and space, transcending the entire created order, all of time
eternally present to God by a mode of knowing unfathomable to mere time-trapped
creatures — yet, this God acts in time to announce and to bring about God’s own
promises at particular, identifiable historical moments (“In the days of Herod, king of
Judea,” for instance (Luke 1.5)). The tension between the timeless eternity of God
and the action of God in time is starkly illustrated by the doctrine of the Incarnation.
Thus, if Ockham explicitly ascribes to the doctrine of the necessity of the
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present, we must hold him to account if he is to also claim that the knowledge God
presently has is contingent, if the subject of that knowledge is contingent. It does not
seem to me that Ockham has provided a satisfactory account of how these notions
can be reconciled.

Conclusion
Having now surveyed in some depth Ockham’s approach to the problem, and
considered a few possible objections to his approach, we will turn in the next
chapter to an introduction to Bradwardine’s text, and discover his own reasons for
rejecting Ockham’s solution.
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Chapter 3
Bradwardine’s Treatise, Part I:
The Rejection of the Ockhamist Solution

Introduction
We have now examined in some detail the solutions of four major figures —
Boethius, Anselm, Duns Scotus, and Ockham — to the problem of future contingents.
It is in light of these positions that we turn finally to the titular subject of this
dissertation, which is the early treatise of Thomas Bradwardine called the De futuris
contingentibus (On future contingents; DFC henceforth).101 We begin our
examination of the DFC in this chapter with a discussion of the structure of the
treatise, which is complicated by the fact that there has been some
misunderstanding on this front present in the literature on the treatise (3.1). We
will then turn to a summary of the first half of the treatise itself (3.2), with especial
attention given to Bradwardine’s criticism of Ockham’s view as it appears in that
section (3.3). These tasks completed, we will be ready to move, in the next chapter,
to an examination of Bradwardine’s own solution to the problem.

Thomas Bradwardine, De futuris contingentibus (ed. J.-F. Genest), Recherches Augustiniennes vol. 14
(1979), 280 – 336. This edition is immediately preceded by Jean-François Genest’s immensely
informative introduction (ibid., 249 - 279). The mid-twentieth-century literature on Bradwardine,
including Heiko Oberman’s volume Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: A fourteenth century Augustinian
(Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1958) and Genest’s introduction, informs me that there also exists an earlier,
fragmentary edition of DFC by P. Bartomeu-Maria Xiberta, published in 1935, but I have not seen this
edition for myself (in any case, Genest reports that Xiberta’s edition covers less than 15% of the text.
Genest 1979, 249). From Genest’s description of the Xiberta extracts, though, I suspect that this may
have been what Norman Kretzmann was working from when he drafted a translation of fragments of
the text (the quantity of text included — “moins de 15%” — would seem, at any rate, to be about the
same). It was, incidentally, Stephen Read who first shared Kretzmann’s fragmentary translation draft
with me, and this document sparked my initial interest in this text.
101
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3.1 - Structure of De futuris contingentibus
Before moving on to the explicit arguments set forward by Bradwardine, it
will be worth our taking a bit of time to understand the general structure of this
little-studied treatise. Indeed, as we shall see, it is partly because of
misunderstandings of the structure of DFC that its significance in the history of
discussions of future contingents has been overlooked before now. The treatise
breaks down broadly into two halves: in the first half, Bradwardine examines and
critiques a number of approaches to the problem of future contingents put forward
by others; in the second half, he lays out his own solution, and responds to possible
objections. But due to textual issues that will be discussed below, even this basic
structure has been misunderstood by some, and consequently the content of the
second half has not consistently been recognized as even presenting an original
solution to the problem of future contingents at all. In this section, then, I will
describe the structure of the treatise (3.1.1), and then highlight and discuss the
textual problem that I think has led to a misunderstanding of this structure (3.1.2).

3.1.1 - The De futuris contingentibus, Parts I & II
The De futuris contingentibus is comprised of two main parts:

Part I (DFC 3a - 40g)
After a brief introduction, in which Bradwardine outlines the problem of
reconciling the existence of future contingents with God's prescience, Bradwardine
lays out nine solutions to the problem that have been put forward by various
philosophers (DFC 3a - 40g). In this part of the treatise, Bradwardine systematically
considers each of these nine opinions, and in scholastic fashion, considers
arguments in favour of and opposed to each one. In the following two sections (3.2.
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and 3.3), I will provide a summary of these positions and Bradwardine’s treatment
of them, with special attention (3.3) to the lengthy discussion Bradwardine
undertakes of Ockham’s position.

Part II (DFC 41 - 63)
After having outlined the solutions of others, and in most cases, his criticisms
of the same, Bradwardine turns in the second part to a presentation of his own
solution, addresses objections possible objections to the same, and explores his
solution’s application to various related questions (DFC 41 - 63). We will not take up
a discussion of this section until the following chapter, with an analysis in the final
chapter.

3.1.2 - A textual problem
Despite this seemingly straightforward two-part division of the text, a
confusion that has arisen with regard to the structure at the point of transition
between the two. This confusion is the result of the fact that just prior to the
responsio propria, Bradwardine introduces this second portion of the treatise by a
restatement of the question at hand. But in restating the question, the text phrases it
in a way that is subtly – but significantly – different from the question with which
the treatise began. The treatise opens with the question, “Whether God has
foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents”;102 at this point, however,
when we expect him to provide his own response to the initial question, he instead
restates the question as, “Whether Christ, who is God, has foreknowledge of all ad
utrumlibet future contingents” (emphatic italics added).103

utrum Deus habeat prescienciam omnium futurorum contingencium ad utrumlibet. (Heading at the
beginning of at least two MSS (Troyes and Vatican), preceding what Genest numbers as paragraph 1.)
103
utrum Christus qui est Deus habeat prescienciam omnium futurorum contingencium ad utrumlibet.
102

101
With the addition of three words (“Christus qui est”), the initial question
becomes an entirely different – though related – question: this latter question
highlights problems relating to the nature of the Incarnation, and the complex
relationship between Jesus Christ's divine nature and human nature, rather than just
the puzzles relating to God's foreknowledge and future contingents. This latter
question echoes those of a long tradition of questions about the knowledge of the
incarnate Christ, from the third book of Peter Lombard’s Sentences to the Tertia Pars
of St Thomas’s Summa Theologiae (particularly questions 9 through 12104 ). What
complicates the question of Christ’s knowledge is his simultaneous, complete
possession of both divine and human natures. For by his divine nature, it would
seem that Christ would possess all the knowledge (including the foreknowledge) of
God; but by his human nature, it would seem that such complete and total
knowledge is impossible. Thus, the question of Christ’s knowledge, and for the case
in question, his foreknowledge, is far more complicated than the more basic
question of God’s foreknowledge (to be sure, I recognize the irony of calling the
latter question “basic”).
Genest suggests that the formulation at the beginning of the responsio propria
(“Whether Christ, who is God, has knowledge of all ad utrumlibet future
contingents”) may indicate that the whole question of the treatise really arose in
connection with Christ’s knowledge, and may be connected with Adam Wodeham’s
lectures on the subject in Oxford in 1331 - 32.105 Genest thinks this indicates that
the question Bradwardine is really concerned with is that of Christ’s knowledge. But
there are reasons, I believe, to question this conclusion. In particular, if

(DFC 41)
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For a sense of the complexity of this question, the articles in these sections include, for instance, “Did
Christ have any knowledge besides the Divine?” (Q. 9 art. 1); “Did he have any acquired knowledge?” (Q.
9 art. 4); “Did the soul of Christ know all things in the Word?” (Q. 10 art. 2); (on infused knowledge) “Did
Christ know all things by this knowledge?” (Q. 11 art. 1); “The comparison of this knowledge with the
angelic knowledge” (Q. 11 art. 4); (on acquired knowledge) “Did Christ know all things by this
knowledge?” (Q. 12 art. 1); “Did he advance in this knowledge?” (Q. 12 art. 2); “Did he learn anything
from man?” (Q. 12 art. 4); etc.
105
Genest, p. 254.
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Bradwardine’s main concern is the knowledge of Christ, as Genest speculates, it
should strike us as extraordinarily strange that so little of the subsequent discussion
has anything to do with the particularities of the knowledge of the incarnate Word.
With only a few isolated exceptions, the discussion concerns the knowledge of God
more generally; if Bradwardine really intended to speak of Christ’s knowledge, then
surely this would have been brought forward more explicitly, since the issues
surrounding Christ’s knowledge are so very different from and very much more
complicated than those of God’s knowledge in general. This is because, while much
of God’s foreknowledge might be explained by appeal to God’s inhabiting an eternal
moment which transcends time, if we speak of the person of Jesus Christ, we are
necessarily speaking of God inhabiting time and space and thus bound by those
things. If Christ is fully God, then our set of problems surrounding God’s knowledge
becomes complicated even further by the fact that we seem to be positing
simultaneously that God transcends time — and in this way possesses perfect and
complete knowledge of all events in time, past, present and future — and that God
dwells fully in time. Without straying into one or another trinitarian heresy
(particularly tempting here are modalism and tri-partism), it is very difficult to see
how these two ideas might be reconciled. It would therefore be passing strange if a
treatise supposedly devoted to the problem of “Whether Christ, who is God, has
knowledge of all ad utrimlibet future contingents” did not, in fact, address any of
these pressing problems relating to that question.
Similarly, if this is taken to be the introduction of a new question, it is
puzzling that what follows does not address this second question in any way (except
insofar as it relates to the first). Additionally, this reading does not seem to make
good sense of what is actually happening structurally with the treatise: if the treatise
did break into two parts, addressing two distinct questions, then it seems that
Bradwardine will never have given his own positive account in response to the first
question within the section concerning that question, while failing also to address
the features of the second question which distinguish it from the first. Indeed, as I
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have been implying from the start, the overall structure (which, despite Genest’s
conclusions to the contrary, is supported by Genest's editorial presentation) seems
to frame what follows as Bradwardine's solution to the original question; for it is to
this question that his response most readily applies, and it does not in any way treat
the particular problems of the question of Jesus' foreknowledge and the Incarnation.
On my view, it seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the second half of the
treatise, like the first, is concerned with the question of “Whether God has
foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future contingents.” On this view, then, the
addition of “Christus qui est” in the second instance of the question is an error,
whether due to a copyist, or to a student's faulty transcription (as the work we have
does seem to be a reportatio), or perhaps even to Bradwardine's own slip of the
tongue.106 Perhaps a more thorough investigation of this portion of the extant
manuscripts (something which I have been unable to undertake myself) would yield
useful clues on the matter, but as the scholarship currently stands, the reasons for
this error remain something of a mystery. What does seem clear, however, is that
throughout the treatise, Bradwardine is addressing the problem of God's knowledge
of future contingents, and does not seem concerned with the related particulars
regarding the knowledge of the Incarnate Jesus Christ.
I draw attention to this textual point because I think it is because of this that
Heiko Oberman has misunderstood the structure of the treatise, which substantially
confuses his interpretation. Oberman takes the second statement of the question to
be introducing a second part of the treatise on the separate question of Christ's
foreknowledge.107 From what I have argued above, however, I believe that Oberman
Richard Moll has quite validly objected that this conclusion seems somewhat backwards: in
particular, it glosses over the fact that, from a text-editing perspective, much more authoritative
credence ought to be to the main body text than to editorial headings; the “Christus qui est” appears in
the main body of text, while the appearance of the question without those words appears in an editorial
heading, which is presumably a later addition. Moll may very well be right that my conclusion is
ill-founded from a textual-historical perspective; however, even if it is indeed the case that the inclusion
of “Christus qui est” was intentional on Bradwardine’s part, it remains a serious puzzle why his
subsequent discussion does little to address the particularities of that question.
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Oberman, pp. 107 ff, especially p. 111. I should note here that we ought not to be too harsh in our
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is mistaken in his assessment of the work's structure as two distinct questions. I
think also that Genest is mistaken in supposing that the main aim of the entire
treatise is the treatment of the question of Christ’s knowledge. In sum, it seems to
me to be far more sensible to treat the entire treatise as a continuous treatment of
the first question, and the addition of the words “Christus qui est” as a textual error.

3.2 - The nine opinions
Now that we have an idea of the overall structure of the DFC, we are ready to
turn to a summary of the first part, in which nine “opinions” are examined by
Bradwardine and, in almost every case, dismissed. For the most part, I will be quite
brief, pausing over only a couple which merit further examination. And I will save
discussion of the eighth opinion — that of Ockham — ’til the next section (3.3). This
cursory summary may strike the reader as a frustrating offering of mere “teasers,”
without much in-depth investigation of their merit or broader implications. But I
feel that presenting them in this way is in some ways necessary and unavoidable in
the current project: presenting each view, however briefly, seems necessary for an
adequate summary of an almost unknown work; and doing so with brevity and
terseness is unavoidable if we are not to become too distracted from the main thrust
of the project.
Something that may be useful to keep in mind when considering these views
is the spectrum I laid out in the main Introduction of solutions to the problem of
future contingents, from a denial of free will (Determinism) on the one end, to a
denial of God’s foreknowledge (Open Theism) on the other. For at least some of the

judgment of Oberman’s scholarship on this account: at the time of the publication of his book on the
theology of Bradwardine, no edition of the complete DFC existed, and he had to rely on the very
incomplete publication by E.B.M. Xiberta, O. Carm, “Fragments d’una questio inedita de Thomas
Bradwardina,” in Festschrift für M. Grabmann (Münster, 1935), pp. 1169 - 1180 in BB,
Supplementvolume III, 2 (Publication from Cod. Vat. Lat. 813). It is quite understandable, therefore, that
he did not have an accurate understanding of the overall structure of the work.
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solutions that follow, it is useful to consider how they might map onto this spectrum.

Opinions 1 & 2
The first opinion which Bradwardine considers (DFC 3a - 8g) is that nothing
is future. This is supported by a sophistical argument that the future is nothing
(because it does not presently exist), and so by inversion, nothing is future. But this,
Bradwardine argues, is not consistent with our own experience of the passage of
time. We experience time as successive, and perceive our own present to have been
future to time past; that time which stands in the same relationship to our present as
our present stands to the past is simply what we mean by future. To say that nothing
will be future does not bear out our own experience of times past.
The second opinion (DFC 9a - 9d) concedes that there are future things, but
as the first opinion claims that future things are nothing, the second claims that
future things have no power. In virtue of their lack of power, the second opinion
asserts that future things have no power for being, or becoming, and are hence
unable to be. Bradwardine responds, by appeal to Anselm, that it is not through a
thing’s own power that it comes to be in the first place, but rather by God’s power: so
a thing’s powerlessness to bring itself into being is irrelevant, since no-one claims
that that is the power that brings it about, anyway.

Opinion 3
The third opinion (DFC 10 - 12) expresses what Bradwardine takes to be
Aristotle’s opinion, as made clear by one of the few explicit attributions
Bradwardine cites among the nine opinions (“Et hoc patet per Philosophum…”, or,
“And this holds according to the Philosopher…”). This opinion is clearly an
interpretation of Aristotle’s view as laid out in the De interpretatione, which
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Bradwardine summarizes as putting forward the view that future contingents are
not determined, and thus that propositions concerning them have no determinate
truth value, so are neither true nor false. It is interesting to compare this
interpretation to the contested interpretation of Boethius, discussed in 1.1.1; and
also to that of Ockham, discussed in 2.2.2. (Doing so will uncover subtle differences
in possible interpretation that may affect our evaluation of the charity of
Bradwardine’s criticisms of the opinion.) Among Bradwardine’s objections to this
claim is that it would make nonsense of claims of God’s foreknowledge, since God
could not have determinate knowledge of things that were not determined.
Bradwardine says that on this account, the only sort of foreknowledge God might
have is that “under a disjunction” (i.e., the knowledge of the tautology, “A will happen
or A will not happen”), but “any idiot knows in that way!”108

Opinions 4 & 5
The fourth opinion (DFC 13a - 15c) is somewhat peculiar, and a bit difficult to
parse out: according to this opinion, things which are going to be, begin at a certain
point to be going to be. In other words, future things were not going to be from
eternity, but only from a certain point in time. But Bradwardine does not think this
makes a whole lot of sense: suppose some future thing, A, begins to be going to be at
some future point in time. Then is it not the case now that A will begin to be going to
be in the future — and hence, does it not follow that even now (and from eternity!),
A is going to be? Furthermore, if something begins to be going to be at a certain
point in time, then wasn’t there an earlier point in time at which that beginning
began to be going to be? And prior to that, would there not have been a beginning
for that beginning? And so on ad infinitum. All in all, though, it is not entirely clear
to me what the upshot of this opinion is: in what way does it attempt to resolve any

Similiter sic sequitur quod Deus nihil presciret nisi sub disjunctione, et sic scit quilibet ydiota. (DFC
11c)
108
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of the problems inherent in future contingents? It is also not an opinion that I
recognize as having actually belonged to anyone in particular, despite Bradwardine’s
confusing suggestion that Aristotle defends the position (as well as its refutation —
DFC 13c, 14a). In any case, an investigation of this confusing position — though
certainly beyond the scope of our current endeavour — may be worth further study.
109

The fifth opinion (DFC 16a - d) is the rather impious suggestion that God does
not in fact have any foreknowledge of future contingents. This, Bradwardine claims
— by an obscure reference to a work on dreams which he calls De sompno [sic] et
vigilia — is implicitly affirmed by Averroes (DFC 16b). Bradwardine defers his reply
to this opinion until after his own discussion, in which he will make clear how it is
that God in fact does have knowledge of future contingents.

Opinion 6
The sixth opinion (DFC 17 - 19) is the classic Anselmian-Augustinian view
(attributed by Bradwardine to Anselm) that, by virtue of God’s transcendence of
time, all of time — past, present, and future — is present to God. God’s
transcendence of time is a result of time being a part of the created order; time did
not pre-exist the creation of the universe, on this view. Thus, what is future for us is
not future for God. Because of this, God’s knowledge of what is future to us is not, in
relation to God, foreknowledge at all, since it is only knowledge of what is present to
God. Thus, it is claimed on this view that there is nothing about this sort of
knowledge that results in any compulsion for something to turn out as it is known —
no more than our knowledge of what is present to us adds any compulsion for
something to turn out as it does.

In particular, it may be fruitful to consider this question in relation to Bradwardine’s own treatise on
beginning and ceasing, De incipit et desinit, ed. L.O. Nielson, in Cahiers de L'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et
Latin, vol. 42 (1982), pp. 47 – 83.
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We have already discussed the view of Anselm in great detail (1.2), so I will
not say much more about it here. Interestingly, though, while Bradwardine does put
forward a couple of objections to this opinion, all are immediately given responses.
Unlike all other opinions of the first section, this one ends not with a sed contra
argument, but a respondetur (DFC 19). It would seem, therefore, that Bradwardine
does not, in fact, reject this opinion. As we will see when his own argument unfolds,
it seems as though Bradwardine takes his own solution to the problem of future
contingents to be an elaboration upon, or a refinement of, this sixth opinion. This
supports my argument that Bradwardine’s own solution ought to be understood as
following in a lineage of positions that includes that of Anselm.

Opinions 7 (& 8) & 9
The seventh opinion (DFC 20) is one which Bradwardine claims to find too
preposterous, “so entirely contrary to both philosophy and theology,” that it does not
even merit a response: it is the view that nothing is contingent, but that everything
happens by necessity. Although Bradwardine does not make the attribution, a view
like this has been attributed by several scholars to Averroes. Despite Bradwardine’s
emphatic insistence that necessitarianism is entirely untenable as a philosophical or
theological position, as we shall explore in the following chapter, it may be the case
that Bradwardine’s own view strays alarmingly close to this position. Perhaps, in his
adamant dismissal of this position, the Profound Doctor doth protest too much.
The eighth opinion (DFC 21 - 38g) is that which receives Bradwardine’s
greatest attention by far: it is the opinion of Ockham, which we will examine in much
greater depth, along with Bradwardine’s objections, in the next section (3.3).
The ninth and final opinion (DFC 39 - 40g), unattributed by Bradwardine,
claims that those future things which God explicitly foretells (in prophecy, promises,
and the like) are necessary, but all other things are not. Bradwardine has two main
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objections to this claim. Firstly, he takes it to be the case that, even if God does not
explicitly foretell something, that God could foretell that thing if God so wished
(since God freely spoke everything into being, and has complete knowledge of all
things that will be); thus it would appear to follow that everything could be
necessary. Bradwardine seems then to follow a line of reasoning consistent with an
S5 modal system, concluding that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then
it is necessary. So this leads to the result, already rejected in the seventh opinion,
that everything is necessary. Furthermore, this position would seem to reverse the
causal relationship between what is foretold and the foretelling: things do not
happen, argues Bradwardine, because they have been foretold, but rather, something
may be foretold because it is going to happen. He illustrates his point with the
prophecy of Isaiah that “a virgin shall conceive and bear a son”: Jesus was not born
of a virgin because Isaiah prophesied that he would be; rather, Isaiah prophesied a
virgin birth because that was the way in which Jesus would be born (DFC 40g).

Analysis
With this ninth opinion, Bradwardine concludes his survey of responses to
the problem of future contingents. We may notice gaps in Bradwardine’s survey:
most notably, perhaps, there is no explicit discussion of any opinion that seems to be
like that of Duns Scotus (see 1.3). (I will claim shortly that a strongly possible
reason for this absence in the survey is that Scotus’ view is one which Bradwardine
himself will pick up and elaborate upon in his own responsio propria.) But as has
been noted already (see the Introduction), in our consideration of a spectrum of
views on the problem of future contingents and God’s foreknowledge, there are two
extreme possible solutions, while all other solutions try to avoid falling into either
extreme: on the one extreme, the problem is solved by rejecting the existence of
future contingents, in one of various forms of determinism or necessitarianism. The
trouble with this extreme is that it would seem, at least on the face of it, to

110
undermine human free will. On the other extreme lies the denial that God does, in
fact, know all things future. (In contemporary theology, this sort of solution arises in
the context of what has been called “Open Theism”, as influentially espoused by the
late Clark Pinnock, Canadian Protestant theologian at McMaster University.110
Among philosophers of religion, this position has been vigorously embraced by, e.g.,
William Hasker,111 and aspects of Open Theism’s particular criticisms of Classical
Theism can be seen already in, e.g., Alvin Plantinga.112 The direct denial of God’s
foreknowledge is also strongly present throughout the work of Richard Swinburne,
and is, in fact, among the more controversial of Swinburne’s theistic claims.113 )
However, this opposite extreme undermines God's omniscience.
Despite the fact that Bradwardine’s list of nine opinions is not at all
comprehensive, we should note that both of these two extreme solutions can be
identified among them. Necessitarianism, which is the seventh listed, is simply
dismissed as “opposed to philosophy as much as to theology.” (DFC 20) We also see
a denial of the existence of future contingents in the first opinion, which not only
rejects the contingency of future things, but even their very existence! (DFC 3ff) On
the other extreme, something like “Open Theism” is found in the third opinion,
purportedly Aristotle’s, which says that of a future contingent A, God only knows
that A will be or A will not be. (DFC 10ff)
But none of these eight opinions is really Bradwardine’s chief target in this
project of his. For that, we must turn to his treatment of Ockham’s position.

3.3 - Bradwardine’s case against Ockham

See, e.g., Clark Pinnock, The Openness of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); and Most
Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2001).
111
William Hasker, Foreknowledge, Evil, and the Openness of God (London: Routledge, 2004).
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Alvin Plantinga, “On Ockham’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy vol. 3 (1986), pp. 235 - 69. Reprinted
in Thomas V. Morris, ed., The Concept of God (Oxford: OUP, 1987), pp. 171 - 200.
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Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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Bradwardine’s objections to Ockham’s solution to the problem of future
contingents in De futuris contingentibus fit within his broader anti-Ockhamist
project, a project which is seen most explicitly in the thousand-page anti-Pelagian
polemic of the next decade, De causa Dei. In the De futuris contingentibus, however,
his objections to Ockham arise in the context of his refutations of nine separate
solutions to the problem of future contingents. As we have seen, these nine
solutions range from a statement denying God’s foreknowledge (the fifth opinion,
DFC 16a ff.), to a statement of absolute determinism (the seventh opinion, DFC 20).
Almost all of the nine opinions receive brief, terse replies, some of which have been
summarized above; but to the eighth, Bradwardine devotes fifteen or more pages of
text. This eighth position is that of William Ockham.
Bradwardine's concentrated attention on this one view seems not to spring
so much from finding it a particularly difficult or subtle position to reject, but rather,
from an impulse to show us just how entirely bad the view really is. It seems,
therefore, that in Ockham's theory, we discover the primary motivation for
Bradwardine's treatise – and that is to offer an alternative to the solution of his
Oxford adversary. One way of understanding Ockham’s position that helps us to
understand Bradwardine’s deep suspicion of it is to observe that it seems that, for
Ockham, what is most important in his development of a solution is the preservation
of the true contingency of future events. That future contingents are truly
contingent is, as it were, taken as a given, and the rest of the account developed
accordingly to correspond with this fact. In a certain way, it seems that Ockham’s
position unfolds around the central tenet of future contingents, such that he is
saying, “In light of this, what is to be said of God's knowledge of future contingents?”
From this perspective, it seems that, concerning any future contingent event
A, Ockham would have it, concerning God’s knowledge of A, that, because A is
contingent, God's knowledge of A is also contingent. Ockham's claim is that
knowledge of future events cannot be ascribed the same properties as knowledge of
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present or past events. Because the subject matter of the knowledge in question is
future and contingent, Ockham would have it that God’s knowledge of these things is
itself future and contingent in some special sense. Through this assertion, Ockham
blocks the conclusion that God's foreknowledge of A entails the necessity of A: for if
God's knowledge of A is future and contingent, we cannot ascribe to it the sort of
necessity generally thought to inhere in past and present knowledge. Since the
knowledge itself is not necessary, it therefore does not in any way follow that its
subject, A, is necessary. But to make this work, it was necessary for Ockham to deny
necessity of God’s knowledge. And thus, Bradwardine summarizes Ockham’s view
by saying, “something is going to happen contingently ad utrumlibet114 and is
foreknown by God in this present instant, but . . . it is possible, even for this present
instant, that it could not be going to be, nor foreknown by God.”115 As has just been
discussed in the preceding section, this solution raises some important
epistemological and logical problems. But despite these other issues, as we shall
see, what Bradwardine is primarily concerned with are the ways this solution seems
to undermine the absolute omniscience of God.

3.3.1 - Bradwardine’s case
Bradwardine makes his case against Ockham in the eighth section of the nine
purported solutions and rebuttals that he considers (DFC 21 - 37g). He summarizes
Ockham’s position in the following way:
The eighth opinion posits that something is going to happen contingently ad
utrumlibet and is foreknown by God in this present instant, but that it is
possible, even for this present instant, that it could not be going to be, nor
foreknown by God – nay, even more, that at no time was it ever going to be,
More about this phrase — which means something like “in either way” — and my reasons for leaving
it untranslated can be found in the first footnote of the appendix, as well as in the introduction, p. 4ff.
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aliquod est futurum contingens ad utrumlibet et prescitum a Deo in isto instanti presenti, et quod
tamen possibile est pro isto instanti presenti quod non sit futurum nec prescitum a Deo… (DFC 21; this
passage will be quoted more fully in just a moment).
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nor [was it] foreknown by God.

Octava opinio est que ponit quod aliquod est futurum contingens ad
utrumlibet et prescitum a Deo in isto instanti presenti, et quod tamen
possibile est pro isto instanti presenti quod non sit futurum nec prescitum a
Deo, ymmo quod nunquam fuerit futurum nec prescitum a Deo. (DFC 21)

It must be noted that Bradwardine does not explicitly name Ockham as the
originator of this view — indeed, few of the nine opinions, except the third
(Aristotle) and the sixth (Anselm),116 are given an explicit attribution.
At least two clues let us know that it is Ockham’s position that Bradwardine
has in his sights in the eighth opinion. Firstly, the characterization fits at least a
certain interpretation of Ockham’s position, and is consistent with Bradwardine’s
own characterizations of Ockham’s position in later writing: future contingents are
known by God in a way that is contingent, and thus in such a way that those events
could yet turn out not to happen. In such a case, then God will not have known them
to be going to be, since they would not have happened, which seems to be what is
expressed in the passage above. Secondly, this is the opinion which receives
Bradwardine’s most sustained attack by far, indicating Bradwardine’s intense
interest in replying to this particular opinion. Given Bradwardine’s evident interest
in refuting Ockham’s position on future contingents in later writing (notably, the De
The sixth opinion (DFC 17) is attributed by Bradwardine to Anselm, though Genest has suggested
that this opinion is perhaps more accurately Boethian:“La sixième opinion, qui remonte à Boèce, mais
que Bradwardine place ici spécialement sous le patronage de s. Anselme, soutient que la connaissance
que Dieu a de l’avenir n’est pas à proprement parler une prescience, les futurs étant présents à l’éternité
divine.” (Genest, 263) I am not convinced that Genest is correct to trace this view to Boethius rather
than Anselm. Indeed, the sixth view seems certainly to reflect the view defended by Anselm in De
concordia, and though Boethius gestures toward a model of this sort, his view is much more concerned
with an understanding of the way in which God’s knowledge differs from our own so as to make God’s
foreknowledge of our actions non-compelling (why “Goddes worthy forwityng” does not “streyneth me
nedely for to doon a thyng,” as Chaucer would put it), and his discussion of conditional necessity. If I
were to point to anyone as a precursor to Anselm in the view that God foreknows all things in virtue of
their being eternally present to God, I would pick out Augustine, not Boethius. But about this, more will
be said in the following chapter.
116
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causa Dei), it should not be surprising that his preoccupation with this position
began somewhat earlier, and is evident in this work. Genest agrees with the
identification of the eighth view as Ockham’s, and also agrees with the assessment
that this opinion is the real target of Bradwardine’s treatise, saying that “the
principle target for Bradwardine is clearly the eighth opinion, in which we recognize
the Ockhamist theory of future contingents.”117
We have examined already, in the preceding chapter, a number of potential
problems with Ockham’s solution, but Bradwardine’s objections are somewhat
different than those outlined previously. To summarize Bradwardine's reply, his
chief complaint against Ockham's solution is that attributing to God knowledge that
is contingent undermines God's immutability. Contingent knowledge, at least on
Bradwardine’s understanding of contingency, must be knowledge that could come
into or out of existence: for God to have such knowledge would imply that God might
know A at time t1, and cease to know A at t2. Loss of knowledge seems, to
Bradwardine, to constitute a substantial change in the knower, leading to the
unacceptable consequence that God is mutable.
For instance, the first objection Bradwardine levels against Ockham’s position
runs as follows:
But against this, consider the following: it follows that it is possible that
something would be going to be that is not now going to be. This consequent
is false, since, if it were so [the following argument could be made]: Suppose
that it is now that instant [in the future], and [suppose] that A would
[happen]; it may then be argued as follows: A is now going to be, and
previously A was not going to be, therefore it is changed from not-going-to-be
to going-to-be; and it is not changed because of a change in itself (since it did
not exist before now); it is therefore the case that, if A is changed, it is
because of a change in something else. This consequent is false, since in the
same way that it has just been argued concerning possibility that A can be
changed from not-going-to-be to going-to-be, so too could it be argued
“Mais la cible principale de Bradwardine est évidement la huitième opinion, où l’on reconnaît la
théorie ockhamiste des futurs contingents.” (Genest 263)
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concerning [A’s] essence.

Sed contra sic : sequitur quod possibile est quod aliquod sit futurum quod
nunc non est futurum. Consequens est falsum, quia, si sic, ponatur illud
instans in esse, et sit A, et arguitur sic : A est futurum nunc, et prius non fuit
futurum, igitur mutatur de non futuro ad futurum; et non sic mutatur propter
mutacionem in seipso, cum non sit adhuc ; igitur oportet quod, si A mutatur,
sit propter mutacionem in alio. Consequens est falsum, quia sic arguitur de
possibili quod A potest mutari de non futuro ad futurum sicut arguitur de
inesse. (DFC 22a)

If it were the case, argues Bradwardine, that something could come to be that was
previously not going to be, as would seem to follow from Ockham’s claim that God’s
foreknowledge is contingent, then something must change between the time when
the thing was not going to be and the time that it came to be, other than the thing
itself. This is because prior to the thing’s coming to be, nothing of it exists to
undergo change. We see in this objection premonitions of things to come: for in
what “other” thing might that change occur than God?
The connexion to God’s mutability is drawn out more strongly in the second
objection, several paragraphs later:
Secondly, [one objects] to the principal [argument] in this way: If God has
foreknowledge of ad utrumlibet future contingents, it follows that God can
will and promise the opposite of what is now known, promised, and willed by
him. This consequent is false, since in this way God could be changed with
respect to knowledge, will, and promises, which is contrary to what is said in
Malachi 3 [v. 6]: “I am the LORD, and I do not change”; and so it follows that
[if] it will not be just as God has promised or has willed it to be, then God is
changed.

Secundo ad principale sic : si Deus habet prescienciam futurorum
contingencium ad utrumlibet, sequitur quod Deus potest velle et promittere
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oppositum nunc sciti, promissi et voliti ab eo. Consequens est falsum, quia sic
Deus potest mutari de scitis, volitis et promissis, quod est contra illud
Malachie 3: « Ego Dominus et non mutor »; et ita sequitur quod non erit sic
sicut Deus promisit vel voluit fore, igitur Deus mutatur. (DFC 23a)

Bradwardine is arguing that God’s foreknowledge, as understood by Ockham, leads
to the consequence that key aspects of God’s nature — namely, God’s knowledge,
God’s will, and God’s promise-making — are mutable. This is so because,
Bradwardine reasons, on Ockham’s model, things may turn out otherwise than they
were at one point going to turn out. So suppose at time t1, some future event A was
not going to happen. Then at t1, God knew that A would not happen, perhaps willed
that A would not happen, and perhaps even promised that A would not happen. But
because of A’s contingency, Bradwardine’s Ockham may suppose that A does in fact
happen, say at time t2. Were A to happen at t2, after it had been the case at t1 that A
was not going to happen — along with God’s corresponding knowledge, will, and
perhaps even promises — then at t2 God’s knowledge, will, and promises are
substantially different, and consequently, God will have changed. This, as
Bradwardine attests, is contrary not only to the Classical or Neoplatonist notions of
God, but to the character and person of God as presented in the Jewish and Christian
canons of Scripture.
We next come to a series of objections relating directly to God’s promises as
revealed in prophecy, which Bradwardine frequently refers to as “seeing in the
Word,” i.e. seeing what is revealed by the second Person of the Trinity, identified
throughout Scripture as the Wisdom, Word, or λογος of God.118 These objections also

The identification of the Word of God with the second Person of the Trinity is very ancient in the
Christian tradition, tracing its origin at least as far back as St John’s Gospel of the first century, with the
famous opening prologue, “In the beginning was the Word (λογος), and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God . . . . And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.” (John 1.1, 14a) St John appears to
be quite deliberate in his appropriation of the term λογος, which has a rich philosophical history
reaching back to the Presocratics, from Heraclitus onward. Christian commentators on Old Testament
texts, following John’s lead, quickly came to identify instances of God’s speech acts (e.g., in the creation
narratives) and references to “the word of God” or “the word of the LORD ” (e.g., Gen. 15.1, Is. 55.11), as
118
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deal explicitly with problems relating to the predestined and the reprobate.
Thirdly, [it may be objected] in this way to the principle [argument]: if
whatever is going to be can be not going to be, then it follows that, with
respect to the future, it cannot be something revealed in the Word [i.e., by
God]. This consequent is false, but the consequence holds, since if it were so
[that whatever is going to be can be not going to be], it would follow that
what has already happened can have not happened, [so for example]
someone who died in mortal sin can have not died in mortal sin, and so also
someone who died in a state of grace can have not died in a state of grace, and
so also a damned person can not ever have been damned, and a saved person
can not ever have been saved. This consequent is therefore false. But the
consequence holds: I suppose that A sees in the Word [i.e., has a vision from
God] that B is about to be, and that it would be expected, under penalty of
mortal sin, that A would foretell and affirm what A sees in the Word, and
[would foretell] nothing other than what A sees in the Word. Then suppose
that A foretells that B is going to be, and that through [sharing] this
prediction and through obedience [A] is saved, and otherwise [A] is not
[saved]. Then it may be argued as follows: it is possible for B not to happen,
therefore it is possible for [A] not to have foretold that B was going to be; and
consequently, if [A] is saved precisely because of [A’s] foretelling, it is possible
for [A] not to have been saved. And so the proposition follows, namely, that
the past can not be the past [i.e., can not have happened], and other things of
this sort, since if B is not going to be, [A] did not see in the Word [that] B is
about to be going to be, and consequently, [A] did not foretell it to be so, nor,
consequently, was [A] saved because of this [foretelling]; therefore, etc.

Tercio sic ad principale : si quodlibet futurum potest non esse futurum, igitur
sequitur quod de futuris non potest esse aliqua revelacio in Verbo.
well as to “the wisdom of God” (e.g., Prov. 8), with the second Person of the Trinity, incarnate in Jesus.
Instances of God granting revelation to prophets and patriarchs (e.g., “The word of the LORD came to
Abram in a vision …”) are interpreted throughout the Christian tradition as instances of the acts of God
the Son. In the medieval tradition, this was often depicted quite literally in artistic representations of
Old Testament revelation: for example, in depictions of Moses hearing God speak to him in the burning
bush, the face of Jesus is often to be seen in the burning bush (examples can be found in medieval books
of Hours, in Eastern iconography, and in Western stained glass; very often, the image is of Christ as an
infant in the arms of his Mother). Given this strong precedent, it is not surprising that Bradwardine and
other medieval writers refer to true prophesy as “vision in the Word,” or “seeing in the Word,” despite
the odd ring it has for us.
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Consequens est falsum et consequencia patet, quia si sic, sequitur quod
preteritum potest non esse preteritum, et qui decessit in peccato mortali
potest non decessisse in peccato mortali, et sic de illo qui decessit in caritate
potest non etc., et sic dampnatus potest nunquam fuisse dampnatus et
salvatus nunquam fuisse salvatus. Consequens est falsum, igitur. Hec
consequencia patet, posito quod A videat in Verbo B fore et quod precipiatur
sub pena peccati mortalis quod predicet et affirmet illud quod vidit in Verbo,
et non aliud vel alia quam omnia illa que videt in Verbo. Tunc ponatur quod A
predicet B fore futurum, et quod pro illa predicacione et obediencia salvetur
et aliter non. Tunc arguitur sic : possibile est B non evenire, igitur possibile
est ipsum non predixisse B fore futurum ; et per consequens, si salvetur pro
illa predicacione precise, possibile est ipsum non esse salvatum. Et sic
sequitur propositum, scilicet quod preteritum potest non esse preteritum et
hujusmodi, quia si B non est futurum, ille sic non vidit in Verbo B fore
futurum, et per consequens non sic predixit, nec pro isto salvatur per
consequens; igitur etc. (DFC 24a)

This is a long and somewhat confused objection, and to understand it rightly, I think
it is best to read it as a series of interrelated arguments. Firstly, there is a repetition
of the first objection (that Ockham’s view leads to the contradictory result that
something that is going to happen will not happen), with a number of specific
examples relating to the salvation and damnation of particular people. Secondly,
there is a largely implicit argument that, because of the contradiction of the first
objection, prophecy and revelation from God would be impossible on Ockham’s
model. This is because God’s revelation, and subsequent prophetic acts, depend for
their veracity upon what is foretold actually occurring. If something that is going to
happen does not happen, then no true revelation or prophesy concerning that thing
can properly be given. Thirdly and finally, these two arguments are combined in a
rather unintuitive way, so that the second leads to a very particular example of the
first: suppose that some particular prophet’s salvation depends upon her faithfully
reporting what God supernaturally reveals to her about the future. Then if prophecy
is not possible, she will be unable to make the prophetic reports upon which her
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own salvation depends! And so it follows that although it is the case (by
assumption) that she is saved in virtue of her obedience to God’s revelatory
demands, she is unable to prophesy, and thus it contradictorily follows that she is
not saved.
Another thirteen major objections follow, but of these, only a few bring
substantially new elements to bear on the discussion. We will briefly consider two
more objections, for they pertain specifically to the question of whether necessity is a
perfection in God or not. Because this issue was so important in our discussion of
Ockham’s model of God’s foreknowledge, Bradwardine’s response to this issue bears
examination. The first of these objections is the twelfth, in which Bradwardine
affirms the necessity of God’s knowledge as a perfection in God. We have discussed
already the dominant medieval assumption that in virtue of God’s perfection, God’s
knowledge is necessary, and we have seen the way in which this assumption is
exemplified in Anselm’s writing. Bradwardine shares this assumption, and, in his
own arguments against Ockham, he spells it out explicitly, citing Anselm as his
authority:
In the same way, necessary knowledge and necessary will are more perfect
than contingent knowledge and contingent will, just as necessity is in itself
more perfect than contingency. Necessary knowledge of a thing and
necessary will are therefore attributed to God. The antecedent holds, since
contingency includes potency [for the opposite], and consequently [potency
for] imperfection. The consequence holds according to Anselm.

Item necessaria sciencia et necessaria voluntas perfectior est sciencia
contingenti et voluntate contingenti, sicut necessitas simpliciter perfectior
est contingencia. Igitur necessaria sciencia rerum et necessaria voluntas est
attribuenda Deo. Antecedens patet, quia contingencia includit potenciam et
per consequens imperfectionem. Consequencia patet per Anselmum. (DFC
33a)
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Bradwardine unequivocally denies Ockham’s claim that necessity does not in itself
constitute a perfection of God. But he does not address Ockham’s concerns about
immutable knowledge in fact being faulty knowledge (more on this shortly in 3.3.2).
However, Bradwardine does address, and at length, the concern that God’s
necessity might in some way impinge upon God’s freedom of will. This is the topic of
the fourteenth objection, which begins in this way:
Similarly, if necessity were excluded from God's volition, this would be mostly
due to freedom of choice. But this necessity is in no way incompatible with
free choice; therefore, because of this, it ought not to be excluded from the
will of God, as far as his internal and external actions. This is less the case in
speaking of freedom for contradictories ad utrumque partem [i.e., the
freedom to act in either of two ways], since this sort of freedom is not held by
God, nor by the blessed; therefore, it follows that necessity ought in no way to
be excluded from God in his action, since that power for contradictories is not
part of freedom, nor does it pertain to freedom, according to what Anselm
indicates by saying: “Who is more free? God and the blessed ones, who
cannot sin and can [only] not sin, [are more free than us by] our freedom, by
which we can sin and not sin.” It therefore follows that necessity, but not
coercion, is compatible with true liberty, since coercion is not compatible
with God.

Item si necessitas in volicione Dei excluderetur, hoc maxime foret propter
libertatem arbitrii ; sed illa necessitas in nullo repugnat libero arbitrio ; igitur
propter hoc non debet excludi a voluntate Dei quoad operaciones ejus ad
extra et ad intra. Minor patet loquendo de libertate contradictionis ad
utramque partem, quia illa libertas non est ponenda in Deo nec in beatis ;
igitur propter illam in nullo debet excludi a Deo necessitas in sua actione,
quia illa potestas contradictionis non est pars libertatis nec pertinet ad
libertatem, secundum quod innuit Anselmus dicens : « Qui liberior est ? Deus
et beatus, qui non possunt peccare et possunt non peccare, an [correxi: quam]
libertas nostra qua possumus peccare et non peccare? ». Igitur sequitur quod
cum vera libertate stat necessitas, sed non coactio, quia hec sibi repugnat.
(DFC 35a, correction Genest’s; internal quotation from Anselm’s De libertate
arbitrii I (Schmitt edition, vol. I, p. 208))
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Bradwardine emphasises the Anselmian doctrine that true freedom of choice, or free
will, is not the “freedom for contradictories” by which we are free to act in either of
two ways (e.g., to sin or to refrain from sinning); if this were the case, then God and
the blessed ones are less free than we, since they lack even the ability to sin, and this
conclusion seems preposterous. Rather, freedom of choice is most perfectly
exercised in choosing to perform virtuous acts. We are most free, not when we
exercise our freedom to choose between opposing courses of action, but when we
freely chose to act in accordance with virtue, for it is in choosing to act virtuously
that we become most truly ourselves, and hence most free. In this way, Bradwardine
thinks that Ockham is on entirely the wrong track in denying the necessity of God’s
will and knowledge, and indeed, of God’s very essence.

3.3.2 - Analysis of Bradwardine’s case
It may be the case that Bradwardine’s criticisms of Ockham betray significant
misunderstandings of Ockham himself. As we have already seen (in 2.2.2, Q. II art.
iii), Ockham denies, at least in general, that God is mutable, and denies that any
claim about the contingency of God’s knowledge necessarily results in saying that
God is mutable. For Ockham does not think that mutability necessarily follows from
contingency. To see this, it may be helpful to consider the difference as one between
mutability as the capability to change, and contingency as the capability to be
different. What I mean by this is that when we assert that something is mutable, we
are claiming something about its ability to change over time; so, for instance, to say
that a ball of playdough is mutable is to claim that it may be substantially different at
one time, t1, than it is at another time, t2 (perhaps at t1 it was a non-descript blob of
dough, and then between t1 and t2 I transform the dough into a scale model of Notre
Dame Cathedral, complete with flying buttresses). To assert that something is
contingent, however, is a much weaker claim: the thing in question may not be
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mutable in the sense that it could undertake substantial change from t1 to t2; but we
may yet claim that that thing could have been otherwise than it is. In this case, that it
is now such as it is, is not something that can change at any time in the future; but
that it is now such as it is, could have been otherwise, had the events leading up to
this point been otherwise than they were. (Think of something like the Cullinan I
diamond, which is — at least in relative terms — immutable, but is not necessary,
since it could have been otherwise than it is. See p. 74ff)
On the face of it, then, Bradwardine’s claims that the contingency of God’s
knowledge would result in the mutability of God do not seem to cohere with
Ockham’s own account. However, if we consider more deeply the implications of
Ockham’s position, we may perhaps see some deeper inconsistencies that make his
claims less tenable. It seems to be the case that Ockham considers God’s knowledge
to be contingent at least in the sense that it could have been otherwise than it in fact
is. But as we discussed in the previous chapter (2.3.2), it is at least difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile this view simultaneously with the view that the present is
necessary. With respect to God’s knowledge, if God now knows that on Friday I will
contingently drive to my grandparents’ cottage, then Ockham’s claim that God’s
knowledge of that event is contingent would seem to entail that God’s knowledge
could be otherwise than it in fact is; but this would seem, at least on the face of it, to
stand in direct contradiction with the idea that because God knows it now, God’s
knowledge couldn't be otherwise than it is: something that is true now must be true
necessarily.
The logical problems of trying to maintain, as Ockham does, that God’s
knowledge of future contingent events cannot properly be said to be something
about the present (but rather, that this knowledge is itself future and contingent in
some special sense) lead to serious problems when we come to consider how God
might actually enact God’s will in the world. And as we have seen, these are
precisely among the issues that Bradwardine raises in his criticisms (as, for example,
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in the concerns he raises about prophecy and God’s promises; though we did not
explicitly consider them above, some objections also consider Christ’s actions in the
world). So it seems as though, despite Ockham’s protestations that his theory does
not imply the mutability of God, Bradwardine is correct to criticize Ockham for a
model of God’s knowledge that undermines God’s immutability.
However, an aspect of Ockham’s argument that Bradwardine fails to
adequately address is this: Ockham makes the point that, when it comes to
knowledge, immutability may actually be seen, at least from a certain vantage point,
as an imperfection (see 2.2.2, Q. II art. iii). So on the one hand, Ockham argues that
the contingency of God’s knowledge does not actually imply that God’s knowledge is
mutable; but on the other, he argues that, at least in a certain sense, we may not even
want to affirm the immutability of God’s knowledge, since immutable knowledge
may in fact be bad knowledge. After all, circumstances in the world change
constantly, so if our knowledge does not also change accordingly to accommodate
changes in the world around us, we will be left with false knowledge. It used to be
the case that George W. Bush was the president of the United States of America.
When, in 2001, I knew that George W. Bush was the American president, that piece
of knowledge stood me in good stead. But if today I persisted in the knowledge (or,
perhaps to speak more precisely, the belief) that Bush is the American president,
then no amount of protestation about the perfection of immutable knowledge would
make me correct.
In order for my knowledge to track true states in the world, it must be the
case that the content of my knowledge changes along with states in the world.
Though Bradwardine does not seem to explicitly address this problem, it seems
likely that he has in mind one of two conceptions of God’s immutable knowledge.
Either (a) he conceives of the content of God’s knowledge as being, in a sense,
time-tracking, so that God doesn’t know, for instance, “Sarah will drive to her
grandparents’ cottage tomorrow” (which, even assuming I do, is a statement that
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will become false after today); but rather, what God knows is, “Sarah drives to her
grandparents’ cottage on Friday, 12 June, 2015” (which, assuming I do, remains true
tomorrow and any day thereafter); or (b) this is a context in which Bradwardine
does appeal to the timeless eternity of God, so that God’s knowledge cannot be
properly said to change, since change requires the passage of time and God is not
subject to time. These two possible interpretations may be seen, in fact, as
potentially complementary: if we may conceive of the possibility, in any case, of
human knowledge operating in the sort of time-tracking manner just described (and
which I also described in 2.2.2), and thus not really changing even when the tenses
of the propositions used to describe that knowledge do change, how much more
might such a mode of knowing be ascribed to a timelessly eternal God? In fact, this
may be precisely the key for unlocking the puzzle of reconciling the ideas of God
both inhabiting an eternal present, and acting in time (discussed at greater length in
2.3.3): though all of time is simultaneously present to God, it may yet be present to
God as time-indexed. Though the assassinations of Julius Caesar and John F.
Kennedy may be simultaneously present to God in eternity, they may be present to
God in such a way that God’s contemplation of the one includes an awareness of its
having happened two millennia before the other. God does not simply know, “Julius
Caesar is assassinated,” and “John F. Kennedy is assassinated,” but rather, “Julius
Caesar is assassinated (15 March 44 B.C.),” and “John F. Kennedy is assassinated
(November 22 1963 A. D.)” (or whatever these date markers might be in the Divine,
rather than Gregorian, calendar — perhaps indexed from the beginning of the
created order?). God’s simultaneous knowledge of the two events need not imply a
mistaken belief that they happen simultaneously in the world. In fact, it need no
more imply this result than my simultaneous knowledge of Julius Caesar’s and J.F.K.’s
assassinations implies that I think they happened simultaneously (clearly, I do not).
Considered in this way, it may seem more plausible to suppose that God’s
knowledge is immutable in a way that does not constitute an imperfection in God’s
knowledge (as Ockham claims that it might), since on this view, God’s knowledge
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would never change in the eternal present, without the immutability of God’s
knowledge constituting an imperfection in that knowledge. God’s knowledge, on
this account, would always accurately track true states of the world, without ever
changing. Furthermore, while all of time is simultaneously present to God, every
moment of time is present to God far more fully than it is to creatures who inhabit
time. For as time- and space-bound creatures, every moment of time is a fleeting
instant, never present for more than the instant in which it occurs. As soon as we
are aware of it, it is past, and we cannot retrieve it to take a closer look; nor can we
be aware of what passed in the moment in any place but the immediate
surroundings present to our senses. But for God, each moment is always present,
and his contemplation includes every detail of that moment in every place in the
universe. The infinite vastness of every moment is present to God in God’s eternal
contemplation. In this way, not only is all of time simultaneously present to God in
the infinite moment of eternity, but every moment of time is more completely
present to God than it is even to the creatures who inhabit it. As St Peter writes,
“with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (2
Pet. 3.8).
Augustine gives a familiar analogy to describe God’s simultaneous survey of
all of time: God’s foreknowledge, he says, is like that of a person at the top of a high
hill overlooking a road, who can simultaneously survey the road behind and before
the wayfarers who walk along it. The wayfarers may only be able to see a short
distance ahead — especially if the road is particularly hilly or winding — but the
person who watches from the hill (and presumably has very good eyesight, or
maybe a pair of binoculars) will be able to see what they will encounter ahead of
them on the road before they get there — a gang of highwaymen, perhaps, or a
wounded rabbit, or a patch of wild raspberries by the side of the road, or a sudden
precipice. This analogy is of course imperfect, since while the person on the hill may
be able to anticipate some of the pleasures or dangers the wayfarers will encounter,
she cannot know the details of these encounters (she may know they will find a
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wounded rabbit in their way; but will the wayfarers try to help the rabbit? or put it
out of its misery, then stew it for dinner?); indeed, it is even impossible for her to
know that the wayfarers will necessarily encounter the things she sees at all
(perhaps the highwaymen will murder and rob them before they even reach the
raspberries; or perhaps they will suddenly turn back the way they came). But
overlooking these shortcomings, the analogy can perhaps be pressed further in a
certain respect to illustrate the point I am making above: the onlooker
simultaneously sees, say, a wounded rabbit and a patch of raspberries along the road.
But just because she sees them simultaneously does not mean that she supposes the
wayfarers will encounter them simultaneously. Rather, she sees that one comes
before the other along the road, and — assuming the wayfarers’ speed is steady —
she may even be able to tell approximately when each encounter will occur.
What I have presented above goes beyond what Bradwardine himself
explicitly asserts or argues. However I think this represents a plausible model of the
way in which God foreknows events in the created world, compatible with what
Bradwardine does assert, which explains both (a) how God can have knowledge of
future things without necessitating their occurrence (by appeal to God’s
transcendence of time), and (b) how it is that God can yet know the sequence in
which events occur for creatures, despite God’s simultaneous purview of these
events. It seems, I think, to be a model which is compatible with Bradwardine’s
criticisms of Ockham, and to which Ockham has denied himself access. For if
Ockham is correct that aspects of God’s knowledge and will are contingent, then it is
not possible for God to exist in an eternal realm apart from time. For recall that
according to Ockham’s powers conception of contingency and necessity (which I
have already explained above must be the view of modality with which Ockham is
operating), for something to be contingent, there must be some prior time at which
there existed the power for that event to occur, and also the power for that event not
to occur. In the case in question — namely, the knowledge of God — it would
therefore need to be the case that if God’s knowledge of a thing is contingent, it is
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because there is some power for it to either turn out or not to turn out. But this
power is not possible if God transcends time, for in such a case there can be no
temporally prior states of God, with powers for opposites. Thus, while the timelessly
eternal model of God’s foreknowledge assists Bradwardine in making his own case
against Ockham, it is not a model to which Ockham can appeal for any help.
This view — that Ockham denies the timeless eternity of God — is supported
by William Lane Craig, who states,
For Ockham the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and future
contingents was a literally conceived concern, for he held that God’s eternity
was not a state of timelessness, but that God, though immutable, endures
throughout all past, present, and future time, which arises from the order of
succession among changeable things. (Craig, The Problem of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill,
1988), 146)

In making this claim, Craig is apparently relying on the work of Marilyn Adams in
her doctoral dissertation, The Problem of God’s Foreknowledge and Free Will in
Boethius and William Ockham (Cornell University, 1967). This interpretation of
Ockham’s view of eternity seems consistent with what I have observed of his
thought, and supports my analysis above.
It may even be argued that the Ockhamist view expressed in the eighth
opinion constitutes a sort of outright denial of God’s foreknowledge, and thus also a
brand of Open Theism: so claims Heiko Oberman, certainly, who thinks that this
brand of “foreknowledge” amounts to little more than a kind of “passive waiting” on
the part of God.119 This interpretation is, I think, supported by Bradwardine’s own
criticisms. (DFC 21ff)
As I bring this chapter to a close, I would just like to highlight once again the
Heiko Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth-Century Augustinian: A study of this
theology in its historical context (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1957), p. 109.
119
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significance of Ockham’s view in relation to the DFC treatise: Bradwardine's
excessive attention to this one view, in comparison with the eight others, seems not
to spring so much from finding it a particularly difficult or subtle position to reject,
but rather, from an impulse to show us just how entirely bad the view really is. It
seems clear, therefore, that in Ockham's theory, we find the primary motivation for
Bradwardine's treatise: to offer an alternative to the solution of his Oxford adversary.
Thus, we will turn in the fourth chapter to Bradwardine’s own solution to the
problem.
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Chapter 4
Bradwardine’s Treatise, Part II:
Responsio Propria

Introduction
We are now halfway through our examination of Bradwardine’s DFC. In the
previous chapter, I laid out the two-fold structure of the treatise, and walked through
a summary of the nine positions which Bradwardine engages in the first half. I paid
by far the greatest attention, however, to the position which clearly corresponds to
Bradwardine’s interpretation of Ockham; the opprobrium with which Bradwardine
considers this view is abundantly clear, and thus his motivation for writing the
treatise is identified — namely, to correct the error, as he sees it, of Ockham’s
solution. In what follows below, I turn to giving a detailed explication of
Bradwardine’s own arguments as presented in the treatise (4.1). This is followed by
a discussion of how Bradwardine’s solution represents, as I claimed at the outset, a
continuation, in a sense, of the views of Boethius, Anselm, and Duns Scotus, but also
the ways in which Bradwardine’s view develops this trajectory of solutions in ways
original to him (4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).

4.1 - The Responsio propria
Having laid out the structure of the treatise as a whole, we come now to
discussing the content of the second half, for it is here that we find the most
interesting and original suggestions of this work. As we shall see, Bradwardine
presents a solution to the problem of future contingents which places a particular
and unique emphasis on a distinction in God’s power. For this reason, we will first
spend some time understanding the distinction itself and its history (4.1.1 and
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4.1.2), before attempting to understand how it aids Bradwardine in forming a
solution to the problem (4.1.3). I argue that, though Bradwardine is by no means
original in his formulation of this distinction, he is original in the application of the
distinction to this particular problem.

4.1.1 - God’s absolute vs. ordained power
The heart of Bradwardine's own solution begins with a distinction between
God's absolute and ordained power.
One replies by drawing a distinction regarding power, or what is possible, in
that it is of two sorts; for one sort is absolute, the other ordained. And I [now]
explain what I mean by absolute power and by ordained power. Absolute
power is that [same] ordained power; but it is absolute power insofar as it is
undetermined relative to each part of a contradiction. And ordained power is
that [same] power, insofar as it is determined relative to only one (or the
other) part of a contradiction.

Respondetur distinguendo potenciam, seu possibile, eo quod duplex est, quia
quedam est absoluta, quedam ordinata ; et expono quid intelligo per
potenciam absolutam et per potenciam ordinatam. Potencia absoluta est illa
potencia ordinata, sed tamen est potencia absoluta ut indeterminata est ad
utramque partem contradictionis; et potencia ordinata est illa eadem ut est
determinata ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum. (DCF 42f)

God’s absolute power is distinguished from his ordained power; but Bradwardine is
quick to clarify that he does not mean that God has two separate, distinct powers.
Rather, “absolute” and “ordained” are two ways of talking about God’s one power.
We may now be inclined to ask, what is it that constrains God’s ordained power?
Relative to which “part of a contradiction” is it determined? We discover the answer
to this question in what immediately follows:
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And absolute power in the superior cause — namely, in God — is his
ordained power, not insofar as it is ordained relative to only one (or the
other) part of a contradiction, but as it is infinite and not determined or
ordained relative to one (or the other) part [of a contradiction]. And his
ordained power is [his] absolute – that is, infinite – power, not as
undetermined relative to one (or the other) part of a contradiction, but as
determined in virtue of his justice, and his mercy, and his will – for example,
for producing something besides himself, immediately or mediately, or for
saving [a person].

Et potencia absoluta in causa superiori, scilicet in Deo, est potencia sua
ordinata non ut est ordinata ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed
ut est infinita et non determinata vel ordinata ad alteram partem . Et potencia
ejus ordinata est potencia absoluta, scilicet infinita, et non ut indeterminata
ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed ut determinata per suam
justiciam et misericordiam et voluntatem, ut ad producendum aliquid ad
extra, immediate vel mediate, vel ad salvandum. (DCF 42f)

What constrains God’s ordained power and makes it distinct from God’s absolute
power are the dictates of God’s will (I take it that God’s justice and mercy are
functions of God’s will, so listing them separately is somewhat redundant on
Bradwardine’s part120 ). So we might perhaps conceive of this distinction as saying
that God’s one power operates in two distinct modes: on the one hand, God's power
is able to operate with complete and unrestrained freedom, and in this sense we
speak of God's absolute power; but on the other, God submits God’s power to the
dictates of God’s will, doing only that which God wills, and nothing more – in this

Here we run straight up against a variation of the Euthyphro dilemma: is something good (or just, or
merciful) because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good (or just, or merciful)? Regardless of
which way the causal implication runs, however, it may be agreed (or at the very least, granted for the
sake of argument) that the extension of the set “what-God-wills” is contained within the set
“what-is-good” (and “what-is-just,” and “what-is-merciful”). By implying that the containment
relationship runs in the direction I’ve just indicated, I’ve perhaps tipped my own hand; but it makes no
critical difference to my argument if it were to run the other way, or if the sets were considered to be
identical. And so I stand by my point that Bradwardine’s list is redundant.
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sense, we speak of God's power being ordained, or ordered, by God's will.
Let me illustrate this by analogy with the power of a chess-player to move
playing pieces. Absolutely speaking, the player has it within her power to move a
knight wherever she pleases — from b1 to g8, say. But why confine her movements
to the board, even? She could take the piece and place it on top of the refrigerator, or
put it in an envelope and post it to Australia. All of these possibilities lie within her
power, considered absolutely. But when her power is considered with respect to the
game of chess — the power of the chess-player qua player of chess — her options
become considerably more limited: that knight at b1, for instance, can only be
moved to a3, c3, or d2 — and to these spaces only if they are unoccupied by another
of her own pieces, and only if it doesn’t leave her own king in check. For as long as
she is playing chess, her power is ordained by the rules of the game of chess. The
analogy between this situation and the powers of God is strengthened by the fact
that playing chess is something that the player has chosen to do. Knowing the rules
of chess, she has deemed it right and good to surrender her extensive powers of
moving game pieces wherever she might please, and to order them in accordance
with those prescribed, limited, finite movements allowed by the rules of the game.
She has ordered her power in accordance with her will.
Of course, God’s absolute power extends considerably beyond those of the
chess-player. While the chess-player could move a piece to anywhere within her
limited reach, or perhaps toss it a few dozen metres or pop it in the post (where it
might continue to be moved a while longer by other human beings), God could,
conceivably, transport the piece absolutely anywhere in the universe in the blink of
an eye.121 God’s absolute power, with respect to all things created and uncreated, is
I am assuming, at least for the time being, that violating physical laws (such as those that would
dictate that the maximum speed of an object in space is that of light) does not entail any logical
contradiction, and thus lies within the absolute power of God. However, the question of whether
violating physical laws constitutes a logical violation (by considering that action in light of the
equilibrium of the physical universe) is not one that will be tremendously relevant to my discussion, and
so if the reader disagrees with my assessment, I would ask that she simply concede this point for the
sake of argument.
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limited only by logical possibility, while those of any finite creature operate under
considerable physical limitations. But on this score, Bradwardine has more to say,
and his intuitions may surprise us (I begin with a recap of what we have just read,
because the context is important):
And absolute power in the superior cause — namely, in God — is his
ordained power, not insofar as it is ordained relative to only one (or the
other) part of a contradiction, but as it is infinite and not determined or
ordained relative to one (or the other) part. And his ordained power is [his]
absolute – that is, infinite – power, not as undetermined relative to one (or
the other) part of a contradiction, but as determined in virtue of his justice,
and his mercy, and his will – for example, for producing something besides
himself, immediately or mediately, or for saving [a person]. And it may be
said in the same way of power in an inferior cause – namely, [power in] a
creature (which is not now, but can be in the future; or which is now, and can
do something in the future) — similarly to the distinction just made
regarding power in the superior cause, God. For there are two sorts of power
in an inferior cause: [its] absolute [power] is that which in itself is not
determined relative to being, rather than relative to not being, as long as [the
being or not being] is future, or relative to producing something in the future
or not producing it as long as it has not been produced; and [its] ordained
power is that by which it is ordained relative to only one (or the other) part
of a contradiction, [whether] by the superior cause, God, or by an inferior
cause, a creature.

Et potencia absoluta in causa superiori, scilicet in Deo, est potencia sua
ordinata non ut est ordinata ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed
ut est infinita et non determinata vel ordinata ad alteram partem . Et potencia
ejus ordinata est potencia absoluta, scilicet infinita, et non ut indeterminata
ad alteram partem contradictionis tantum, sed ut determinata per suam
justiciam et misericordiam et voluntatem, ut ad producendum aliquid ad
extra, immediate vel mediate, vel ad salvandum. Et similiter dicitur de
potencia in causa inferiori, scilicet creatura, que non est sed potest esse in
futurum , vel quod est et potest aliquid facere in futurum , sicut nunc
distinguitur de potencia in causa superiori, scilicet Deo ; quia in causa
inferiori duplex est potencia, scilicet absoluta, que de se non est determinata
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plus ad esse quam ad non esse quamdiu est futurum , vel ad producendum
aliquid in futurum vel ad non producendum quamdiu non est productum ; et
potencia ordinata est illa qua ordinatur ad unam partem contradictionis
tantum, per causam superiorem, scilicet Deum , vel per causam inferiorem,
scilicet creaturam. (DCF 42f, emphasis added)

Not only is Bradwardine urging a distinction between the absolute and ordained
powers of God, he is proposing a similar distinction in creatures. But how is this to
be understood? It seems, I think, that Bradwardine is proposing that according to
their absolute power, even creatures would be constrained by nothing “relative to
being,” or in other words, that creatures are not, absolutely speaking, constrained by
their being creatures. It would seem, then, that it is within the absolute power of a
creature to do anything that is not contrary to logical possibility — that is, anything
that God could do, absolutely. This conclusion should surprise us, for it means that
the absolute power of a creature is on a level with that of the all-powerful God. The
key difference between creaturely power and divine power thus lies in the difference
between their relative ordained powers. For God’s ordained power is ordered, or
constrained, by God himself; whereas creaturely ordained power is ordered not by
the creature (or at least not primarily by the creature), but by everything around the
creature, also: physical laws, the limitations of bodies, and so on, each of which is
ordained by God. This renders the ordained power of the creature immeasurably
inferior to that of God.122

Lorne Falkenstein has suggested that I may be guilty of over-reading this passage, and taking it to
imply a vastly greater sense of absolute power in a creature than it in fact does. On Falkenstein’s
reading, all that is meant by “absolute power” in a creature is the power to exercise its own will in
matters, uninhibited by opposing forces (God, or other creatures). To be undetermined “relative to
being” refers to the being or not being of the thing freely caused. As I re-read the passage in this light, I
take his point that it may not be implying something quite as strong as I take it to; but I still find it more
natural to read the “being” relative to which the power is undetermined as the creature’s, rather than
the caused thing’s, being. Either way, however, it will make little difference to my subsequent argument.
122
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4.1.2 - History of the distinction prior to the 14th Century
A very extensive study of the history of making this sort of distinction of
God’s power is given by Lawrence Moonan.123 We should note that Moonan —
rather eccentrically — chooses to render the distinction between potentia absoluta
and potentia ordinata as that between “option-neutral power” and “option-tied
power.” He argues that by doing so, he frees the terms from the baggage that
phrases like “absolute power” (suggesting a sort of despotism), “ordinate power”
(suggesting the possibility of inordinate power), and “ordained power” (which
sounds arbitrary) have collected.124 However, no other scholars have, to my
knowledge, followed Moonan’s usage. Furthermore, apart from being cumbersome,
it seems to me that to render absoluta and ordinata as “option-neutral” and
“option-tied” is to impose an interpretation on the terms that strays a substantial
way from being a straightforward translation. Translation is always a tricky balance
between literal rendering and interpretation; but while I think Moonan is broadly
correct in his interpretation of the sense that these terms come to have in their
medieval use, I think that by actually translating the terms in this way, he tips the
balance too far toward the interpretive side. Particularly given that he purports to
be tracing a history of these terms and their use up to the thirteenth century, by
translating the terms which are the object of his study in this loaded way, he winds
up, in a small way, at least, begging the question. For my own part, I prefer,
therefore, to adhere to more common translation practices: for potentia absoluta, I
use “absolute power”; for potentia ordinata, I use “ordained,” “ordinate,” and
“ordered power,” more or less interchangeably.
The distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power is one that
arises primarily in logical, disputational contexts. Moonan points to the difficulty of

Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power: The Medieval power distinction up to its adoption by Albert,
Bonaventure, and Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Rather frustratingly, this book contains no
bibliography; all sources must be gleaned from footnotes throughout the body of the text.
124
Ibid., pp. 18 - 19.
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discovering the true “source” of the powers distinction in such a context:
The very nature of dialectical debate makes it hard to identify authorship of
dialectical devices: ‘Dialectic is a coorperative and progressive polemic — a
polemic not between persons, but between theses and counter-theses.
Theses are not personal property, nor arguments.’ It is for such reasons,
incidentally, that anyone hoping for a unique and correct answer to ‘Who
invented the Power Distinction?’ may have to remain disappointed.125

It is therefore not entirely clear with whom the power distinction originates. What
is clear is that it arose in the context of dialectical debates as a particular way of
dealing with Aristotle’s Secundum Quid fallacy, and that it was firmly embedded in
common philosophical use by Bradwardine’s time.126 I will shortly return to a
discussion of more particular instances of the distinction’s historical use, but first,
before we become too sidetracked, we should return to Bradwardine to see how,
exactly, he employs this distinction.

4.1.3 - How the Distinction Solves the Problem
In the following passage, Bradwardine addresses an argument that rests on
the assumption that if A is a future contingent, then it is the case that “A can be not
going to be”; and this, then, is equivalent to the statement “that A will not be is
possible”:
Now in reply to the proposition at issue [namely, the statement: “A can be not
going to be, and God foreknows that A will be; therefore that A will not be is
possible”, where A is some future contingent], I say that A can be not going to
be in virtue of absolute power, whether of the superior or of an inferior cause.
For that A is going to be or not going to be is in no way incompatible with
such a power in the superior or in an inferior cause. If, however, one is
Ibid., pp. 327 - 28; internal quotation G. Ryle, “Dialectics in the Academy,” in G.E.I. Owen (ed.),
Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topic, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 1968), p. 76.
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Ibid., pp. 328 - 29.
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speaking of the ordained power of the superior or of an inferior cause, in that
case one says that A (or any future thing) cannot be not going to be. For if by
that power A can be not going to be, it follows that God can be deceived and
can err, and that his knowledge can be mistaken, and that he can say what is
false and a lie — if God has predicted, mediately or immediately, that A is
going to be.

Nunc ad propositum, dico quod A potest non fore de potencia absoluta tam
cause superioris quam inferioris, quia A fore vel non fore in nullo repugnat
tali potencie in causa superiori vel inferiori. Sed loquendo de potencia
ordinata cause superioris et inferioris, sic dicitur quod A non potest non fore
nec aliquod futurum, quia si illa potencia A potest non fore, sequitur quod
Deus potest decipi et errare, et falli potest ejus sciencia, et potest falsum
dicere et mentiri si Deus predixit A fore mediate vel immediate. (DFC 42g)

We now see the use to which Bradwardine puts the distinction between God's
absolute and ordained power. Bradwardine proposes that God's foreknowledge is
enacted by his ordained power127 ; relative to this power, Bradwardine concedes,
what God knows will be, necessarily will be. However, it is not necessary relative to
his absolute power, and so, absolutely or logically speaking, future contingents
which God foreknows remain contingent despite his knowledge of them. In this way,
Bradwardine claims to resolve the apparent tension between God’s foreknowledge,
and the creature’s ability to act freely. God knows my future acts by virtue of his
ordained foreknowledge, and relative to this ordained power, I am constrained to act
as God foreknows; but in an absolute sense, I am yet free to act otherwise.
Bradwardine goes on to reply to the person who objects that this still boils
It is, perhaps, a little bit difficult to understand what it means for a sort of knowledge to be “enacted”
through a particular sort of power, and it may indeed be the case that there exists a better way of
expressing this than I have yet discovered. In using this expression, I am doing my best to convey the
sense in which God’s (fore)knowledge relates to the powers distinction. The most natural way in which
I can understand this, is that any capacity we have — whether for thinking, acting, perceiving, etc. —
must be empowered in order to operate. And so when I say that, according to Bradwardine, God’s
foreknowledge is “enacted” by God’s ordained power, what I mean is that God’s ordained power is that
which allows God’s capacity for foreknowledge to operate.
127
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down to determinism. The objector says, “Since in respect of ordained power A
cannot be going to be, A cannot be going to be”. But Bradwardine insists that, since A
can be with respect to absolute power, we properly draw the conclusion that A can
be (the same inference does not hold in the case of ordained power). (DFC 43a-b.)
Let's take as an example to illustrate this my taking a train to London,
England, from Cambridge, as I did once to present a preliminary version of the
central arguments of this thesis. The day before I went to London, presumably, God
foreknew that I would take the 10:15 train from Cambridge to London. Now,
thinking about this then-future event apart from God's knowledge of it, there is
nothing about it which is necessary; any number of things may have prevented its
occurrence. I may have been running late and missed the 10:15 train; I may have
tripped on the platform, fallen on the tracks, and been run over by the train; I may
have decided that my paper was not ready for presentation, and ashamed to show
my face, have stayed in bed that morning. However, Bradwardine would have it that,
insofar as God foreknew I'd take the 10:15 to London, and relative to the ordained
power by which God enacted that knowledge,128 it was necessary that I catch the
10:15 train. But lest he be accused of determinism, Bradwardine would swiftly add
that this necessity was not absolute: it remained a possibility, at least in an absolute
sense, that God could have suspended his ordained power, and by his absolute
power have made it otherwise.129
We thus see how Bradwardine’s account makes use of the distinction
between God’s absolute and ordained power to explain how God might have

See previous footnote.
Something that remains somewhat unclear here, and something about which I have yet to gain
certainty from the text of DFC itself, is in what sense Bradwardine means to imply that God’s absolute
power could have been enacted rather than God’s ordained power. Does he simply mean that things
could have been ordained differently, such that something else could have been brought into being; or
does he mean that, even in the current ordering of creation, God could enact alternative outcomes by
somehow asserting God’s absolute power in the present order? I’m inclined to think it more likely that
he means something like the former, rather than the latter; but I have not yet fully established this or not
from my reading of the text. It is, however, an important question, and one worthy of further
consideration.
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knowledge of our actions without necessitating those actions. Discovering whether
Bradwardine’s account is ultimately coherent, and whether it ultimately avoids
being deterministic in its zeal to preserve the perfect foreknowledge of God, will be
the main task of the fifth and final chapter. What I hope to argue in the remainder of
this chapter, however, is that Bradwardine’s use of this distinction in the context of
future contingents is original to him.
It may be objected that the distinction between the ordained and absolute
powers of God is not original, for it can be seen already in the writing of Scotus and,
as Moonan shows, it is in extensive use even earlier than that. Let me be clear,
therefore, that it is not my claim that the distinction between God’s absolute and
ordained power is by any means an invention of Bradwardine's: Scotus, for instance,
expressed the distinction by saying that through his absolute power, God is able to
do anything that is logically possible; God constrains his power, however, by his own
will, to operate within the bounds of the naturally possible, and thereby ordains, or
orders, his power. But Scotus was in this case discussing the logically possible
versus the naturally possible. What I argue, rather, is that though Bradwardine is not
original in making this distinction, he is original in the use to which he puts it, as we
shall see as he develops his argument further. Thus, it is not my claim that
Bradwardine is the first to make use of this distinction simpliciter, but rather, that he
is the first (and perhaps the only) to make use of it in this particular context, to
explain the compatibility of God’s foreknowledge and the contingency of some
future things.
It must be noted, however, that there are a few earlier sources that gesture in
the direction of this use, as outlined in Moonan’s history. In particular, there are a
few instances to be noted of this and similar distinctions being made in discussions
of a particular case of future contingents, namely, that of the final state of particular
souls. Throughout the Middle Ages, the ultimate beatitude of St Peter, and the
ultimate damnation of Judas Iscariot, are taken to be prototypical examples of future
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contingent events about which we know the truth value — i.e., we know as
theological certainties that Peter is saved, and that Judas is damned, despite neither
of these future events being necessary in themselves. Thus, statements such as
“Peter is damned” and “Judas is saved” are taken to be counterfactual statements
about future events, statements which we know to in fact be false and contrary to
the will of God, despite neither being a strictly impossible event considered in itself.
Thus we see, for instance, something very similar to Bradwardine’s use of the
power distinction in a discussion concerning damning Peter and saving Judas in
William of Auxerre (d. 1231).130 Rather than talking about this things being possible
or impossible relative to God’s ordained or absolute power, however, William talks
about them being possible de potentia of God, but not de justitia of God (that is,
possible with respect to God’s power, but not with respect to God’s justice).131
Likewise, the Dominican Hugh of St Cher (d. 1263) makes use of a similar distinction
in his framing of the problem, but speaks of the distinction as that between God’s
potentia absoluta and God’s potentia conditionata (that is, between God’s absolute
and conditional power) when speaking of God’s ability to damn Peter and save
Judas.132 In each of these cases, while coming close to the distinction in a way
similar to Bradwardine, the distinction is ultimately articulated in slightly different
terms, and with different implications. Furthermore, it is important to note that,
while these cases consider a particular special case of future contingents, they do
not extend the solution to future contingents more generally.
Two examples of the use of the distinction which come rather closer to
Bradwardine’s (but again, only in the very particular case of damning Peter and
saving Judas) are to be found in the Summa of the English Franciscan, Alexander of

William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, ed. Ribailler, I (1980), 212
Moonan, pp. 69 - 71.
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This discussion occurs in Hugh of St Cher’s commentary on the Sentences, I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, edited by
E. Randi and published as “Potentia dei conditionata: Una questione di Ugo di Saint Cher
sull’omnipotenza divina (Sent. I, d. 42, q. 1),” in Rivista di storia della filosofia, 39 (1984), pp. 521 - 36;
discussed in Moonan, pp. 116 - 17.
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Hales (d. 1245), and the Sentences commentary of a philosopher of substantially
greater historical import, Albert the Great (d. 1280), the teacher of St Thomas
Aquinas. Alexander explicitly uses the language of potentia absoluta and potentia
ordinata in his discussion of the topic in his Summa Theologica.133 Alexander’s
discussion is brief, and once again, the powers distinction is only applied to this
particular example, not to future contingents in general, but it is nonetheless worth
noting. A little later, Albert employs a very similar distinction (which he puts as that
between potentia absoluta — absolute power — and potentia relata ad ordinem
sapientiae — power relative to the ordinances of wisdom) in his own discussion of
damning Peter and saving Judas in his Sentences commentary.134
A final noteworthy instance of a pre-Bradwardinian use of the distinction in
the context of future contingents comes in the Franciscan St Bonaventure’s (d. 1274)
mention — and immediate critique — of a view which sounds very much like
Bradwardine’s. Bonaventure reports an opinion using the distinction, but
immediately criticizes its use in his reply: “This distinction does not seem
appropriate, because God can do nothing that he cannot do ordinate. For to be able
to do something inordinate is not-being-able (non posse), like being able to sin, and
being able to lie.”135 It is not clear whose view Bonaventure is reporting, but it
sounds very much like a prototype of Bradwardine’s own. What is perhaps more
interesting than the report itself, however, is Bonaventure’s critical response,
variations of which will be taken up when we come to a critical examination of
Bradwardine’s position in chapter 4. In what remains of this chapter, however, I
return to the three views with which I began this study to explore the relationship of
each with the position of Bradwardine.

Alexander of Hales, Summa Hales, 1: 220 - 21; discussed by Moonan, pp. 140 - 41.
Albert the Great, I Sent., d. 42c, art. 3, ed. Borgnet, 26; 381b; mentioned by Moonan pp. 169 - 70.
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Bonaventure, Op. theol. Sel., Quaracchi edition (1924) 1: 778a, p. 618; mentioned by Moonan, p. 202.
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4.2 - Bradwardine and Boethius
In chapter 1, we examined three positions on the problem of future
contingents (those of Boethius, Anselm, and Duns Scotus) which I claimed to have a
particularly significant relationship with Bradwardine’s own solution as forebears in
a sort of family tree of related solutions to the problem of future contingents. In this
and the following two sections, I will examine this claim by looking at each position
and its relationship to Bradwardine’s in turn. We begin now with discussion of
Bradwardine’s solution as it relates to that of Boethius.

4.2.1 - The similarities of Boethius and Bradwardine
Bradwardine’s solution to the problem bears certain resemblances to
Boethius’ famous solution. Namely, both solutions rest on recasting our
understanding of God’s mode of knowledge. Boethius, as we have seen (1.1),
appeals to a mode of knowing in God that is as mysterious to us as our mode of
understanding and knowing is to, say, a clam. God’s mode of knowing, for Boethius,
is fundamentally above, beyond, or higher than our mode of knowing, and hence is
ultimately fundamentally mysterious to us. Thus, Boethius claims, we can make
some sort of limited sense out of how God might possess knowledge of the future
that does not necessitate the things that God knows, in part, at least, because God
does not know things in the same way that we do.
Bradwardine similarly makes the move of seeking to explain the
compatibility of God’s foreknowledge with freedom by appeal to God’s mode of
knowing. Bradwardine argues that God knows future contingent events by means of
a particular sort of power — namely, God’s ordained power — and thus claims that
by confining God’s power of foreknowledge to the realm of God’s ordained power,
our freedom to act is still preserved in an absolute sense (i.e., relative to God’s
absolute power). Relative to God’s ordained power, by which God knows our future
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actions, these actions are constrained by God’s knowledge of them; but because
God’s ordained power is only part of the story of God’s power, relative to God’s
power absolutely speaking, our actions are not constrained. Hence, divine
foreknowledge is claimed to be preserved alongside human freedom to act.
In both cases, then, this compatibility of God’s knowledge of our future
actions with the freedom of those same actions is explained by direct appeal to the
way in which God knows.

4.2.2 - Differences
But this account perhaps glosses over some of the more pronounced
differences between the two solutions. In particular, while Boethius makes his
appeal to the way in which God knows, that mode of knowing remains
fundamentally unexplained to us. We are given logical reasons to think that such a
mode of knowing might be possible — reasons why God’s necessary knowledge of
an action does not make that action necessary, per se, any more than because I am
sitting I am necessarily not standing makes my not standing necessary per se — but
apart from some vague and undeveloped gestures toward what Anselm would more
explicitly work out by appeal to God’s timeless eternity, we are given no idea of the
mechanism whereby God’s non-necessitating foreknowledge might work. In the end,
it is primarily a mystery explained by analogy (God’s knowledge is to ours as our
knowledge is to that of animals). Bradwardine, by contrast, seeks to provide a more
complete explanation of how it is that God’s knowledge of our actions need not
necessitate those actions. It is because of the power by which God enacts God’s
foreknowledge (i.e., ordained) that there is a sense (i.e., absolute) in which our
actions remain free.
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4.2.3 - A development of Boethius?
Despite these differences, however, it is possible to view Bradwardine’s
solution as a development compatible with Boethius. On this view, it would appear
that where Boethius provides the basic framework within which to understand
God’s foreknowledge in relation to human freedom, Bradwardine provides a fuller
account of the mechanics undergirding the view. Boethius gives us reasons for
believing that the reconciliation of God’s foreknowledge with human freedom might
be possible: He makes arguments which claim to demonstrate no necessary
contradiction between the two notions, opening the possibility of conceiving of
God’s foreknowledge operating in a way quite unlike our own mode of knowing, and
pointing out the lack of any logical necessity entailed in things by God’s knowledge
of them. But he does not in any way indicate how such a knowledge might operate,
or at best gestures toward the Anselmian notion (also present to some degree in
Augustine) that God’s timeless eternity privileges God to a perspective,
inconceivable by us time-bound creatures, free from the constraints of time and
space. However, Boethius’ explication of God’s foreknowledge as possible because of
God’s eternality (De consolatione Philosophia Book V, prose VI) is relatively sketchy
and incomplete, leaving us yet with little sense of how God’s foreknowledge operates
in a way that does not necessitate the things foreknown.
Bradwardine, by contrast, seeks to provide an account which helps us to
understand how exactly this non-necessitating foreknowledge of God is possible.
Whereas Boethius allows us to contemplate the mere possibility of such knowledge
in God by appeal to analogy (the analogy of our knowledge as compared to that of a
non-rational animal, or analogous ways of grasping at the notion of all of eternity
being present to God), Bradwardine seeks to give an account of the mechanism
whereby such knowledge comes to pass. Bradwardine does not seek merely to show
us by way of various analogies that it is not inconceivable that God’s foreknowledge
of things does not compel the objects of God’s knowledge to come about; but rather,
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Bradwardine offers a theory of the way in which such knowledge is possible. He
seeks to give an explanation of the exact sense in which we can claim freedom of
action, despite God’s knowledge of that action before we do it.
In doing so, however, Bradwardine does not contradict Boethius’ premises.
Nothing in Bradwardine’s solution undermines the central premise that God’s mode
of knowing is essentially different from and transcends our own. His solution also
invokes the Boethian distinction between absolute and conditional necessity. But
Bradwardine seeks to explain in more detail how, exactly, those differences in God’s
knowledge from our own operate. I think, therefore, Bradwardine’s solution can be
understood as a possible development of, or elaboration of, that of Boethius.

4.3 - Bradwardine and Anselm
We have observed already the influence exhibited by Anselm on
Bradwardine’s summary of alternative solutions to the problem of future
contingents. The opinion of Anselm, we have seen, is one of the few to receive an
explicit attribution. More importantly, however, of the nine opinions put forward,
Anselm’s is the only one that does not appear to be rejected outright. We see this
structurally from the fact that in the objections and responses to the Anselmian
view, every objection posed receives a response. Since every objection raised seems
to be dealt with, and since the section concludes with a defense of the view, rather
than an attack (which is the way in which all other sections conclude), it seems that
Bradwardine is ultimately seeking to defend Anselm’s view as correct.
Furthermore, in the objections and responses that follow the responsio
propria, Anselm is perhaps the most-cited authority after Holy Scripture. Again and
again, Bradwardine supports his arguments by making reference to works of
Anselm, particularly the De concordia and the De casu diabolo.
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But if Anselm’s work has so much purported influence on Bradwardine’s
account, are we able to discern marked similarities between Anselm’s account and
Bradwardine’s? Is the content of the two accounts really very similar at all? In what
follows, I will examine, firstly, the ways in which Bradwardine and Anselm’s
respective accounts really seem not to have anything to do with one another at all; I
will them propose a way in which these views might be reconciled as compatible
with one another, arguing in particular that Bradwardine intended for his view to be
compatible with that of Anselm.

4.3.1 - The divergence of Bradwardine’s view from Anselm’s
On the one hand, it may not appear at first blush that Bradwardine’s view and
Anselm’s have much in common at all. In fact, the two seem to be focusing on
different things entirely. Anselm’s solution to the problem of reconciling God’s
foreknowledge and human freedom rests on an examination of the nature of time
itself, and God’s relationship to it. It is only because of God’s transcendence of time,
according to Anselm, that God has knowledge of things that are, to us, future. God
surveys the whole expanse of time in a moment, from the perspective of eternality;
God simply “sees” all of history spread out before God. Thus, Anselm’s solution
relies on a particular understanding of the nature of time, on the one hand, as
created by God and fundamentally relative to the perspective of the being
experiencing it; and of eternity, on the other, as that timeless existence in which God
dwells, but from which God is able to observe all at once the entirety of created time.
By contrast, in the present treatise, Bradwardine seems hardly at all
interested in the nature of time or perspectives of time. Though Bradwardine picks
up Anselm’s solution in his summaries (3.1), and speaks of the relativity of
perspectives of time when he does, notions of time do not explicitly enter
Bradwardine’s discussions of his own solution. Instead, his focus is exclusively on
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the operation and interaction of God’s power and knowledge. It seems conceivable,
in fact, that on Bradwardine’s solution, God may not in fact transcend time.
Bradwardine’s solution is consistent, it seems, with a notion of God that constrains
God within the bounds of time. If God’s knowledge operates in a way entirely unlike
our own (as Boethius suggests), then it does not seem impossible to imagine that
God could know future things while being situated in a particular place in time. In
such a case, Bradwardine would offer a solution to the problem of how such
knowledge of the future does not dictate the events of the future, despite God’s
knowledge in time of things future even to God. I should clarify at this point that I
am not proposing that Bradwardine does, in fact, deny God’s transcendence of time; I
am merely pointing out that his solution is not inherently inconsistent with a view
that fails to ascribe transcendence of time to God.

4.3.2 - Consonance between Bradwardine’s view and Anselm’s
As when we considered Bradwardine’s view in relation to that of Boethius
(4.2), it seems to me that the key to understanding the relationship between
Anselm’s and Bradwardine’s view is understanding the respective modes in which
their solutions operate. In the preceding section, I argued that, while Boethius’
solution offers us reason to think that Divine foreknowledge does not necessitate
determinism, Bradwardine offers us an explanation of how such non-determining
Divine foreknowledge actually operates. The difference between Bradwardine’s
view and Anselm’s, however, is somewhat more subtle. For in this case, we have in a
sense two separate examinations of the “how” of God’s foreknowledge: both
Bradwardine and Anselm seem to be offering explanations of how God’s
foreknowledge does not necessitate future events, Anselm by appeal to a particular
view of time and God’s eternality, and Bradwardine by an examination of God’s
power and the way in which that power operates.
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However, as was the case with Boethius, it seems to me that the different
approaches employed by Anselm and Bradwardine can be reconciled when
considered as ways of examining two different aspects of the problems that arise
from the puzzles surrounding God’s foreknowledge. Anselm provides us with a
particular picture of God’s relation to creation, one that focuses on the grand-scale,
cosmic make-up of the universe. All that is created exists within the framework of
time; indeed, time itself is of the order of creation. God, however, is metaphysically
prior to the created order, if not temporally prior (since temporal priority makes
little sense apart from a notion of time). Anselm is painting a broad sweeping
picture of the cosmos, created and Divine, and shaping our understanding of the
relationship between the two.
Bradwardine, by contrast, focuses instead on the very nature and operations
of God. Bradwardine’s analysis of the operation of God’s knowledge is independent
of the created order. Rather than examining God’s knowledge in relation to that of
God’s creatures, Bradwardine seeks to describe God’s knowledge by an examination
of God’s self. Put another way, Bradwardine’s analysis of how God knows future
things is independent of the created order in which those future things exist.
Whether or not anything future exists, God knows what God knows by virtue of
God’s ordained power. Even if, per impossibile, time and the material universe it
accompanies had not been created, this is the way in which God’s knowledge would
operate.
But simply because Anselm and Bradwardine focus on God’s knowledge from
quite different perspectives, this does not mean that their explanations are
incompatible. As was the case in the previous section (Bradwardine and Boethius,
4.2), it is possible in this case, I think, to maintain that both Anselm’s position and
Bradwardine’s may be compatibly maintained — even as, for instance, it may be
compatibly maintained that “red” is the colour which reflects light of about
wavelength 700 nanometres, on the one hand, and that “red” is passionate, fiery, and
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the colour of a flamenco dancer’s skirt, on the other. Each philosopher is seeking out
different sorts of causes in his respective explanation of how, precisely, God’s
foreknowledge (especially of human action) does not compel (those actions). While
I’m not sure that one can really separate the sorts of causes that Anselm and
Bradwardine identify in the manner of Aristotle’s four causes — as it seems that
both Anselm and Bradwardine are concerned with the efficient cause, in a sense, of
God’s foreknowledge — we may yet recognize that they are looking to different
aspects of a causal explanation.
Indeed, I think it may be fairly asserted that Bradwardine, at least, perceives
his solution as being compatible with Anselm’s in this way. Our strongest clue to this
fact is the way in which Bradwardine handles Anselm’s view in the expositional
section. Recall that Bradwardine lays out a total of nine views on the question of
future contingents before moving on to his own solution. Of these nine, his
treatment of the sixth view (which he — rather unusually — explicitly attributes to
Anselm) is unique: whereas with all the other eight views, his scholastic-style
objection-and-response section of arguments, for and opposed, invariably ends with
a sound denunciation of the view, when it comes to the sixth view, he concludes the
section with a whole series of arguments in support of the view. This fact, coupled
with Bradwardine’s frequent citation of Anselm throughout the remaining corpus —
and particularly throughout his defense of his own solution — would seem to
indicate not only Bradwardine’s high regard for Anselm and his work, but his strong
agreement with what Anselm thinks on the matter.

4.4 - Comparisons with Scotus’ solution
We have now examined the relationship, and likely consonance, between
Bradwardine’s view and both Boethius’ and Anselm’s. In both cases, I made fairly
similar arguments about their compatibility and complementarity. And, indeed, I
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think it may be quite easily seen that Boethius’ and Anselm’s respective solutions to
the problem of future contingents are compatible with one another: Anselm’s view
would appear to be a direct development of Boethius’ hint that God’s
non-necessitating foreknowledge is possible because of God’s transcendence of time.
Thus the views of Boethius, Anselm, and Bradwardine together constitute a sort of
family tree of solutions, each one descending from those previous.
In the case of Duns Scotus, the situation is perhaps a little bit different. This
is because Scotus departs from the views of his predecessors in rather dramatic
fashion by explicitly denying the timeless eternity of God, and Bradwardine does not
follow Scotus on this count. In fact, the primary point of contact, or at least that of
particular interest, between Scotus’ thought and Bradwardine’s solution to this
problem lies not in Scotus’ treatment of future contingents, per se. Instead, we
observe as Bradwardine’s primary “Scotusian” influence, if I may be permitted the
neologism, an aspect of Scotus’ thought that never explicitly comes to bear in Scotus’
own treatment of the problem of future contingents in relation to God’s
foreknowledge. It is Scotus’ development of the distinction between God’s absolute
and ordained power that will exercise such a profound influence on Bradwardine’s
solution to the problem of future contingents in the treatise at hand; but in Scotus’
own work, this distinction plays no role whatsoever in his treatment of future
contingents. In what follows, I will first briefly talk about the role the distinction
does play in Scotus’ writing; I will then discuss how Bradwardine appropriates the
distinction in an entirely new way (highlighting once again the particular
uniqueness of Bradwardine’s DFC solution in this respect); and finally, I will discuss
whether Bradwardine’s reappropriation of Scotus’ distinction in the context of
future contingents is compatible with Scotus’ own solution to the problem of future
contingents as we saw laid out in 1.3.
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4.4.1 - Scotus on Absolute and Ordained Power
Scotus employs the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained powers,
but he does so in a somewhat different context than does Bradwardine. In Scotus’
case, the distinction arises (in the Ordinatio I.44) when he comes to consider
whether God could have created the world in a way other than God in fact did, or
whether God could act in a way other than God does. He rephrases the Lombard’s
question — “whether God could have made things better than he did”136 — and
instead asks the question, “Could God have made things otherwise than he has
ordered them to be made?”137 We might almost wonder if rephrasing the question in
this way does not somewhat beg the question, for by posing it in terms of God’s
ordinance, it leads him directly to his own response, which is to make a distinction
between God’s ordained and absolute power:
I reply: in every agent acting intelligently and voluntarily that can act in
conformity with an upright or just law but does not have to do so of necessity,
one can distinguish between its ordained power and its absolute power. The
reason is that either it can act in conformity with some right and just law, and
then it is acting according to its ordained power (for it is ordained insofar as
it is a principle for doing something in conformity with a right or just law), or
else it can act beyond or against such a law, and in this case its absolute
power exceeds its ordered power.

Respondeo: In omni agente per intellectum et voluntatem, potente
conformiter agere legi rectae et tamen non necessario conformiter agere legi
rectae, est distinguere potentiam ordinatam a potentia absoluta; et ratio
huius est, quia potest agere conformiter illi legi rectae, et tunc secundum
potentiam ordinatam (ordinata enim est in quantum est principium
exsequendi aliqua conformiter legi rectae), et potest agere praeter illam legen
vel contra eam, et in hoc est potentia absoluta, excedens potentiam
“utrum Deus potuit res melius fecisse quam fecit.” Ordinatio I.44, in John Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on
the Will and Morality, selected and trans. with introduction by A. B. Wolter, O.F.M. (Washington D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 254-55. Translations throughout this section are Wolter’s,
unless otherwise noted.
137
“utrum Deus possit aliter facere res quam ab ipso ordinatum est eas fieri.” Ibid.
136
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ordinatam.138

Indeed, according to Scotus, not only God, but every free agent has this ability to
either act in accordance with some rule, or against it, and in this sense has both
power to act ordainedly, or absolutely.139
In the case of God, however, the relationship between his ordained and
absolute power is somewhat different from our own, since whereas constraints on
our own power are largely imposed by external ordinances, it is God who constrains
the ordering of God’s power by God’s own will. Thus for us creatures, it is not in fact
possible for our absolute power to extend beyond our ordained power, since the
limits of our ordained power are not set by us; in the case of God, however, God could
have ordained God’s power differently, and thus could have acted or created
otherwise:
[W]henever the law and its rectitude are in the power of the agent, so that the
law is right only because it has been established, then the agent can freely
order things otherwise than this right law dictates and still can act orderly,
because he can establish another right or just law according to which he may
act orderly.

[Q]uando in potestate agentis est lex et rectitudo legis, ita quod non est recta
nisi quia statuta, tunc potest aliter agens ex libertate sua ordinare quam lex
illa recta dicet; et tamen cum hoc potest ordinate agere, quia potest statuere
aliam legem rectam secundum quam agat ordinate.140

Scotus concludes that God is in fact able, absolutely speaking, to have established his

Ibid.
“Et ideo non tantum in Deo, sed in omni agente libere — qui poetest agere secundum dictamen legis
rectae et praeter talem legem vel contra eam — est distinguere inter potentiam ordinatam et
absolutam.” Ibid.
140
Ibid., 256-57.
138
139
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ordinances in any way that does not entail a contradiction: God could have ordained
things to be other than God did — and in such a case, since God’s ordinances would
have been different, God’s actions, though inordinate with respect to our present
state, would have been ordinate with respect to that alternative state.
Since, however, God in fact established God’s ordinances in the way that God
did, God cannot — or perhaps it might be more correct to say, would not — now act
in a way contrary to God’s own ordinances. The division of powers, as Richard Cross
puts it, “is just a convenient way of stating that God can do more than he has actually
done”; however, “anything that God does is brought about by his ordained power. It
is a mistake to suppose that Scotus holds God’s absolute power to be some kind of
executive power capable of overruling the ordained power.”141 This becomes clear in
the way Scotus expresses what it would have been like if God had ordained an
alternative order to our present one:
I say, therefore, that God can act otherwise than is prescribed not only by a
particular order, but also by a universal order or law of justice, and in so
doing he could still act ordainedly, because what God could do by his absolute
power that is either beyond or runs counter to the present order, he could do
ordainedly.

Dico ergo quod Deus non solum potest agere aliter quam ordinatum est
ordine particulari, sed aliter quam ordinatum est ordine universali — sive
secundum leges iustitiae — potest ordinate agere, quia tam illa quae sunt
praeter illum ordinem, quam illa quae sunt contra ordinem illum, possent a
Deo ordinate fieri potentia absoluta.142

Had God ordained an order other than the order God in fact ordained, then all of his
actions would be ordained according to that order.

Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, in the Great Medieval Thinkers series (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 59. (Cross’s
emphasis.)
142
Duns Scotus, 258-59, emphasis added.
141
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But although God can only actually act in accordance with God’s ordained
power, Scotus yet prescribes remarkable freedom to God’s power absolutely
speaking, as we see in the following passage:
God, therefore, insofar as he is able to act in accord with those right laws he
set up previously, is said to act according to his ordained power; but insofar
as he is able to do many things that are not in accord with, but go beyond,
these pre-established laws, God is said to act according to his absolute power.
God can do anything that is not self-contradictory or act in any way that does
not include a contradiction (and there are many such ways he could act); and
then he is said to be acting according to his absolute power.

Deus ergo, agere potens secundum illas rectas leges ut praefixae sunt ab eo,
dicitur agere secundum potentiam ordinatam.; ut autem potest multa agere
quae non sunt secundum illas leges iam praefixas, sec praeter illas, dicitur
eius potentia absoluta: quia enim Deus quodlibet potest agere quod non
includit contraditionem, et omni modo potest agere qui non includit
contradictionem (et tales sunt multi modi alii), ideo dicitur tunc agere
secundum potentiam absolutam.143

Absolutely speaking, then, God’s power extends to anything at all that does not entail
a contradiction, even though God’s actual power only extends as far as God has
ordained.
This, then, gives us a fairly good understanding of Scotus' understanding and
use of the Divine powers distinction, and one can see from the passages quoted how
important this distinction might be for Scotus' explanation of the way in which
logical necessity and metaphysical necessity are distinguished from one another.
What is chiefly notable for our purposes, however, is what the discussion is not: the
context in which Scotus discusses the distinction and makes use of it for his own
purposes is not at all related to his discussion of future contingents and God’s
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Ibid., 256-57.
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foreknowledge. Instead, it is a discussion about God’s ability to have acted
differently than God did in the past.

4.4.2 - Bradwardine’s Appropriation of the Distinction
Bradwardine, as we have seen (4.1), makes use of this distinction between
God’s ordained and absolute power in a key way in his own solution, and in so doing,
he is applying this distinction in a context quite unlike that of Scotus. Indeed, it is
my contention that Bradwardine is in fact relatively unique among medieval authors
in his application of the distinction between absolute and ordained Divine power
specifically to the problem of God’s foreknowledge and future contingents. Though
others before and after him speak of this distinction in other contexts, I have been
unable to discover any that do so directly in the context of the problem of future
contingents (at least not beyond the passing mentions in the “damning Peter and
saving Judas” discussions mentioned above). This makes this treatise a particularly
interesting piece in the history of the future contingents discussion, being as it is
something of an anomaly.
Even in Bradwardine’s own later writing on the topic, he does not revisit this
distinction in any pertinent way. Indeed, the account of future contingents implicitly
present throughout the De causa Dei corpus is virtually indistinguishable from that
of Scotus. The uniqueness of Bradwardine’s solution in this particular work, of
course, raises some intriguing questions: how widely read was this treatise, and did
it have any broader influence in Bradwardine’s own time, or that immediately after
him? Why did other figures, like Scotus, who were already quite keen to apply the
distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power in other contexts, not do so
when speaking of the problem of future contingents? Why does Bradwardine
himself abandon the approach in subsequent treatments of the same topic? We will
not, in our present study, find satisfactory answers to all of these questions, but they
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will be treated in more detail in the final chapter and conclusion.

4.4.3 - Scotus’ and Bradwardine’s Solutions Compared
If, as we have seen, Bradwardine’s solution relies on appropriating a Scotist
distinction, but one which Scotus himself never exploited for these purposes, then
we might quite justifiably wonder whether Bradwardine’s Scotist-flavoured solution
is in fact compatible with Scotus’ own solution to the problem. Does the distinction
which Scotus develops, but never uses for this purpose, actually benefit the topic of
future contingents, or does it constitute an unnecessary obfuscation? These and
other questions will be more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter. In the
meantime, however, I shall say just a few words about the relationship between
Scotus' solution and that of Bradwardine in the DFC.
It seems to me that Scotus’ and Bradwardine’s solutions are in fact quite
complementary. Indeed, they may reflect, in a way, two sides of the same coin —
Scotus emphasizing the primacy of the will, and God's knowledge of his own will,
while Bradwardine emphasizes God's knowledge, and that knowledge as ordained
by the will. It seems to me, therefore, that it may be possible for Scotus' and
Bradwardine’s accounts to be reconciled to form a single, unified account of God’s
foreknowledge and human free will.
What might this unified account look like? Well, suppose it is the case that in
any given moment, it is truly the case that I can either perform action A or not-A,
because in either case, no contradiction follows. Presume furthermore, as Scotus
would seem to have it, that God knows, before I perform either action, which I will
choose, simply by his complete and perfect knowledge of me and my will. Does
God’s knowledge of that action make it any less free? Scotus' response is that God’s
knowledge of my action does not compel my action in any way, since his knowledge
was based on a knowledge of my will and what action I would freely perform, given
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the sort of person I am, with the sort of will I possess, and so it remains logically
possible that I could have acted otherwise than I in fact did. Bradwardine, on the
other hand, would say that just because God knows I will perform action A (or not-A)
does not compel my action, because that knowledge of God operates according to
God’s ordained power; and thus, relative to God’s absolute power, I remain free. It
would seem a reasonable consolidation of these two views to posit that God knows
what I will will before I actually will it, by virtue of his knowledge of my will, and
that that knowledge proceeds under the auspices of God’s ordained power. In this
way, Scotus’ insistence on the contingency of my action is preserved, since not only
is there no contradiction in supposing that I act otherwise than I do (so there is no
logical necessity that I act as I do); but also, no necessity proceeds from God’s
foreknowledge of my action, since that foreknowledge is enacted according to God’s
ordained power, and so relative to God’s absolute power it remains possible for me
to act otherwise.
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Chapter 5
Critical Evaluation of Bradwardine’s Solution

Introduction
In this final chapter, which is comparatively brief, I will concern myself with a
critical evaluation of Bradwardine’s solution to the problem of future contingents.
In particular, I will examine whether Bradwardine’s solution successfully resolves
the apparent logical conflict between simultaneously holding that God foreknows all
things, and that human beings exercise free will, ultimately concluding that it does
not. To this end, I will first consider a sort of schematic of ideas to systematically
categorize strategies for solving the problem (5.1); I will then consider what a
successful solution to the problem ought to achieve, and how this is to be
understood in light of the schematic (5.2); I will then explain how Bradwardine’s
solution fails to be successful in this way (5.3).

5.1 - The problem and its solutions
In this section, I will first spend some time highlighting the exact points at
which the “problem” of future contingents arises and discussing its variants, with
special attention to the problem related to the so-called argument for “theological
fatalism,” since this is the primarily relevant context for our present study (5.1.1).
We have, in ways, already assumed and touched on much of what will be laid out in
this section, but it is helpful at this point to revisit the problem itself, and to lay it out
in a systematic way. I will then outline the main families of solutions to the problem
represented in the historical discussion, dividing these families of solutions into two
broad categories: the compatibilist solutions (5.1.2), and the incompatibilist
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solutions (5.1.3).

5.1.1 - The problem and its variants
In the context at hand, future contingents are a problem because their
existence seems to lead to the contradictory convergence of two theses. I focus here
on the problem as it arises in a theistic context, but it is worth noticing that a
completely parallel problem arises in the materialist context of causal determinism.
144

Firstly, it is taken as a necessary consequence of God’s omniscience that God’s

knowledge extends to all things, not only past and present, but also future. In a
particularly Christian theistic context, the power of God to enlighten prophets
concerning future events would seem to confirm this supposition concerning God’s
omniscience. When this belief is taken together with the authoritative tradition of
scriptural statements like the following, the impetus for adhering to belief in God’s
foreknowledge becomes yet stronger: “Lord, let me know mine end, and the number
of my days” (Ps 39.5); “Before a word is on my tongue, O Lord, you know it
altogether” and “Your eyes saw my unformed substance; in your book were written,
every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of
them” (Ps 139.4, 16); “‘I know the plans I have for you,’ declares the Lord” (Jer
29.11). But we also have strong motives — motives to do with ideas of
responsibility, justice, reward and blame, as well as the almost irresistible conviction
of our own subjective psychological experience — to believe that there are at least
some matters over which we exercise choice and activities of the will that may be
A good place to start for contemporary discussions of causal determinism is the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the topic by Carl Hoefer, “Causal Determinism,” The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-causal/>. For a discussion of the
compatibilist position between causal determinism and free will, see Michael McKenna and D. Justin
Coates, “Compatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/compatibilism/>; for
arguments opposed, see Kadri Vihvelin, “Arguments for Incompatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/>.
144
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truly said to be uncoerced and free. It is these instances of perceived free will that
give rise to some of the most compelling instances of what we wish to believe, in any
case, to be examples of future contingents. That tomorrow I sin in some particular
way, or act meritoriously in some way, I wish to believe are events over which I have
some control, and are thus able to turn out or not turn out according to the dictates
of some power that I possess in myself. (More on the relationship between free will
and responsibility will be said shortly.)
In her Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on foreknowledge and free
will, Linda Zagzebski provides a schematic for analysing the problem of future
contingents — more specifically, the problem of understanding God’s foreknowledge
in relation to those future contingents tied to human free will — and its various
solutions that I think, while not perfect in every respect, will be helpful for us in our
own analysis of Bradwardine’s solution.145 The structure that she lays out for
analysing the problem and the various approaches to its solution is usefully
systematic, and though my own analysis and conclusions differ from hers in several
ways, in much of what follows, I am indebted to the structure and framework for
analysis that she provides.
I will begin, therefore, by recounting the problem in the rough form that
Zagzebski uses. Zagzebski outlines the problem in the form of an argument for
“theological fatalism,” the premises of which she delineates in a way similar to the
following, where P is some action that will happen in the future, resulting from the
choice of a created agent (the same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to such
events in the present)146 :

Linda Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Free Will", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/>.
146
For the purposes of the present section, I am setting aside an important point of Zagzebski’s: she
highlights that it is the infallibility of God’s knowledge that makes the problem such a pressing one. The
issue of the degree of justification which a true belief requires to constitute knowledge, at least in a
medieval context, is one which I took up in greater detail already in the second chapter. Zagzebski is
quite right to take into account the fact that, particularly in a contemporary context, quite a low
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P1.

Yesterday, God knew P.

P2.

If something happened in the past, it is necessary in the sense that it is
fixed.

P3.

God’s knowledge yesterday of P is necessary in the sense that it is fixed.
(P1 and P2)

P4.

Necessarily, if God knew P yesterday, then P (since God’s knowledge is
infallible).

P5.

If a is necessary in the sense that it is fixed, and necessarily (a

b),

then b is necessary in the sense that it is fixed. (Transfer of necessity
principle)
P6.

So P is necessary in the sense that it is fixed. (P3, P4, and P5)

P7.

If P is necessary in the sense that it is fixed, then the agent who will
bring about P cannot do otherwise than bring about P.

P8.

So the agent cannot do otherwise than bring about P. (P6 and P7)

P9.

If an agent cannot do otherwise than she does, she does not act freely.

C.

The agent who will bring about P will not do so freely. (P8 and P9)

standard of justification is generally required for something to be considered to be “knowledge” in some
kind of meaningful sense, at least when speaking of human knowledge. But in the present discussion,
this point is less important for three reasons: firstly, it is not at all clear to me that contemporary
notions of what might constitute adequate justification are reflective of the historical context at hand.
While perhaps nothing quite so strong as a priori deduction may be required, certainly something
stronger than, say, a report from an authority is necessary for something to be considered sufficiently
“justified” as to be knowledge. Secondly, knowledge requires that the subject of its belief be true: if what
the supposed knower knows turns out not to be the case, then this demonstrates that the belief, being
untrue, was never knowledge at all. It therefore seems exceedingly strange to me that knowledge —
either God’s or man’s — might ever be fallible. Fallible knowledge that turns out to be false simply isn’t
knowledge at all, but merely false belief. And thirdly and finally, the distinction, even if it is valid, seems
irrelevant in the present context precisely because it is God’s knowledge that is at issue, so whatever
disagreements may exist in the contemporary literature about whether and to what extent human
knowledge may be fallible, these disagreements presumably cease to be relevant when we speak of the
knowledge of an infallible God.
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I have modified Zagzebski’s presentation of the argument and terminology in a
number of minor ways (for instance, Zagzebski uses a term “now-necessary,” which I
take to mean the necessity of fixity, or something very like it — though I find the
terminology “now-necessary” to be misleading, because it seems to apply more
strongly to events in the past than those in the present, or “now”), but none of these
alterations change the substance of her presentation. What we have, then, is an
argument that seems to show that, if we accept that God foreknows all things, it
follows that human beings can never act freely (and by extension, that future
contingents do not exist).
Calvin Normore argues that future contingents actually give rise to at least
three distinct, though interrelated, problems.147 Normore distinguishes among (1)
the problem of reconciling the principle of bivalence (that every proposition is either
true or false) with the existence of future contingents; (2) the problem of reconciling
foreknowledge in general with the existence of future contingents; and (3) the
problem of reconciling the foreknowledge of God in particular (in all of God’s
infallibility, immutability, and impassibility) with the existence of future contingents.
I am unconvinced that the distinction between (2) and (3) is an altogether useful
one, since foreknowledge of the infallible sort that gives rise to the problem is only
relevant with respect to the foreknowledge of God (either God’s own foreknowledge,
or God’s foreknowledge as prophetically revealed to human beings). We in our
creaturely way may presume to have knowledge about what will or will not happen,
but our knowledge of such things is in no way presumed to be infallible, and thus
there is no contradiction with supposing that things may turn out otherwise than we
suppose that they will.
Perhaps the problem of our apparent lack of freedom would not be so

Calvin Normore, “Future Contingents,” in N. Kretzmann et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 1982), pp. 358 - 59.
147
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troubling were it not also closely linked with intuitions about responsibility and
justice, rewards and punishments. I do not take for granted that freedom — in
particular, freedom for contradictories — is a necessary condition for responsibility;
indeed, as we will shortly examine in greater detail, many have given arguments to
the contrary. But there is an undeniably strong intuitive pull toward the conclusion
that justice in reward and punishment requires responsibility on the part of those
being rewarded or punished for their actions; and that responsibility requires that
the agents be relevantly free in their action; and that relevant freedom includes the
freedom to act otherwise. All of these assumptions will come to be questioned in
what follows.
However, it appears to be the case, by the terms of the argument above, that
since God knows all future human actions, those actions cannot really turn out
otherwise. As I have said, perhaps this in itself would not be so very troubling: what
does it really matter to my lived experience of freedom that God may have already
known the outcome of my choices before I make them? But this only seems to be of
little importance when considering the quantitative bulk of human choices, not
those which are qualitatively most important. For it is arguably the case that most
possible future contingents are of little or no moral consequence in and of
themselves, and whether or not these things are foreknown or determined by God
would appear to be neither here nor there; but when it comes to the morally
significant choices of human beings, that these choices are truly contingent — and
thus truly free — would appear to have monumentally important consequences.
Indeed, it appears to be a necessary consequence of the doctrine of hell (i.e., the
doctrine that eternal separation from God — with or without other punishments
and tortures, depending on whether one consults Dante or other theologians on the
matter — awaits those who utterly reject God by their actions in this life), taken
together with the justice of God, that human beings must accept or reject God freely
and of their own volition. For if the choice is compelled, then punishment for such a
choice would seem supremely unjust (just as we would consider those forced into
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illegal actions while under bondage to be victims, rather than perpetrators, of
crime). Of course, justice in meting out consequences for actions would presumably
extend to rewards as well as punishments; but it is perhaps less upsetting to think
that some may receive an unmerited reward, than it is to think that some may
receive an undeserved punishment (particularly when contemplating punishments
of extreme intensity and eternal duration).148
So having outlined some of the main ways in which future contingents pose a
problem, we turn in the next subsections to a systematic overview of the main
strategies solutions to the problem have followed. When this task is completed,
there will follow an examination of what would be required of a true solution to this
problem, in order that we may then judge Bradwardine’s solution against that
measure.
In order to avoid the troubling conclusion of this fatalist argument, a number
of strategies may be advanced. The argument itself appears valid in form, and so a
rational person must either find fault with one or more of its premises, or accept the
truth of its conclusion. Zagzebski has broadly delineated between two sorts of
approaches to the problem, in a way that will be helpful for us in our own analysis149
: on the one hand, there are approaches that attempt to uphold both of the seemingly
contradictory pillars of God’s foreknowledge together with human freedom. These
are the approaches which, on account of their attempt to show the compatibility of
God’s foreknowledge with human free will, are termed “compatibilist” (or perhaps
we might want to say more precisely in our present context, “theological
compatibilist”). On the other hand, in the face of the argument for theological
fatalism, some have either accepted its conclusion (that we do not possess freedom

Though Jesus’ parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Matthew 20) might seem to undermine this
notion, as well: in the parable, all the labourers, regardless of whether they worked a full day, a half day,
or even just the last hour of the day, receive a full day’s wages. This “unmerited reward” for those who
worked only a very little time outrages those who had laboured the full day in their sense of justice. (cf.
Matthew 20)
149
Zagzebski 2016.
148
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of action or will), or rejected its first premise (that God foreknows anything). Either
or both of these commitments may be rejected without an outright rejection of the
existence of God, though to be sure, a rejection of either commitment is bound to
substantially impact the way in which one conceives of God. (Some, indeed, have
rejected the foreknowledge of God by rejecting the notion of any kind of god at all;
and others the existence of freedom on the part of human beings by adhering to a
doctrine of strict causal determinism or one of its variants. But these sorts of
positions are not relevant to our present discussion, focussed as it is on the theistic
context of Bradwardine and his interlocutors.) These approaches are termed
“incompatibilist,” since they view the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and
(human) freedom as incompatible, and rather than try to maintain the two
commitments, they reject one or the other.
I will argue shortly that the incompatibilist approaches should not be
considered “solutions” to the problem, per se, relying instead on a kind of cop-out
that avoids the problem in the first place. But before doing that, I will briefly outline
the main families of solutions as Zagzebski sees them.

5.1.2 - Compatibilist solutions
The compatibilist solutions as a group comprise a number of families of
solution strategies, which I will outline in turn below.
The first family of solutions are those which follow along the lines of the
majority interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of tomorrow’s sea battle in De
interpretatione IX: these solutions deny that a proposition concerning a future
contingent event can have any truth-value at all, and thus deny the principle of
bivalence at least with respect to propositions about certain future things. In so
doing, they undermine the very definitions of terms in the argument as laid out
above: P was defined to be some future contingent event which happens, assuming
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from the outset that there is a truth to be known about P. Zagzebski calls this the
Aristotelian approach, but it is possible that Boethius also held a similar view — or
at least defends something like it in his commentary on the De interpretatione (as
discussed in 1.1).150
The second family of solutions, which has by far the most illustrious and
influential heritage in the Western Latin tradition, is that characterized by a
rejection of the first premise of the theological fatalist argument — but not on the
grounds that God doesn’t know the relevant future contingent fact, but on the
grounds that, as an eternal being beyond temporal existence, it is improper to speak
of God as knowing something yesterday (or today, or tomorrow). Thus, the natural
inferences we may wish to make about necessity inhering in certain things in virtue
of their being past fail to apply when speaking of God, because God is beyond the
temporal indicators of past, present, and future. Zagzebski calls this the “Boethian
solution,” and we have already seen that Boethius did indeed gesture toward
something like this (see 1.1); but we have also seen that the position was already
proposed prior to Boethius by Augustine, and was later much more robustly
developed by Anselm (1.2), and so I would be much more inclined to call this the
Augustinian/Anselmian position. We have seen already what a profound influence
this solution had throughout the Middle Ages and on Bradwardine’s own solution,
and its legacy continues to this day. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, for
instance, have stalwartly defended the position in the realm of contemporary
philosophy of religion, and younger scholars in the field — myself included —
continue to find the position attractive and defensible.151 But a number of very
influential philosophers of religion have also criticised this position over the last
several decades, and these critics include Nicholas Wolterstorff, Richard Swinburne,
Among contemporary proponents of this approach are J.R. Lucas, The Future: An Essay on God,
Temporality, and Truth (London: Blackwell, 1989); and David Kyle Johnson, “God, Fatalism, and
Temporal Ontology,” Religious Studies, 45 (2009) no. 4, 435–54.
151
See, e.g., Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” Journal of Philosophy, 78 (August 1981),
429–58; Michael Rota, “The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine
Foreknowledge,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2 (2010) no.1, 165–186.
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and Zagzebski herself.152
Next is the position of William Ockham, which we have already spent a great
deal of time examining. Ockham’s solution, attributing a certain sort of contingency
even to past things which themselves pertain to future contingents (such as
propositions like “Peter was predestinate” — recall that, in terms of tense, the
proposition appears to be about the past; but Peter’s predestinate state is really
about the future — namely, his ultimate future state of beatitude), would seem to
undermine all of the second, third, and fourth premises of the argument for
theological fatalism. We have already seen the way in which Marilyn McCord Adams
incited a sort of rediscovery and revival of Ockham’s position (see chapter 2). Alvin
Plantinga defended what might be seen as a sort of version of Ockhamism in his
1986 paper, “On Ockham’s Way Out,”153 and a few others, including William Lane
Craig, have ventured defenses of their own.154 But many others have been severely
critical of this approach, for reasons that should by this point be apparent (see
chapter 2.3, and Bradwardine’s criticisms in chapter 3).155 Zagzebski puts forward a
criticism, perhaps not highlighted in my own discussion before, that Ockham’s
solution seems to be guilty of ad hockery: for what exactly is it about God’s past
knowledge that makes it a special case exempting it from the same sort of necessity
as other past things?156 I am not convinced, however, that Zagzebski’s accusation is
apropos, since Ockham does not seem to see God’s past foreknowledge as a unique
case of apparently-past-tense things to which the usual sorts of tense conditions do
not apply, but, rather, as something that is of a kind with a whole class of other sorts

See, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob, C.
Orlebeke and L. Smedes (eds.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975); Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of
Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and
Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Other criticisms come from, e.g., Clark
Pinnock, but his position will be addressed in more particularity a little further on.
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Alvin Plantinga, “On Ockham's Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy, 3 (1986) no. 3, 235–269.
154
E.g., William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Brill's Studies in Intellectual
History 19. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).
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See, e.g., John Martin Fischer, “Ockhamism,” Philosophical Review, 94 (January 1985): 81–100;
William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
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of apparently-past-tense things which actually concern the future (see 2.2.3 for a
more detailed discussion of this).
Molinism — following Luis de Molina — forms another family of solutions,
arguing that God possesses a so-called “middle knowledge” concerning a class of
propositions which have been termed “counter-factuals of freedom.” In the
contemporary literature, this view has been defended by William Lane Craig, in a
lengthy exchange between him and William Hasker.157 In essence, what Molinism
argues is that God does not have direct infallible knowledge of our future actions —
but he has direct infallible knowledge of the sorts of people we are and the ways in
which we would act under particular hypothetical circumstances. This move is
supposed to preserve the contingency of those actions, but I see no way around the
fact that this solution seems to merely re-frame the problem in slightly different
terms; because not only can God infallibly infer from God’s knowledge of me and my
hypothetical actions to knowledge of what I will, in fact do, but God is also directly
responsible for creating me as I am, with the character and inclinations that I have,
and so if God knows how I will act in a particular hypothetical situation because of
his knowledge of me, it would seem that God is indirectly responsible for all of my
actions because of God’s creation of me.
The final family of solutions (not necessarily disjoint from other families) is
that which calls into question premise nine: that genuine alternative possibilities are
required for an agent to act freely. Zagzebski attributes this view to Augustine, who
does accord the greatest degree of freedom to the blessed, who cannot but act
righteously. But I think we once against see this idea developed much more

See, e.g., William Lane Craig, “Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (54 (1994) no. 4: 857–861); and “On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism,”
Faith and Philosophy (15 (1998) no. 2: 236–240) for Craig’s defenses of the view. See, e.g., William
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); “Middle Knowledge: A
Refutation Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy (12 (1995) no. 2: 223–236); “Explanatory Priority:
Transitive and Unequivocal, a Reply to William Craig,” Philosophy and Phenomological Research
(57(1997) no. 2: 389–393); and “Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!” Faith and Philosophy (17 (2000) no. 1:
126–131) for Hasker’s arguments to the contrary.
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thoroughly by Anselm, as Tomas Ekenberg has shown.158 It is worth noting here the
active and controversial debate that continues to this day about the complex
relationship between freedom of will, determinism, and moral responsibility.
Among the most significant developments in the contemporary debate are those
which (perhaps not unlike Anselm) provide arguments in support of the thesis that
alternative possibilities are not required for a person to be exercising freedom in a
way that entails personal responsibility. In his seminal article of 1969 entitled
“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry Frankfurt argues that
responsibility for an action does not require genuine alternative choices by appeal to
a thought experiment like the following:159 suppose Alfred intends to shoot Claudia;
suppose, furthermore, that Bertha, a mad neuroscientist who has it in for Claudia,
wants to ensure that there is no way for Alfred to mess up the job. Bertha secretly
sedates Alfred and implants a device in his brain that will allow her to force Alfred to
shoot Claudia if, at the crucial moment, he gets cold feet. Now suppose that Alfred,
after forming the intention to shoot Claudia, actually does so of his own volition, so
that Bertha has no need to activate her brain-implant device. In this situation, Alfred
could not do otherwise than shoot Claudia; and yet, since the action was carried out
under his own volition and in accordance with his own intention, it nevertheless
seems reasonable to attribute to Alfred moral responsibility for his action.
Such a view would seem to cohere well with the view of freedom suggested
by Augustine and developed much more fully by Anselm. Recall that Anselm argued
that the most truly free beings are those which cannot but avoid sin and act with
perfect goodness.160 Thus, the blessed in heaven, whose wills are united with God’s
in such perfect sanctity that it has become an impossibility that they should sin are

See, e.g., Thomas Ekenberg, Falling Freely (Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2005); “Free Will and
Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 22 (2005) no. 4., 301 - 18.
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Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 46
(December 1969), 829–839.
160
Recall (from 1.2.2) that Anselm defines free will as the “the power to preserve rightness of will for
the sake of that same rightness” — and thus, those beings are most free who never fail to preserve
rightness for its own sake.
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seen by Anselm to be the ones who are most truly free, for their freedom to act is
unencumbered by conflicting desires and impulses to depravity. But despite the fact
that alternative courses of action are not open to them, because their wills are in
such complete conformity with what is good and righteous, they are themselves
actively willing those righteous acts that they do. And so it appears that they are
exercising the sort of freedom that entails responsibility on Frankfurt’s model.161

5.1.3 - Incompatibilist solutions
I spoke earlier of there being two extreme solutions possible to the problem
of future contingents and God's foreknowledge, and these two form the poles of the
incompatibilist approaches: on the one extreme, the problem is solved by rejecting
the existence of future contingents. This amounts to determinism, and (at least on
most understandings) may lead to the outright denial of human free will. On the
other extreme lies the denial that God does, in fact, know all things future. In
contemporary theology, this sort of solution arises in the context of what has been
called “Open Theism”, as influentially espoused by the late Clark Pinnock, Canadian
Protestant theologian at McMaster University.162 Denials of God’s foreknowledge
can also be seen quite explicitly in the thought of Richard Swinburne.163 However,
this approach undermines God's omniscience (this is because it thereby makes his
foreknowledge either non-existent, or fallible), which has almost always been among
the properties that Christians have traditionally ascribed to God.

5.2 - What constitutes a true solution?

For a much more in-depth discussion of the relationship between Frankfurt’s views and Anselm’s, see
Ekenberg 2005b.
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In what follows, I will explain what I think a true solution to the problem
ought to achieve, and why I think the incompatibilist solutions fail to obtain this end.
I will also explain why it is that some of the apparently compatibilist solutions —
and particularly, the Ockhamist solution — despite appearances to the contrary, in
fact boil down to an incompatibilist approach and therefore fail as solutions. I will
then, briefly, provide reasons why I think that the Augustinian/Boethian/Anselmian
approach — by appeal to the timeless eternity of God — is the most promising path
to a true solution and an authentically compatibilist understanding of the
relationship between the foreknowledge of God and human freedom of will and
action.

5.2.1 - What a solution is not
The problem of future contingents, and in particular, the problem of divine
foreknowledge and free will, is a problem precisely because there is an apparent
conflict between two important commitments which many people throughout
history (and in our present day) wish to hold. A solution to the problem that is
successful, then, must maintain both of these commitments. A so-called solution to
the problem that simply sets aside one or the other or both of these commitments
has not actually resolved the problem, but has merely dismissed it.
It is for this reason that I do not admit the incompatibilist solutions outlined
above as true solutions to the problem. The problem is one of reconciling two
apparently contradictory commitments, and so simply discarding one of the
commitments to resolve the conflict does nothing to reconcile the two to one
another. It is not enough for the success of a solution to be simply internally
consistent; it must also simultaneously uphold the foreknowledge of God, and the
freedom of the human will, and uphold both of these things in as robust a sense as
possible. To say that one has solved the problem, merely by discarding one or the
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other of these two tenets, is like claiming to have saved a troubled marriage by
killing off one of the spouses.
Let me be clear, however, that I do not mean by this to suggest that
incompatibilist positions are untenable philosophical positions per se. If a
philosopher is not committed to either or both of the premises that (1) God
possesses foreknowledge of all things, and that (2) human beings exercise free will,
then there is no reason at all for her to be concerned about maintaining either or
both premise. In fact, given the great difficulty faced by anyone who does try to
maintain (1) and (2), it is quite reasonable indeed to conclude that either or both of
(1) and (2) is untenable. But for the philosopher who is willing to part with (1) or
(2), the problem of future contingents in relation to the foreknowledge of God does
not exist, or at least, does not exist in nearly so robust a way as it does for the
philosopher to takes both (1) and (2) to be intractable commitments. Such a
philosopher is just not the sort of person for whom the problem is, well, much of a
problem to begin with. The problem is such only for those whose pre-existing
commitments make it impossible to reject either premise (1) or premise (2). This is
all I mean when I say that the incompatibilist fails to solve the problem: that the sort
of solution the incompatibilist offers is not the sort that would satisfy the
philosopher for whom the problem really exists, because such a person is unwilling
to concede either (1) or (2) in the first place.
Now, I also believe it to be the case that many attempts to provide a
compatibilist solution fail in the same way, because they are in fact thinly-veiled
incompatibilist approaches. In particular, and as I have already discussed at length
in chapter 2, Ockham’s solution strays too far, in my view, towards a denial of God’s
foreknowledge. At the very least, Ockham’s solution reduces God’s foreknowledge to
something far less robust than the tradition is committed to maintain. God’s
foreknowledge, as Ockham would have it, is so reduced as to seriously call into
question that God’s immutable and impassible nature. However, as I will soon

173
discuss in 5.3, it seems likely to me that Bradwardine’s solution — which
Bradwardine understood as an answer to the error of Ockham’s — strays too far the
other way, and ultimately ends up denying human beings any meaningful freedom of
will.

5.2.2 - The promise of the Anselmian approach
In my own view, the approach to the problem which appears to offer the most
promise as a genuine solution — in that it maintains a robust notion of both God’s
foreknowledge and of human freedom, and that it seems rationally compelling and
internally consistent — is that of Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm (and of course,
many others). This is the approach which relies on an appeal to the atemporal
eternality of God to explain how God’s knowledge of all things, past, present, and
future are not thereby made necessary because of God’s knowing them. It seems to
me that this approach does the best job of any of them in maintaining a firm
commitment to the notion that God knows — really knows — my future actions,
whilst also maintaining that those future actions, and the choices and willings
relating to them, are really mine, and are really free. It also seems to me that, by
introducing an additional plane of existence, as it were, in which our normal notions
of necessity relative to the passage of time fail to apply, this approach offers a
solution which is rationally tenable. Granted, this very move of introducing an
additional plane of existence, while providing a rational way out of the problem,
introduces complexities that are extremely difficult to fully grasp: for how can we, as
beings whose only experience of the world is in time, even begin to understand what
timeless existence might mean, or how logic applies in such a realm? But is not an
adequate reason, in my view, to reject the approach.
Some object to this approach because it seems hard to understand how a
timelessly eternal God might relate to the world in time. If all of time is
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simultaneously present to God, how is it that God can know in what sequence events
happen, with respect to God’s creatures? And thus, how can God decide to intervene
in events at a particular point in time, and not another? As I have made plain before,
however, I think this objection is laid to rest by analogy: insofar as I know about past
events, they are equally and simultaneously present to me; but this does not mean
that I perceive them as simultaneous with each other, and I am able to understand a
sequential order to them (Julius Caesar was assassinated prior to the birth of
Mohammed, which was prior to the Norman invasion, which was prior to the French
Revolution, which was prior to the election of Donald Trump, for instance). In the
same way, God’s simultaneous perception of all created time does not mean that God
is unable to understand that there is a sequence in events.
Others, such as Zagzebski, object that God’s eternal knowledge of the future
makes the things known no less necessary than would God’s knowledge in time of
the future.164 But this objection erroneously presumes to think about timeless
eternity as though it is just like the past. In reality, a true understanding of timeless
eternity and its relationship with modality is impossible to fully grasp except by
analogy, precisely because our entire experience is “en-timed.” We may catch
fleeting glimpses of what timelessness is through the lense of theoretical physics or
transcendental meditation, perhaps, but we cannot wholly escape our created,
embodied experience in time to wholly understand what this plane of existence is
like.
We have seen already, in the preceding chapter, that Bradwardine views his
own solution as lying in the lineage of the Anselmian approach, and indeed,
Bradwardine seems truly committed to the timeless eternality of God and sees his
own solution as a development of this approach. However, as we will see in the next
section, Bradwardine’s solution fails to truly follow in the spirit of Anselm et alia: in
Bradwardine’s attempt to develop the approach of Anselm, he takes a tack that lands
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him in the incompatibilist trap of determinism.

5.3 - Shortcomings of Bradwardine’s solution
As an internally logically consistent interpretation of the operation of God’s
foreknowledge in relation to future contingents, Bradwardine’s solution seems quite
satisfactory in many ways. It makes a certain logical sense that if God’s
foreknowledge operates by God’s ordained power, then it is only relative to that
power that the things foreknown are necessary. This leaves open the possibility that
some future things may be contingent absolutely speaking, or relative to God’s
absolute power. (This comes very close, theoretically, to a doctrine of possible
worlds contingency: taking just the actual world, as ordained by God, all things must
happen as they happen, and so seem to be necessary in that respect; but it could
have been the case, absolutely speaking, that an alternative world was actualized by
God, and in that alternative world, some things might have worked out differently.)
But as I have argued in the section above, it is not sufficient for a solution to merely
be consistent to truly be a viable solution to the problem at hand. If it is to really
solve the problem of the apparent contradiction of God’s foreknowledge and human
freedom, then a true solution must necessarily avoid denying either God’s
foreknowledge or human freedom.
Bradwardine’s solution comes as a response to Ockham’s, which Bradwardine
identifies — rightly, I think — as having sacrificed a robust understanding of God’s
omniscience for the sake of preserving a particularly robust understanding of
freedom of the human will: in the troubled marriage between divine foreknowledge
and human freedom, Ockham has killed off God’s foreknowledge in an attempt to
save the marriage. But has Bradwardine, in his own solution, successfully avoided
sacrificing the other spouse, namely, free will? As I argue in what follows, I do not
think that he has.
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I spoke earlier of incompatibilist approaches encompassing two polar
extremes of rejecting one or the other of the two central tenets that form the core of
the problem: the first, what I've anachronistically called “Open Theism,” is the result
of discarding in one way or another the centrality of God’s omniscience; the second,
and what most would conventionally call determinism of one stripe or another,
involves the rejection in some way of the freedom of human beings in will and/or
action. It is the latter of these two incompatibilist traps in which, I contend,
Bradwardine finds himself ensnared. In avoiding Ockham’s Scylla of Open Theism,
he has instead landed in the Charybdis of determinism.
In particular, if Bradwardine is to save human freedom, there seems to me to
be something a bit backwards about his account: surely, if we are at all concerned to
preserve freedom of the will, it is relative to God's ordained power that we would
really want to be free, since it is this ordained power which operates according to
the constraints of God's justice, mercy, etc. Freedom in an absolute, or logical sense,
seems hardly to be freedom at all, since what good is it in a created order that is
subject to God's ordered power? In other words, if the world as created by God is
fashioned and governed exclusively according to God’s ordained power, then God’s
absolute power seems almost not to matter for any practical purpose. What I mean
by this is that, despite the existence of absolute power to act otherwise, any action
God does perform is by means of God’s ordained power; and thus God’s absolute
power apart from what God ordains never has any bearing on the actual course of
events in the world. But if God’s absolute power does not matter, practically
speaking, then neither does freedom relative to that power.
For suppose it is foreknown by God that a person will die apart from his grace
and so be damned: Bradwardine may contend that, absolutely speaking, it is possible
that she will seek God's grace and so be saved (even though she in fact doesn't); but
given that it is actually the case that God foreknows that she will be damned, it is,
with respect to God's ordained power, necessary that she be damned; and since it is
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only by this ordained power that God actually operates, this seems to be the only
power that really matters with respect to our actual freedom. It may be the case that
it is logically possible that our damnandus (damnanda?) will amend her life in
accordance with God's grace, and so be saved; but on her way to the hell fires, it will
be small comfort to know that she was free to be saved, logically speaking!
Bradwardine’s employment of the distinction of powers, rather than solving
the problem, simply puts the problem in slightly different terms. While previously,
the concern was how, relative to God’s power and omniscience simpliciter, we might
truly exercise freedom, now the concern is how we might be said to be truly free
given that our actions are necessary relative to God’s ordained power. Indeed, it
seems to me that, for all practical intents and purposes, for one’s actions to be
necessary relative to God’s ordained power is precisely for them not to be free. This
is because, though God nevertheless has absolute power relative to which the action
is non-necessary, God’s ordained power is the only power that God ever, in fact,
exercises, and so in a very strong sense, it is the only power that really matters. For
how can a power that is never employed, and that we know never will be employed,
make any difference to the true and practical freedom of an action?
Much earlier, in the introduction and again in chapter 4, I introduced the
analogy of a game of chess to illustrate the difference between God’s ordained and
absolute power. Allow me now to return to that analogy. If you and I are playing
chess — that is, playing by the rules of the game — then whatever power or freedom
we may have in an absolute sense for moving pieces becomes irrelevant within the
constraints of the chess game. If I decide I want to move my pawn from A2 to C2
(i.e., sideways), you will cry, “You can’t do that!” And it is no matter that, in an
absolute sense, I can do that — I have it within my absolute power to do that. It’s
not even worth the grammar pedant’s quibble that what you really meant is that I
may not do that: so long as I am playing chess, in a very strong sense, I cannot move
my pawn sideways. So long as we are playing chess, and so long as I wish to
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continue in the game, there are very real and very definite constraints on the way in
which I may move pieces. My power is ordained by the rules of the game. If I violate
any one of these rules in virtue of my absolute power, then I am no longer playing
chess at all. With respect to the game of chess, my absolute power for moving pieces
wherever I please really doesn’t matter; the only relevant power I have is that
ordained by the rules of the game.
In the solution Bradwardine creates for us, God’s created order is, if you will,
a chess game on a grand scale (though please don’t push this analogy farther than I
intend!). It seems, however, that in Bradwardine’s view, it is a game in which the
players only ever have one choice of move. Every move is forced, and any sense of
choice we have is mere illusion. Recall in particular that Bradwardine explicitly
states that, relative to God’s ordained power, our actions are necessary:
Now, to the proposition [wherein A is some future contingent event that in
fact will happen], I say that A could not happen according to absolute power .
. . since for A to happen or not to happen would in no way contradict such a
power . . . . But in speaking of the ordained power . . . it is said in this way
that neither A, nor any other future thing, cannot not happen, since if by
that power A could not happen, it would follow that God could be deceived
and err, and his knowledge could fail, and he could speak falsely and he could
lie, if God predicted, mediately or immediately, that A will happen.

Nunc ad propositum, dico quod A potest non fore de potencia absoluta . . .
quia A fore vel non fore in nullo repugnat tali potencie . . . . Sed loquendo de
potencia ordinata . . . sic dicitur quod A non potest non fore nec aliquod
futurum, quia si illa potencia A potest non fore, sequitur quod Deus potest
decipi et errare, et falli potest ejus sciencia, et potest falsum dicere et mentiri
si Deus predixit A fore mediate vel immediate. (DFC 42g, emphasis mine.
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Omitted are repeated instances of the phrase, “in causa superiori vel
inferiori,” a secondary distinction which is irrelevant to our current
discussion.)

In stating that a future thing cannot not happen, Bradwardine is making a fairly
explicit statement about the necessity of the event, at least relative to God’s ordained
power.
It is my contention that to be necessary relative to God’s ordained power is
tantamount to being necessary simpliciter, given that God’s ordained power is the
only power that matters relative to us. For if God never acts contrary to God’s
ordained power — i.e., if every action of God, throughout eternity, is enacted
according to God’s ordained power — then anything necessary relative to that
perpetually-realized power is, if not necessary absolutely speaking, at least
contingens ut in pluribus — or technically contingent, but never not the case. It is
certainly not contingent ad utrumlibet, as it would seem Bradwardine wishes to
claim. This seems to imply that by all relevant measures, our actions are determined
in quite a strong sense. And so it appears that Bradwardine’s attempt to provide a
compatibilist solution in the line of Anselm fails, and what he has instead produced
is an incompatibilist version of determinism.
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Conclusion

Summary
In this thesis, I have provided an introductory study of Bradwardine’s De
futuris contingentibus, a work which provides a version of his solution to the
problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. This study required, firstly,
the examination of the positions of three major figures whose solutions shaped and
influenced Bradwardine’s own: in Boethius’ position, we observed the first of the
solutions appealing the a difference in the operation of God’s knowledge from our
own. Boethius argues that it is primarily because God’s knowledge operates on a
plane higher than our own that we cannot understand how its operation does not
necessitate its future objects. Also present in Boethius’ solution, albeit subtly, is the
suggestion that God’s timeless eternity enables this non-necessitating knowledge of
things to come. In Anselm’s position, we saw a much fuller development of the
notion of God’s timeless eternity, together with a more robust discussion of how the
entire expanse of created time — past, present, and future — might be
simultaneously present to God, with a simultaneity that does not obscure succession
in God’s sight. In Anselm’s position, we also encountered a version of free will that
might allow for freedom despite the lack of alternatives. The view of Duns Scotus
fits less neatly into the trajectory begun by Boethius and Anselm, in that it did not
require (and indeed, Scotus elsewhere flatly denies) the presumption of God’s
timeless eternity; with Scotus, we saw instead a new engagement with the notion of
contingency which pushed the parameters that dominated medieval assumptions up
to that point. This is coupled in Scotus' thought, in a way that is perhaps not entirely
seamless, with an understanding of God’s foreknowledge relying on God’s
knowledge of God’s own will. As subsequent chapters showed, the positions of all
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three of these figures have a role to play in Bradwardine’s own solution.
This thesis required, secondly, that we take significant time to understand the
position of Bradwardine’s chief intellectual adversary, William Ockham. Ockham’s
view, like that of Scotus (his fellow Franciscan) did not rely upon (and in fact,
rejected outright) any notion of God’s timeless eternity. Instead, Ockham developed
a complex understanding of modality and verb tense which led him to the
conclusion that our future free acts are not necessary, despite being known by God,
because God’s knowledge of them is not necessary. I responded to Ockham’s position
with a discussion of my own, centring on the nature of knowledge and what sense
can be made of this notion of “contingent knowledge.” I also engaged some logical
difficulties that seem to me to spring from Ockham’s notion, and discussed whether
Ockham’s solution does not just push the problem onto determinacy, rather than
necessity, in his newly-defined set of terms.
I was then ready, thirdly, to introduce Bradwardine’s treatise itself, beginning
with Bradwardine’s consideration of other solutions to the problem. Naturally, we
paid by far the greatest attention to Bradwardine’s rejection of the Ockhamist
position, since this is clearly the position that is of greatest importance for
Bradwardine in his efforts to provide an alternative solution. But Bradwardine’s
objections to Ockham were mostly quite different from my own, focusing on the
danger, as he sees it, for Ockham’s notion of contingent divine foreknowledge to
undermine the immutability and omniscience of God. Bradwardine was very
concerned that Ockham’s preoccupation with human freedom led him into a
heretical neglect of these central attributes of God, as the tradition of Classical
theism would have it. In his own solution, therefore, Bradwardine seeks to restore a
robust, Classical sense of the sovereignty of God, with full authority, power, and
autonomy, expressed in the perfections of omniscience, omnipotence, and
immutability. Bradwardine embraces the Boethian/Anselmian notions of the
timeless eternity of God, and adapts the Scotistic distinction between the absolute
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and ordained power of God to serve his purposes in explaining how it is that God can
have knowledge of our actions without necessitating them. He does this by saying
that God’s foreknowledge operates through the ordained power of God, and thus
human actions foreknown in this way are only necessary ordinately speaking;
relative to God’s absolute power, however, they remain free and undetermined.
Finally, I analyzed the merit of Bradwardine’s solution, relating it to a
schematic of possible solutions. I broadly laid out the main families of solutions
within the two categories of compatibilist and incompatibilist solutions, and then
argued that the incompatibilist positions — though tenable positions in their own
right — fail to really be solutions to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free
will in a true sense, because they are only acceptable as solutions to the kind of
person for whom the problem would never have truly existed in the first place. The
problem arises only for the person for whom God’s foreknowledge of all things and
human freedom are both deep, unavoidable commitments that cannot be discarded.
I then argue that some solutions which aim to be compatibilist inadvertently erode
the foundation of one or the other of these two commitments, and thus ultimately
wind up being incompatibilist solutions despite themselves. Ockham’s solution, I
contend, is one such solution, since it weakens the sense in which God foreknows
anything to the point where it seems almost to be nothing more than a kind of
“passive waiting,” as Oberman expressed it. So Ockham ultimately winds up
undermining his commitment to God’s foreknowledge. Bradwardine, however, in his
enthusiasm to avoid the apparently heretical pitfalls of Ockham’s solution, commits
this opposite error: the notion of freedom that Bradwardine preserves is one that is
so weak as to ultimately boil down to determinism. And thus Bradwardine, too,
winds up an incompatibilist, despite himself.

Remaining questions
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There are a number of remaining avenues of enquiry relating to the De futuris
contingentibus that I have been unable to explore in the course of this thesis study.
One of these questions is that of the relationship between Bradwardine’s solution to
the problem as presented in the De futuris contingentibus, and some years later, in
the much more well-known work De causa Dei. For it seems that in that latter work,
the division of God’s power ceases to play a central role (or any role at all) in
Bradwardine’s treatment of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. He does
retain in that work a very robust sense of the sovereignty and power of God, placing
secondary importance on whether or not human action can really be free under such
circumstances.165 But when it comes to actually giving an account of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom, it winds up coming across in a way that seems
not unlike the solution of Scotus, with a strong dose, too, of Anselmian emphasis on
the eternity of God.166 Absent is the creatively original approach of the DFC,
employing the divine powers distinction. So a major question for further inquiry is,
why did Bradwardine not maintain the division in God’s power as a useful
mechanism for dealing with the problem of divine foreknowledge and human
freedom when he came to address the problem a second time? A fuller answer
would require a much more careful study of DCD and other works of Bradwardine’s
than I am presently able to provide, but I would at this point hazard a guess that it
may have been the case that Bradwardine came to recognize the weaknesses of his
first solution. Perhaps he came to realize that to posit that we are only free relative
to God’s absolute power in fact undermines our freedom in a very significant way.
So perhaps DCD is, among other things, an attempt by Bradwardine to provide a
better answer to the problem than he had in his previous treatise on the topic.

Bradwardine’s strong emphasis on the sovereignty of God has been seen by some scholars — among
them, Oberman and Leff — to prefigure similar emphases in the writings of some early reformers, most
notably John Calvin.
166
De causa Dei itself is a very large, intimidating tome, available only in a difficult-to-read
seventeenth-century edition (or one of its reprints). I do not pretend to have read through it in its
entirety myself yet; however, a snapshot summary of Bradwardine’s treatment of the topic of future
contingents in the DCD is given by Calvin Normore in “Future Contingents,” in Kretzmann et al. (eds),
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 358 - 81, esp. 374 - 75.
165
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A second significant question that arises from this study is that of the
historical reception, transmission, and influence of the work. There are many clues
that Bradwardine’s writing was influential and well-known in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Oberman and Leff trace the likely influence that Bradwardine
had on theological developments leading up to the great rift in the
early-sixteenth-century Church which we call the Reformation. In particular, these
scholars trace a line of intellectual influence connecting Bradwardine with none
other than John Calvin. My own favourite piece of evidence of Bradwardine’s
influence, however, is the following passage from Geoffrey Chaucer’s “The Nun’s
Priest’s Tale” in The Canterbury Tales (the translation below is my own, with no
effort made to preserve the original metre or rhyme in any way):
But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren,
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn,
Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn,
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng, "Nedely" clepe I symple necessitee;
Or elles, if free choys be graunted me
To do that same thyng, or do it noght,
Though God forwoot it, er that I was wroght;
Or if his wityng streyneth never a deel
But by necessitee condicioneel.
But I cannot sift it [as wheat] to the bran
As can the holy Doctor [of the Church], Augustine,
Or Boethius, or the Bishop Bradwardine:
Whether God’s worthy foreknowledge
Compels me by need to do a thing —
By “need” I mean simple necessity —
Or if free choice might be granted to me
To do or not do that same thing,
Although God foreknew [my choice] before I was even made;
Or if God’s knowledge does not compel anything
Except by conditional necessity. (lines 474 - 84)
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The very fact that Chaucer is mentioning Bradwardine by name — in the same
breath, even, as such illustrious greats as Boethius and Augustine — indicates that
Bradwardine must have been something of a household name, even a couple of
decades after his death. Yet more remarkable, though, is the context in which
Chaucer mentions Bradwardine, for the very topic being alluded to is that of the De
futuris contingentibus, namely, divine foreknowledge and human freedom!167 There
can be no clearer evidence than this passing mention in Chaucer’s hugely popular
poem that Bradwardine’s attempts to tackle to problem of divine foreknowledge and
human freedom were widely known, at least among the educated.
Despite this evidence that Bradwardine was famous for his work on the topic,
I have found little evidence to suggest that the De futuris contingentibus treatise in
particular was much read or imitated. Much further textual and paleographic study
of Bradwardine’s contemporaries and immediate successors would be necessary to
establish with any greater degree of certainty the kind of direct influence the
treatise may have had; but the immediate evidence would appear to point to the
influence being very slight. There seem to be few surviving manuscripts, for one
thing; and for another, I have not so far discovered any evidence of the characteristic
element of the DFC’s solution — namely, the reliance on the divine powers
distinction — being reported or taken up by any subsequent philosophers of the
fourteenth century. There are two main possibilities that I can see as to why this
might be: it may be the case that this was a text that simply failed to gain a
critical-mass following, and so was forgotten about (certainly, its stylistic
shortcomings would not have made it an easy, accessible text for students or other
masters of arts hoping to read up on current ideas); or perhaps it was read by some,
even circulated for a time, but not taken up by anyone because its shortcomings as a

If ever my research is accused of being dry and irrelevant to today’s young people, I pull out this
reference in Chaucer. I call it my pop-culture tie-in — because really, how much more hip does it get
than Chaucer?
167
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coherent account were too apparent.
These speculations, however, are based on far too little evidence, as yet, to
make any certain pronouncements. Indeed, it may even turn out that further study
yields evidence of the text having had a greater influence among Bradwardine’s
contemporaries and immediate successors than I currently believe there to be.
Regardless of the text’s influence, however, there remains much of inherent interest
about it; and despite the ultimate failure of the solution it offers to the problem of
divine foreknowledge and human freedom, it yet provides an intriguing case-study
of a creative attempt by a fourteenth-century philosopher to craft a new solution to a
perennial problem of philosophy, and a unique window into the early thought of the
Doctor Profundus.168

Doctor Profundus (“the profound doctor”) is the epithet by which Bradwardine was known to
subsequent generations of medieval scholars.
168
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Appendix

DE FUTURIS CONTINGENTIBUS169

ON FUTURE CONTINGENTS169

Utrum Deus habeat prescienciam
Whether God has foreknowledge of all ad
omnium futurorum contingencium ad utrumlibet170 future contingents.
utrumlibet.170
1. Quod non, quia sid posset
sciencia Dei falli et mutari.
Consequens est falsum, quia sic
Deus posset decipi. Illud sequitur
quod illa contingencia ad utrumlibet
sunt necessaria. Consequens est
falsum.

1. [It may be argued] that [God does] not,
since it would then be possible for God's
knowledge to be mistaken and to be
changed. The consequent is false, since
then God could be deceived. It follows from
this that these contingent things are
necessary. [This] consequent is false.

2a. Ad oppositum questionis
arguitur: nullum contingens ad
utrumlibet est quod non scit, igitur
etc. Antecedens probo, quia si detur
oppositum et sit A illud futurum
contingens ad utrumlibet quod non

2a. In opposition to the question it may be
argued: no contingent thing is such that
[God] does not know [it], therefore, etc. I
prove the antecedent: [Proof:] if the
opposite is granted – so that A is some
future contingent thing that God does not

169

The Latin text is transcribed from the complete edition prepared by Jean-François Genest in “Le De futuris
contingentibus de T. Bradwardine,” Recherches Augustiniennes vol. 14, 249 - 336. The paragraph
numbering is also that of Genest. Unless noted otherwise, I have adhered to Genest’s editorial decisions
throughout. Because I am not including Genest’s editorial notes, no copyright infringement is entailed by
this use. In continental Europe (which is where the edition was created), critical editions are only covered
by copyright for thirty years — it is now thirty-seven years since this edition was published — and in
Canada, only the critical apparatus of an edition (not the text itself) is ever covered by copyright. (See
Thomas Margoni and Mark Perry, ‘Scientific and Critical Editions of Public Domain Works: An Example of
European Copyright Law (Dis)Harmonization’, Canadian Intellectual Property Review 27, no. 1 (2011):
157–170.) The translation is entirely my own. I have completed a draft translation of the entire treatise, but
in the interest of space, am only including excerpts in the present document (the entire treatise, in the
present format, is over one hundred pages in length).
170
“Ad utrumlibet” is a virtually untranslatable term which designates those contingent things which are
really likely to turn out one or the other of two (or possibly more) possible ways; it is used in contrast with
ut in pluribus and ut in paucioribus or ut raro contingencies, which are events which, though technically
contingent, are practically speaking almost certain to happen (or not to happen, respectively). Throughout
the remainder of the text, I will typically leave ad utrumlibet untranslated, or even omit it in the English
entirely, unless a point is being made which rests on the distinction between ad utrumlibet, ut in pluribus,
and ut in paucioribus/ut raro contingencies. Some other translators of medieval sources have rendered the
phrase “indefinite contingency” or “contingency (-) in (-) either (-) of (-) two (-) ways”; I find the former
imports too much technical baggage which may or may not be present in the original context, while the latter
is extremely cumbersome. In almost all instances of its use in this text, plain old “contingency” will do the
job just fine.
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scit, et arguitur sic: A erit quia est
futurum, igitur Deus sciet A esse
quando erit actu existens; et non per
ipsum A hoc sciet, quia sic sciencia
sua acquireretur sibi ex nobis171 ;
igitur sequitur quod sciet A esse
quando erit per essenciam suam hoc
representantem sibi quando A erit;
et si sic, igitur sequitur quod
essencia sua non representat A esse,
nec fore, nec preteritum esse nunc,
et postea representabit A esse; et sic
sequitur quod essencia sua mutatur.
Consequens est falsum.

know – it may be argued as follows: A will
be, since it is future, thus God will know A to
be when A does in fact exist; and he will
know this not through A itself, since then
his knowledge would itself be acquired from
us171 ; it therefore follows that God will
know A to be when it is represented to God
through God’s own essence when A will
exist; and if so, then it follows that God’s
essence does not now represent A to be, nor
to be going to be, nor to have been, and yet
later it represents that A is; and so it follows
that God's essence is changed. [This]
consequent is false.

2b. Similiter sic: sequitur quod
essencia divina non representaret
res esse naturaliter, sed voluntarie.
Consequens est falsum, quia si
voluntarie, igitur prius voluit
essenciam suam sic illam rem
representare sibi per aliam
mensuram; et cum non sit major
racio quare prius per aliam
mensuram quam ab eterno, sequitur
quod ab eterno hoc representavit; et
habetur propositum.

2b. Similarly, then: it follows that the
divine essence would not naturally
represent that a thing is [i.e., through the
nature of the divine essence], but wilfully
[through its will]. [This] consequent is false,
since if it were wilful, then it previously
willed its own essence, so that thing
represents itself by means of another
measure; and since there is no more reason
why [this should happen] first through
another measure than from eternity, it
follows that this representation is from
eternity; and we have the proposition.

2c. Confirmatur, quia aliter
aliquando esset magis sciens et
aliquando minus, scilicet quando scit
rem esse quam prius quando non
scit rem esse; et sic aliquando erit
magis perfectus, aliquando minus
perfectus. Consequens est falsum.

2c. [This] is confirmed, since otherwise
[God's] knowledge would at one time be
greater and at another time less; indeed,
God would at one time know something to
be that he did not know to be at a prior
time; and so God would at one time be more
perfect, and at another time less perfect.
This consequent is false.

2d. Similiter sequitur quod A non
cadit sub providencia Dei et
conservacione sua. Consequens est
falsum. Et similiter, si A sit aliquis

2d. It similarly follows that A [i.e., a future
contingent thing] does not fall under the
providence and keeping of God. [This]
consequent is false. And similarly, if A were

171

Here, it is assumed that A is some action of the (human) will, and so this is why God’s knowledge would
be “acquired from us.”
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homo, sequitur quod aliquis homo
potest esse de numero electorum
qui ab eterno non fuit electus.
Consequens est falsum. Et sic de
reprobatis.

to be some person, it follows that a person
who was not elect from eternity, could be
numbered among the elect. [This]
consequent is false. And so too [with a
person who is] among the reprobate.

2e. Similiter sequitur quod Deus
non ageret ad productionem A, vel
sequitur quod si agat, agit
necessario ad productionem; quia, si
libere agat ad productionem A,
igitur, quando A non fuit, cognovit A
fore, et pari racione ab eterno
cognovit A fore.

2e. It similarly follows that God does not
act to produce A, or it follows that if God did
so act, God would act necessarily to produce
[A]; because, if God were to freely act to
produce A, then when A did not exist, God
would have been aware that A was going to
exist, and by similar reasoning, God would
have been aware from eternity that A was
going to be.

2f. Item Deus scit multa futura,
quia omnes operactiones nostras
bonas et malas, quia aliter non sciret
illas premiare et punire; sic pari
racione scit omnia futura.
Antecedens patet, quia prophete
sciebant multa futura, igitur et Deus,
quia aliter non foret Deus
perfectissimus qui potest esse.

2f. In the same way God knows many
future things, because [God knows] all of
our good and bad deeds, since otherwise he
would not know which to reward and which
to punish; and so by the same reasoning,
God knows all future things. [This]
antecedent holds: since prophet[s] know
many future things, therefore also so does
God, since otherwise God would not be the
most perfect being that can be.

2g. Similiter sequitur quod non
debemus Deum racionabiliter orare
pro futuris.

2g. It similarly follows that, rationally, we
ought not to pray to God for future things.

2h. Similiter sic sequitur quod
homo purus plura scit quam Deus
scit, quia futura.172

2h. It similarly follows, in another way,
that a [being that is] purely human knows
more than God knows, since [the person
knows] future things.172

2i. Similter sequitur quod Deus
potest decipi et errare credendo
illud non esse quod est, quia non

2i. It similarly follows that God can be
deceived and err by believing that
something does not exist which does, since
he does not have knowledge, at the time

172

In this reductio argument, Bradwardine seems to mean that even non-divine human beings have
knowledge of some things in the future (by means of anticipation, inductively learned by experience): when I
see a dark storm cloud approaching, I know that it will rain. So if God truly knows nothing that is future,
then he would know even less than his creatures.
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habet scienciam, quando non est, de that it does not exist, of that non-existent
illo non esse.173
thing.173
2j. Similiter sequitur sic quod illud 2j. It similarly follows, in another way, that
psalmi esset verum ad litteram:
this Psalm would be true when it says: “The
“Non videbit Dominus, nec intelliget Lord will not see, nor will the God of Jacob
Deus Jacob” (Ps. 93.7).174
understand” (Ps. 93/94.7).174
<Prima opinio>

<First opinion>

3a. In ista questione est una opinio
que ponit quod nihil est futurum.
Quod probatur sic: futurum nihil est,
igitur, per conversionem, nihil est
futurum. Antecedens patet, quia
futurum distinctum contra presens
nulla res est.

3a. Concerning this question, there is an
opinion put forward that nothing is future.
This is proven as follows: the future is
nothing, and therefore, by conversion,
nothing is future. The antecedent holds,
since the future is distinguished from the
present [by the fact that] nothing [future] is.

…

…

4. Sed contra istam opinionem
arguitur sic: hec opinio destruit
illam opinionem que ponit tria
tempora, scilicet preteritum, presens
et futurum. Similiter dyalecticam,
que ponit futura contingencia ad
utrumlibet, et scienciam naturalem,
que ponit plura evenire a casu, et
medicinam et astronomiam, que
docent judicare de futuris, et
propheciam et revelacionem, que
sunt de futuris. Hec igitur opinio est
falsa. Respondetur igitur ad
argumenta.
…

4. But against this opinion it may be
argued as follows: this opinion destroys that
opinion which holds [there to be] three
times, namely, past, present, and future. By
a similar logic, which holds there to be
future contingents; and natural knowledge,
which holds many things to come about by
chance; and medicine and astronomy, which
show how to determine future things; and
prophecy and revelation, which are about
future things. This opinion is therefore
false. The argument is therefore answered.

<Secundo opinio>

<Second opinion>

9a. Secunda opinio in ista
questione est quod aliquod est
futurum, sed illud non potest esse,
173
174

…

9a. The second opinion on this question is
that something is future, but cannot exist,
since the future, when it is yet nothing, does

I take this to be an argument from God’s immutability.
This passage, in context, represents the false boast of an evildoer.
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quia futurum, cum nihil sit, non
habet aliquam potenciam et ita non
habet aliquod posse.

not have any power, and so does not have
any ability.

b. Sed respondetur cum Anselmo
quod aliquid dicitur posse esse
respectu hujus verbi “esse”, non quia
ipsum potest esse per potenciam
suam, sed per aliam potenciam, et
ita mundus potuit esse antequam
fuit. Et ita est in proposito.

b. But one responds along with Anselm
that something is said to be able to exist
with respect to this word “to exist,” not
because it itself is able to exist through its
own power, but through the power of
another; and so the world was able to exist
before it was made. And so it is in the
proposition.

c. Sed contra : tunc eadem racione
potest vere concedi quod dominus
potest edificare domum, quia alius
potest edificare domum.
Consequens est falsum.

c. But against this: by that same reasoning
it could be truly conceded that the Lord is
able to make the Lord, since another [thing]
can make the Lord. This consequent is false.

d. Respondetur negando
consequenciam, sed tamen posset
esse sic universaliter: domus potest
esse, igitur aliquis potest facere
quod domus sit.

d. One responds by denying the inference
made — the Lord is able to exist, therefore
something else is able to make it that the
Lord would be — even though it still can
still be so universally.

<Tercia opinio>

<Third opinion>

10. Tercia opinio est quod hec est
vera : 'aliquod futurum ad
utrumlibet est futurum vel non
futurum”, ut accipitur in sensu
composito, sed hec: “aliquid est
futurum”, similiter hec : “aliquid non
est futurum”, nec est vera, nec faIsa,
quia nulla talis in sensu divisa de
futuro est vera vel falsa. Et hoc patet
per Philosophum, qui dicit quod de
futuris contingentibus non est
veritas determinata. Et per
consequens nulla talis in sensu
divisa est vera vel

10. The third opinion is that this is true:
“Some ad utrumlibet [contingent] future
thing is going to be or is not going to be,”
when taken in the compounded sense, but
this sentence: “Something is going to be”,
and similarly this sentence: “Something is
not going to be”, is neither true, nor false,
since no such [proposition] concerning the
future is true or false in the divided sense.
And this holds through [the teaching of] the
Philosopher, who says that, concerning
future contingents, truth is not determined.
And consequently, no such [proposition] is
true or false in the divided sense, since [for]
every true thing it is true that it is, and for
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falsa, quia omne verum est verum
quod est, et omne tale est
determinate verum etc.

every such thing, it is determinately true,
etc.

11. Sed respondetur primo racioni
huic, et post arguetur contra
opinionem istam : quia Philosophus
non vult per hoc plus habere nisi
quod nulla talis est nobis nota esse
vera loquendo naturaliter, eo quod
potest esse et non esse et contingens
est. Sed non vult dicere quod hec
non est vera : “aliquid est futurum”
nec “aliquid non est futurum” tum
quia secundum Philosophum de
quolibet quod est, erit vel fuit dicitur
affirmacio vel negacio et de nullo
eorum ambo175 ; igitur, cum plura
erunt que non sunt, sequitur
propositum quod hec est vera :
“aliquid est futurum”.

11. But one replies to this first argument
(and will afterwards argue against this
opinion) because the Philosopher means by
that no more than that no such
[proposition] is known to us to be true
(naturally speaking), in that it can be and
not be and is contingent. But he does not
want to say that neither “Something is going
to be” nor “Something is not going to be” is
true, because according to the Philosopher
concerning whatever is, will be, or was, it
may be asserted in either the affirmative or
in the negative, but never both175 ; therefore,
since many things will be that do not [now]
exist, it follows that the proposition
“Something is going to be” is true.

…

…

c. Similiter sic sequitur quod Deus
nihil presciret nisi sub disjunctione,
et sic scit quilibet ydiota ; igitur.

c. It similarly follows that God would
foreknow nothing, except under a disjuntion
– and any idiot knows in that way!
Therefore, [etc.].

…

…
<Quarta opinio>

<Fourth opinion>

13a. Quarta est opinio que ponit
aliquid esse futurum ad utrumlibet,
sed illud non semper fuit vel est
futurum, sed quod potest incipere
esse futurum ; quia aliquod potest
esse quod non erit, igitur aliquid
potest esse futurum quod non est
nunc futurum.176 Et sit illud A et

13a. The fourth opinion is the one that
supposes something to be an ad utrumlibet
future [contingent], but that it was not
always or is [not always] going to be [a
future thing], but rather, that it can begin to
be going to be; since something is able to be
that will not be, therefore something can be
future176 that is not currently future. Let

175
176

Here Bradwardine asserts the principle of bivalence and the law of the excluded middle.
Or “going to be,” similarly throughout.
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arguitur sic : A potest esse futurum
et A non est nunc futurum, igitur A
potest incipere esse futurum.
Consequencia patet per
exposicionem de li ' incipit '.

such a thing be A, and argue as follows: A
can be future, and A is not currently future;
therefore, A can begin to be future. The
consequence holds by the definition of the
word “begin”.

…

…

14a. Sed contra per Philosophum :
" Non refert dicere per millesimum
annum aliquid esse futurum vel
quantumcumque tempus”. Igitur
futurum non incipit esse futurum.

14a. But against this, according to the
Philosopher, “It doesn't matter [whether]
you say a thousand years, or however much
time, for something to be future”. Therefore
something that is going to be does not begin
to be future.

b. Item si aliquod futurum aliquo
tempore incipiat esse futurum, sit
gracia exempli quod A futurum
incipiat esse futurum in B tempore
vel instanti, et arguitur sic : A incipit
esse futurum in B instanti futuro,
igitur A erit futurum in B instanti
futuro, et si sic, igitur A non incipiet
(or “incepit”) esse futurum in B
futuro. Sic arguitur de quolibet
instanti futuro et tamen post nunc A
est futurum, et sic arguitur quod A
nunquam incipit [esse futurum] vel
incipiet esse futurum.

b. Similarly if something future begins to
be future at some point in time, consider the
example that A, a future thing, begins to be
future at the time or instant B, and then
argue as follows: A begins to be future at the
future instant B, therefore A will be future
at the future instant B; and if this is so, then
A does not begin to be future at the future
[instant] B. If so it is argued from whatever
future instant, and at each subsequent one,
A is going to be. And so it is argued that A
never begins, nor will begin, to be future.

…

…
<Quinto opinio>

<Fifth opinion>

16a. Quinta est opinio quod aliquid
est futurum contingens ad
utrumlibet, sed illud non prescitur a
Deo, quia si sic, sciencia Dei potest
falli et Deus potest decipi, quod est
falsum.

16a. The fifth is the opinion that
something is an ad utrumlibet future
contingent, but that thing is not foreknown
by God, since if it were, God's knowledge
could fail and God could be deceived, which
is false.

b. Confirmatur per
Commentatorem in De sompno [sic]
et vigilia, quod sompnia vera non

b. This is confirmed by the Commentator
in the treatise On sleeping and waking, that
dreams are not really in us except for those
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sunt in nobis nisi de illis que
that happen for the most part [or which
accidunt in majori parte, et ideo non usually occur], and therefore do not concern
de futuris contingentibus ad
ad utrumlibet future contingents.177
utrumlibet.177
…

…

d. Sed ad ista argumenta
respondebitur post, dicendo ad
questionem.

d. But this argument will be dealt with
after we have discussed the question.

<Sexta opinio>

<Sixth opinion>

17. Sexta est opinio que ponit quod
nihil est Deo futuram, licet plura sint
futura in propriis naturis ; et hec est
opinio Anselmi, qui dicit quod Deus
non habet proprie prescienciam
aliquarum rerum ab eo scitarum, eo
quod omnia futura sunt sibi
presencia.

17. The sixth is the opinion that holds that
nothing is future for God, although it allows
that many things would be future with
respect to their own natures; and this is the
opinion of Anselm, who says that God does
not properly have foreknowledge of
anything that is known by him, since all
future things are present to him.

…

…
<Septima opinio>

20. Septima opinio est que ponit
quod nihil est futurum contingens
ad utrumlibet, sed omnia que
eveniunt, necessario eveniunt. Sed
ista opinio est tam contra
philosophiam quam theologiam,
ideo hic illa non reprobatur.
<Octava opinio>
21. Octava opinio est que ponit
quod aliquod est futurum
contingens ad utrumlibet et
prescitum a Deo in isto instanti
presenti, et quod tamen possibile est
177

<Seventh opinion>
20. The seventh opinion is that which
posits that nothing is an ad utrumlibet
future contingent, but that all things that
happen, happen of necessity. But this
opinion is so entirely contrary to both
philosophy and theology, that it will not be
refuted here.
<Eighth opinion>
21. The eighth opinion posits that
something is going to happen contingently
ad utrumlibet and is foreknown by God in
this present instant, but that it is possible,
even for this present instant, that it could

The significance of this reference, and how it relates to the opinion at hand, is obscure to me.
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pro isto instanti presenti quod non
sit futurum nec prescitum a Deo,
ymmo quod nunquam fuerit
futurum nec prescitum a Deo.

not be going to be, nor foreknown by God –
nay, even more, that at no time was it ever
going to be, nor [was it] foreknown by God.

22a. Sed contra sic : sequitur quod
possibile est quod aliquod sit
futurum quod nunc non est futurum.
Consequens est falsum, quia, si sic,
ponatur illud instans in esse, et sit A
, et arguitur sic : A est futurum nunc,
et prius non fuit futurum, igitur
mutatur de non futuro ad futurum;
et non sic mutatur propter
mutacionem in seipso, cum non sit
adhuc ; igitur oportet quod, si A
mutatur, sit propter mutacionem in
alio. Consequens est falsum, quia sic
arguitur de possibili quod A potest
mutari de non futuro ad futurum
sicut arguitur de inesse.

22a. But against this, consider the
following: it follows that it is possible that
something would be going to be that is not
now going to be. This consequent is false,
since, if it were so [the following argument
could be made]: Suppose that it is now that
instant [in the future], and [suppose] that A
would [happen]; it may then be argued as
follows: A is now going to be, and previously
A was not going to be, therefore it is
changed from not-going-to-be to
going-to-be; and it is not changed because
of a change in itself (since it did not exist
before now); it is therefore the case that, if
A is changed, it is because of a change in
something else. This consequent is false,
since in the same way that it has just been
argued concerning possibility that A can be
changed from not-going-to-be to
going-to-be, so too could it be argued
concerning [A’s] essence.

…

…

23a. Secundo ad principale sic : si
Deus habet prescienciam futurorum
contingencium ad utrumlibet,
sequitur quod Deus potest velle et
pramittere oppositum nunc sciti,
promissi et voliti ab eo. Consequens
est falsum, quia sic Deus potest
mutari de scitis, volitis et promissis,
quod est contra
illud Malachie 3° [Malachi 3.6] : «
Ego Dominus et non mutor»; et ita
sequitur quod non erit sic sicut Deus
promisit vel voluit fore, igitur Deus
mutatur.

23a. Secondly, [one objects] to the
principal [argument] in this way: If God has
foreknowledge of ad utrumlibet future
contingents, it follows that God can will and
promise the opposite of what is now known,
promised, and willed by him. This
consequent is false, since in this way God
could be changed with respect to
knowledge, will, and promises, which is
contrary to what is said in Malachi 3 [v. 6]:
“I am the LORD, and I do not change”; and
so it follows that [if] it will not be just as
God has promised or has willed it to be,
then God is changed.
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24a. Tercio sic ad principale : si
quodlibet futurum potest non esse
futurum, igitur sequitur quod de
futuris non potest esse aliqua
revelacio in Verbo. Consequens est
falsum et consequencia patet, quia si
sic, sequitur quod preteritum potest
non esse preteritum, et qui decessit
in peccato mortali potest non
decessisse in peccato mortali, et sic
de illo qui decessit in caritate potest
non etc., et sic dampnatus potest
nunquam fuisse dampnatus et
salvatus nunquam fuisse salvatus.
Consequens est falsum, igitur. Hec
consequencia patet, posito quod A
videat in Verbo B fore et quod
precipiatur sub pena peccati
mortalis quod predicet et affirmet
illud quod vidit in Verbo, et non
aliud vel alia quam omnia illa que
videt in Verbo. Tunc ponatur quod A
predicet B fore futurum, et quod pro
illa predicacione et obediencia
salvetur et aliter non. Tunc arguitur
sic : possibile est B non evenire,
igitur possibile est ipsum non
predixisse B fore futurum ; et per
consequens, si salvetur pro illa
predicacione precise, possibile est
ipsum non esse salvatum. Et sic
sequitur propositum, scilicet quod
preteritum potest non esse
preteritum et hujusmodi, quia si B
non est futurum, ille sic non vidit in
Verbo B fore futurum, et per
consequens non sic predixit, nec pro
isto salvatur per consequens; igitur
etc.

24a. Thirdly, [it may be objected] in this
way to the principle [argument]: if whatever
is going to be can be not going to be, then it
follows that, with respect to the future, it
cannot be something revealed in the Word
[i.e., by God]. This consequent is false, but
the consequence holds, since if it were so
[that whatever is going to be can be not
going to be], it would follow that what has
already happened can have not happened,
[so for example] someone who died in
mortal sin can have not died in mortal sin,
and so also someone who died in a state of
grace can have not died in a state of grace,
and so also a damned person can not ever
have been damned, and a saved person can
not ever have been saved. This consequent
is therefore false. But the consequence
holds: I suppose that A sees in the Word
[i.e., has a vision from God] that B is about
to be, and that it would be expected, under
penalty of mortal sin, that A would foretell
and affirm what A sees in the Word, and
[would foretell] nothing other than what A
sees in the Word. Then suppose that A
foretells that B is going to be, and that
through [sharing] this prediction and
through obedience [A] is saved, and
otherwise [A] is not [saved]. Then it may be
argued as follows: it is possible for B not to
happen, therefore it is possible for [A] not to
have foretold that B was going to be; and
consequently, if [A] is saved precisely
because of [A’s] foretelling, it is possible for
[A] not to have been saved. And so the
proposition follows, namely, that the past
can not be the past [i.e., can not have
happened], and other things of this sort,
since if B is not going to be, [A] did not see
in the Word [that] B is about to be going to
be, and consequently, [A] did not foretell it
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to be so, nor, consequently, was [A] saved
because of this [foretelling]; therefore, etc.
…

…

33a. <Duodecimum ad principale>.
Item necessaria sciencia et
necessaria voluntas perfectior est
sciencia contingenti et voluntate
contingenti, sicut necessitas
simpliciter perfectior est
contingencia. Igitur necessaria
sciencia rerum et necessaria
voluntas est attribuenda Deo.
Antecedens patet, quia contingencia
includit potenciam et per
consequens imperfectionem.
Consequencia patet per Anselmum.

33a. <The twelfth argument to the first.>
In the same way, necessary knowledge and
necessary will are more perfect than
contingent knowledge and contingent will,
just as necessity is in itself more perfect
than contingency. Necessary knowledge of a
thing and necessary will are therefore
attributed to God. The antecedent holds,
since contingency includes potency [for the
opposite], and consequently [potency for]
imperfection. The consequence holds
according to Anselm.

…

…

35a. <Quartum decimum ad
principale.> Item si necessitas in
volicione Dei excluderetur, hoc
maxime foret propter libertatem
arbitrii ; sed illa necessitas in nullo
repugnat libero arbitrio ; igitur
propter hoc non debet excludi a
voluntate Dei quoad operaciones
ejus ad extra et ad intra. Minor patet
loquendo de libertate
contradictionis ad utramque partem,
quia illa libertas non est ponenda in
Deo nec in beatis ; igitur propter
illam in nullo debet excludi a Deo
necessitas in sua actione, quia illa
potestas contradictionis non est
pars libertatis nec pertinet ad
libertatem, secundum quod innuit
Anselmus dicens : « Qui liberior est ?
Deus et beatus, qui non possunt
peccare et possunt non peccare, an
[quam?] libertas nostra qua
possumus peccare et non peccare? ».

35a. <The fourteenth argument to the
first.> Similarly, if necessity were excluded
from God's volition, this would be mostly
due to freedom of choice. But this necessity
is in no way incompatible with free choice;
therefore, because of this, it ought not to be
excluded from the will of God, as far as his
internal and external actions. This is less the
case in speaking of freedom for
contradictories ad utrumque partem [i.e.,
the freedom to act in either of two ways],
since this sort of freedom is not held by God,
nor by the blessed; therefore, it follows that
necessity ought in no way to be excluded
from God in his action, since that power for
contradictories is not part of freedom, nor
does it pertain to freedom, according to
what Anselm indicates by saying: “Who is
more free? God and the blessed ones, who
cannot sin and can [only] not sin, [are more
free than us by] our freedom, by which we
can sin and not sin.” It therefore follows that
necessity, but not coercion, is compatible
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Igitur sequitur quod cum vera
libertate stat necessitas, sed non
coactio, quia hec sibi repugnat.

with true liberty, since coercion is not
compatible with God.

…

…
<Nona opinio>

<Ninth opinion>

39. Alia est opinio in ista
questione, quod illa sunt necessaria
que Deus predixit fore, sed alia
futura non.

39. Another opinion regarding this
question, [holds] that those things which
God predicted would happen are necessary,
but other future things are not [necessary].

40a. Sed quia verbum Dei
extrinsecum,178 tum mediate vel
immediate dictum, non plus obligat
Deum ad aliquid faciendum vel non
faciendum quam Verbum ejus
intrinsecum, igitur sequitur, cum
Deus ab eterno dixit omnia futura
fore Verbo intrinseco, sequitur quod
omnia futura sunt necessaria, vel
quod illa futura non sunt necessaria
que Deus dixit verbo extrinseco
mediate vel immediate.

40a. But since the extrinsic178 word of God,
once it has been declared mediately or
immediately, no more obliges God to make
or not make something than does his
intrinsic Word, it therefore follows that,
when God spoke all future things into being
from eternity by the intrinsic Word, then all
future things that God spoke by the extrinsic
work, mediately or immediately, would be
necessary.

…

…

g. Item super illo verbo : «Ecce
virgo concipiet» etc., dicit glosa quod
hoc non est ut Christus impleret
prophecias, sed e contrario quod
ideo erant prophetata quia Christus
erat sic facturus; igitur sequitur
quod prophecia vel verbum
extrinsecum non est causa rerum
futurarum, sed e contrario etc.

g. Similarly, on this passage -- “Behold, a
virgin shall conceive”, etc. -- it says in the
gloss that this is not in order that Christ
would fulfil the prophecies, but rather the
contrary, that they were prophesying in this
way because Christ was to be born in this
way; it therefore follows that the prophecies
or the extrinsic word are not the cause of
the future things, but rather the contrary,
etc.

178

In distinguishing between the extrinsic and intrinsic Word of God, I take Bradwardine to be making a
distinction between God’s spoken word, outwardly declared, and the Wisdom or Word of God that is the
Second Person of God’s own Triune self.
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<Responsio propria ad questionem>

<The proper response to the question>

41. Nunc respondetur ad
questionem qua queritur utrum
Christus, qui est Deus, habeat
prescienciam omnium futurorum
contingencium ad utrumlibet,
dicendo quod sic ; et ad principalem
racionem, quando arguebatur sic :
igitur habet scienciam omnium
futurorum contingencium ad
utrumlibet, concedo consequenciam
et consequens.

41. Now to respond to the question that
was asked, whether Christ, who is God, has
foreknowledge of all ad utrumlibet future
contingents, I say that it is so; and to the
first argument, when it is argued in this way
— “therefore he has knowledge of all ad
utrumlibet future contingents” — I concede
the consequence and the consequent.

42a. Sed contra : sic aliqua forent
contingencia ad utrumlibet.

42a. But against this: if this were the case,
there would be some ad utrumlibet future
contingents.

b. Respondetur concedendo
conclusionem .

b. One responds by conceding the
conclusion.

c. Contra: sic igitur sciencia Dei
potest falli et per consequens Deus
potest falli et decipi et errare.

c. Against this: if this were the case, it
would follow that the knowledge of God
could fail, and consequently, God could fail
and be deceived and err.

d. Respondetur consequenciam
negando et conclusionem quoad
omnes partes ejus. Et cum arguitur
contra sic : A est aliquod futurum
contingens ad utrumlibet quod Deus
in illo instanti presenti prescit fore,
et arguitur sic : A non erit et Deus
prescit A fore, igitur Deus prescit
aliquod fore futurum quod non erit,
et per consequens quod non est
futurum, et per consequens Deus
errat illa presciencia, et per
consequens decipitur et sua sciencia
fallitur : antecedens est possibile et
consequencia est bona, igitur et
consequens est possibile, --respondetur negando antecedens.

d. One responds by denying the
consequence and the conclusion in all of
their parts. And when it is argued against
this in the following way — “Suppose A is
some ad utrumlibet future contingent that
God in this instant foreknows what will
happen, then this follows: A will not be, and
God will foreknow A to be future, therefore
God foreknows something to be future that
in fact will not be, and consequently [God
knows something] that is not in fact future,
and consequently God errs in this
foreknowledge, and so is deceived, and is
failed by his knowledge: the antecedent is
possible and the consequence is good, so
therefore the consequent is possible” — one
responds to this argument by denying the
antecedent.
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e. Contra : A potest non fore et
e. Against this: A could not be going to be,
Deus prescit A fore, igitur A non fore and God might foreknow A to be going to
est possibile.
be; therefore it is possible for A to not be
going to be.
f. Respondetur distinguendo
potenciam, seu possibile, eo quod
duplex est, quia quedam est
absoluta, quedam ordinata ; et
expono quid intelligo per potenciam
absolutam et per potenciam
ordinatam. Potencia absoluta est illa
potencia ordinata, sed tamen est
potencia absoluta ut indeterminata
est ad utramque partem
contradictionis; et potencia ordinata
est illa eadem ut est determinata ad
alteram partem contradictionis
tantum . Et potencia absoluta in
causa superiori, scilicet in Deo, est
potencia sua ordinata non ut est
ordinata ad alteram partem
contradictionis tantum, sed ut est
infinita et non determinata vel
ordinata ad alteram partem . Et
potencia ejus ordinata est potencia
absoluta, scilicet infinita, et non ut
indeterminata ad alteram partem
contradictionis tantum, sed ut
determinata per suam justiciam et
misericordiam et voluntatem, ut ad
producendum aliquid ad extra,
immediate vel mediate, vel ad
salvandum. Et similiter dicitur de
potencia in causa inferiori, scilicet
creatura, que non est sed potest esse
in futurum , vel quod est et potest
aliquid facere in futurum , sicut nunc
distinguitur de potencia in causa
superiori, scilicet Deo ; quia in causa
inferiori duplex est potencia, scilicet
absoluta, que de se non est
determinata plus ad esse quam ad

f. One replies by drawing a distinction
regarding power, or what is possible, in that
it is of two sorts; for one sort is absolute, the
other ordained. And I [now] explain what I
mean by absolute power and by ordained
power. Absolute power is that [same]
ordained power; but it is absolute power
insofar as it is undetermined relative to
each part of a contradiction. And ordained
power is that [same] power, insofar as it is
determined relative to only one (or the
other) part of a contradiction. And absolute
power in the superior cause — namely, in
God — is his ordained power, not insofar as
it is ordained relative to only one (or the
other) part of a contradiction, but as it is
infinite and not determined or ordained
relative to one (or the other) part [of a
contradiction]. And his ordained power is
[his] absolute – that is, infinite – power, not
as undetermined relative to one (or the
other) part of a contradiction, but as
determined in virtue of his justice, and his
mercy, and his will – for example, for
producing something besides himself,
immediately or mediately, or for saving [a
person]. And it may be said in the same way
of power in an inferior cause – namely,
[power in] a creature (which is not now, but
can be in the future; or which is now, and
can do something in the future) — similarly
to the distinction just made regarding
power in the superior cause, God. For there
are two sorts of power in an inferior cause:
[its] absolute [power] is that which in itself
is not determined relative to being, rather
than relative to not being, as long as [the
being or not being] is future, or relative to
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non esse quamdiu est futurum , vel
ad producendum aliquid in futurum
vel ad non producendum quamdiu
non est productum ; et potencia
ordinata est illa qua ordinatur ad
unam partem contradictionis
tantum, per causam superiorem,
scilicet Deum , vel per causam
inferiorem, scilicet creaturam.

producing something in the future or not
producing it as long as it has not been
produced; and [its] ordained power is that
by which it is ordained relative to only one
(or the other) part of a contradiction,
[whether] by the superior cause, God, or by
an inferior cause, a creature.

g. Nunc ad propositum, dico quod
A potest non fore de potencia
absoluta tam cause superioris quam
inferioris, quia A fore vel non fore in
nullo repugnat tali potencie in causa
superiori vel inferiori . Sed loquendo
de potencia ordinata cause
superioris et inferioris, sic dicitur
quod A non potest non fore nec
aliquod futurum, quia si illa potencia
A potest non fore, sequitur quod
Deus potest decipi et errare, et falli
potest ejus sciencia, et potest falsum
dicere et mentiri si Deus predixit A
fore mediate vel immediate.

g. Now in reply to the proposition at issue
[namely, the statement: “A can be not going
to be, and God foreknows that A will be;
therefore that A will not be is possible”,
where A is some future contingent], I say
that A can be not going to be in virtue of
absolute power, whether of the superior or
of an inferior cause. For that A is going to be
or not going to be is in no way incompatible
with such a power in the superior or in an
inferior cause. If, however, one is speaking
of the ordained power of the superior or of
an inferior cause, in that case one says that
A (or any future thing) cannot be not going
to be. For if by that power A can be not
going to be, it follows that God can be
deceived and can err, and that his
knowledge can be mistaken, and that he can
say what is false and a lie — if God has
predicted, mediately or immediately, that A
is going to be.

43a. Sed contra : quia de potencia
ordinata A non potest non fore,
igitur A non potest non fore.

43a. But against this: since in respect of
ordained power, A cannot be not going to
be, then A cannot be not going to be.

b. Respondetur negando
consequenciam et consequens, quia
de potencia absoluta tam cause
superioris quam inferioris A potest
non fore, et sequitur : de illa
potencia A potest non fore, igitur A
potest non fore.

b. One responds by denying the
consequence and the consequent, since in
respect of the absolute power of the
superior cause – as much as for the inferior
cause – A can be not going to be, and so it
follows: according to that power, A can be
not going to be; therefore, A can be not
going to be.
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63. . . . Et sic patet quod potencia
libera libertate contradictionis est in
quolibet viatore ; que quidem
potencia, licet non determinetur ad
actum priusquam habet actum
naturaliter per seipsam, nec per
aliquam causam creatam, tamen
determinatur ad actum suum prius
naturaliter per Deum. Qui est
benedictus in secula [seculorum].179
Amen.

63. . . . And it shows in this way that free
power, [in the sense of] freedom of
contradictories, is in any wayfarer; and this
power is a certain power, not determined to
act before it naturally has an act by itself,
nor by another created cause, yet naturally
determined to its own act in the first place
by God – Who is blessed for ever and ever,
world without end.179 Amen.

Explicit Bradwardus de futuris
contingentibus.

Here ends Bradwardine on future
contingents.

179

While not a literal translation, this reflects the traditional English rendering of “saecula saeculorum,” as in
the final line of the Gloria Patri (“Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost … and ever
shall be, world without end. Amen.”).
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